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A Christian Ontology of the Flesh: 
Word, Symbol, Performance 
 
Rozelle Bosch 
 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty responded to the loss of the body in the wake of Western philosophy after 
Rene Descartes by constructing a phenomenology of perception and an ontology of the flesh. His 
voice, although decidedly removed from the religious, is constantly brought into theological debate 
whether it be Judith Butler’s reading of Merleau-Ponty’s early lectures on Malebranche’s sensuous 
theology, or a reading of his phenomenology for theologies of embodiment by contemporary 
philosophers of religion.   
Within Christian theology, the body has experienced its own loss, or so contemporary critics 
of the Christian flesh suggest when they cast it as that which is either negated or riddled with 
dualism. In this line of critique, Paul and Augustine become figureheads for the loss of the 
Christian body. A new reading of Paul, Augustine and others at the hand of recent scholarship 
may, however, provide a different angle from which to approach the problem of the flesh. By 
defining the self as one who is informed by the senses, and thereby relationally ordered to created 
other and divine, perception becomes a new mode of approaching the Christian body. Here the 
focus is less on the absence of the body than the absence of a theological grammar of perception.  
Reading perception in relation to the life, death and resurrection of Christ, the Spirit’s union 
of the self to Christ and of God’s grounding persons in the life of the Trinity, sets the stage for a 
uniquely embodied expression of divine presence. Here an embodied theology advances the 
simultaneous holding of form and content, and of the embodied expression of the divine through 
word, symbol and performance. A new grammar of perception arises, in this instance, which places 
the body central to the Christian story and which refuses any binary, dualism or negation.  
  
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Soli Deo Gloria 
  
 5 
Contents 
 
Acknowledgements 
Declaration of originality and statement of length 
 
Chapter 1. Merleau-Ponty and the Loss of the Body in Philosophy   8 
Chapter 2. Towards a Positive Account of Pauline Flesh    38 
Chapter 3. Athanasius and God Incarnate      59 
Chapter 4. Augustine and the Logic of the Word Incarnate   81 
Chapter 5. Julian and the Passion       103 
Chapter 6. Dante and Performative Words      128 
Chapter 7. Synthesising the Body in Theology: Drawing Conclusions  156 
 
Bibliography          187 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 6 
Acknowledgements 
 
That this dissertation has moved through the stages of conceptualisation, production, and 
presentation, is a testament to those friends, family, church -, and academic communities who have 
supported me along the way.  
Without the generous funding of Cambridge Trust, it would not have been possible for me 
to study towards a doctorate at the Faculty of Divinity, Cambridge. I am grateful to each officer of 
the trust who engaged with me in an enthusiastic and encouraging manner. Financially, I also owe 
a word of gratitude to the Faculty of Divinity and Jesus College who responded to my 
conferencing, seminar, and travel plans positively. One often takes for granted the extent to which 
such funding opens the world of academia up to a young theologian. For that, I am thankful. 
Part of Cambridge culture is the support network that each college and faculty provides for 
their students. An unmistakable characteristic of Jesus College for me is their friendliness, 
personality, collegiality, and sportsmanship. To the tutorial office, I want to thank Vanessa 
Bowman and Louise Hind especially for their communications, their going the extra mile, and 
their efforts to welcome me in every circumstance. Part of the being a Jesuin, is partaking in Jesus 
Chapel. To the fellow chapel secretaries and clerks, a word of thanks. A word of thanks to Paul 
Dominiak for his lively conversations, his ‘pulling’ me into the College’s life, and his guidance 
throughout my time in Cambridge.  
The students and staff of the Faculty of Divinity have, likewise, enriched my thinking in 
innumerable ways. It is impossible for me to thank each student, staff, and lecturer individually, 
so I offer my thanks to all who contributed to my flourishing at the faculty. To Catherine Pickstock 
I am immensely grateful. She introduced me to the graduate research group Cambridge 
Interdisciplinary Performance Network (CIPN) at the Centre for the Arts, Social Sciences and 
Humanities (CRASSH) and served as faculty advisor during my lead-convening years. To the 
brainchild of CIPN, Clare Foster, I offer my thanks for supporting me in the philosophy and 
theology themed year we organised. She has taught me the art of interdisciplinarity and the ways 
in which one can creatively bring a diversity of disciplines around one table.  
For the opportunities to teach, present, and assist at the Faculty of Divinity, I wish to thank 
James Gardom, Emma Wild-Wood, Joel Cabrita, Tali Artman-Partock, Daniel Weiss and Andrew 
 7 
Davison. I also then thank those theological associations who have given me the opportunity to 
participate in and contribute to their forums: the Circle for Concerned African Women 
Theologians, the Society for the Study of Theology, the Institute for Imagination, Theology and 
the Arts in St Andrews, the Sutton Trust, the Centre for Studies in the Humanities and Social 
Sciences, the Theology from Below team, the Global Ecumenical Theological Institute, the Dutch 
Reformed Church in South Africa, and Wesley House.  
For those academics who have walked alongside me as friends, thank you to Robert 
Vosloo, Henry Mbaya, Sinenhlanhla Chisale, Juliana Claassens, Nadia Marais, Nina Muller van 
Velden, and especially Elna Mouton. I would do a great injustice to all those young theologians 
who have shaped my thinking were I to list a few. To all, I thank you for your kind encouragement, 
challenging conversations, and generosity of spirit. To those who have walked with me in a more 
personal capacity, I offer my thanks here too.  
I have incurred a tremendous debt to my supervisor, Janet Soskice. Throughout the years 
of authoring this dissertation, she has opened a world of thought to me that I would not have been 
exposed to otherwise. I thank her for her constant input, her kindness, and her continued support 
throughout my writing. It goes without saying that I take responsibility for any shortcomings this 
thesis may have.  
To those for whom words evade when wanting to express the depth of my appreciation, 
admiration, and love: Lauren Maggs, Elizma le Grange, Isabel Van Wyk, Michelle Burt and 
Annemarie De Kock-Malan, my thanks. And above all, my liefde en dank aan my liefling, ma en 
pa. Ek dra hierdie tesis op aan julle.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 8 
 
Chapter 1 
Merleau-Ponty and the Loss of the Body in Philosophy 
 
René Descartes’ philosophy of the mind marks the gradual loss of the body in Western 
philosophy.1 The philosopher’s theorising prioritised the mind with its immaterial nature over the 
body and its sense-perceptual engagements with the world, thereby approaching knowledge 
production in binary terms.2 A Cartesian epistemology distinguished between that which may be 
known with absolute certainty (that of the intellect, reason and will) and that which may be known 
with a relative or derived certainty (that of the senses, and subjective experience).3 This structuring 
of knowledge according to objective reason and subjective experience gave the illusion that the 
self can bracket its sense-perceptual engagements with the world.4 The resultant diminishing role 
of the subjective and experiential in knowledge production finally lead to the evacuation of the 
body in philosophy.  
For the French philosopher Merleau-Ponty, the loss of the body in philosophy needed 
recovery. By placing the body and its embodied engagements within the world central to his 
theorising, Merleau-Ponty set the stage for the return of the body to philosophy. Published as 
Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and Invisible (unfinished), Merleau-Ponty’s 
theorising developed at the hand of Edmund Husserl’s response to Descartes, and of Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s response to Husserl.5 Between Husserl and Sartre’s theorising, Merleau-Ponty developed 
 
1 Skirry, Justin. n.d. ‘René Descartes (1596-1650)’. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: A 
Peer-Reviewed Academic Resource. Accessed 15 April 2019. 
https://www.iep.utm.edu/descarte/#H4. 
2 Skirry, ‘René Descartes (1596-1650)’.  
3 Skirry, ‘René Descartes (1596-1650)’. 
4 For, writes Edgar, ‘…we do not realize just how Cartesian we are’., Edgar, Orion. 2016. Things 
Seen and Unseen. Oregon: Cascade Books., 5. Edgar lists these dualisms as that of ‘mind and 
body, form and matter, ideal and real, thought and things, freedom and causation, instinct and 
desire, animal and environment, body and world, telos and genesis, humanity and nature, and so 
on’. Edgar, Things Seen and Unseen., 1. 
5 Sartre’s existential phenomenology is one which focusses on human existence itself and less so 
on the existence of the world. In his philosophical masterpiece, Being and Nothingness, Sartre 
develops two sets of realities that ‘lie beyond our conscious experience: the being of the object of 
consciousness and that of consciousness itself. The object of consciousness exists as “in-itself”. 
An essential feature of consciousness is its negative experience: it exists “for-itself”.’ An essential 
feature of consciousness is its negative power, by which we can experience ‘nothingness.’ This 
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his own unique phenomenology of perception which embraced the complex network of 
relationships in which a person exists as a sense-perceptual self.6  
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is increasingly being employed by scholars in 
philosophy of religion. When stating the integrity of the world and humanity in relation to another, 
Andreas Nordlander in Figuring Flesh in Creation, reads Merleau-Ponty and Augustine together. 
He resources Merleau-Ponty’s ontology when constructing a creational ontology.7 When 
addressing the tension between transcendence and immanence, Nordlander in ‘The Wonder of 
Immanence’ engages Merleau-Ponty’s ontology with the logic of the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo.8 Whether the material exists in opposition to the spiritual and whether that casts humans in 
conflict with the divine, Orion Edgar’s Things Seen and Unseen reads the role of the flesh in 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology within the Christian category of the icon.9 In these cases, Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology renders new possibilities for thinking through dualisms which, like 
Western philosophy, underpin Western Christian theology. In its own attempt to straddle modern 
philosophical dualisms, Christian theology has relinquished the body that is so central to its 
Scriptures and doctrines.  
The reception of this modern theological problem has often gone hand in hand with the 
feminist concern that a Christian flesh exists in binaries.  Here, speech pertaining to life and death, 
 
power is also at work within the self, where it creates an intrinsic lack of self-identity. To the unity 
of the self is understood as a task for the for-itself rather than as a given.’ Onof, Christian. n.d. 
‘Jean Paul Sartre: Existentialism’. In Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Accessed 23 
November 2016. http://www.iep.utm.edu/sartre-ex/. 
6 I employ the term ‘sense-perceptual self’ as a means of describing a person whose understanding 
of the world is mediated by the information which comes to that person through the senses and its 
perceptions, as well as the processing of such information through apprehension and 
comprehension. The logic of apprehension and comprehension will be the focus of Chapter 4 
where Malcolm Guite’s, Faith, Hope and Poetry: Theology and the Poetic Imagination, provides 
a new lens for reading the relationship between words and the Word.  
7 Nordlander, Andreas. 2011. Figuring Flesh in Creation. Merleau-Ponty in Conversation with 
Philosophical Theology. Sweden: Lund University. 
8 Nordlander, Andreas. 2013. ‘The Wonder of Immanence: Merleau-Ponty and the Problem of 
Creation’. Modern Theology 29 (2): 104–23. 
9 For Edgar, parallels exist between an incarnational logic in Merleau-Ponty’s theorising of the 
body, and the Christian understanding of embodied existence in light of the doctrine of the 
incarnation. Edgar continues, ‘Merleau-Ponty’s logic is incarnational in the sense that it takes as 
its icon the flesh, a supposed “union of opposites” which, inasmuch as it succeeds in uniting them, 
announces their originary individuation and the possibility of their transformation’. Edgar, Things 
Seen and Unseen., 2.  
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spiritual and physical, body and soul, takes on a competitive tone as though the entities exist 
mutually exclusive from another. Exchanging the complementary for the competitive, means that 
speech that relates to the relationship of human and divine becomes hyper-spiritual and loosed 
from its embodied moorings. A flesh constructed upon such binaries loses the body which is so 
central to Christian theology and its literature. The dominant concern that thus arises from any 
dualistic reading of the body, is the loss of the subjective and experiential means by which a person 
can know the divine in their embodied circumstance.  
Neglecting a corporeal mode of perceiving the divine results in the concomitant loss of 
words to describe the transformation of the self in the face of the divine. Each person has a set of 
words that serves to describe what their senses perceive. The use of these words forms patterns of 
thinking that shapes the way the world presents itself to a person. The words that thus founds a 
person’s description of the world, this dissertation suggests, is a certain type of grammar – one 
which by definition implicates the senses as well as the world in which it exists.  
When speaking of a corporeal grammar then one is referring to a vocabulary that holds 
visible and invisible simultaneously. The usefulness of the term ‘corporeal grammar’ comes to 
play where abstract and corporeal perpetually meet, especially in theological description since 
theology (theo-logos) concerns speech as it pertains to God. Furthermore, to remove the body (the 
foundation of all grammar) from theological speech is to ignore a central part of the Christian 
narrative. The recovery of the body in theology starts with the very fact that God created persons 
in the flesh, and that the very same God was born of that flesh through the virgin Mary.  
Rendering the possibilities that arise between the materiality of existence and the revelation 
of God in the incarnation, starts with a reading of Merleau-Ponty’s writings. His theorising, in its 
construction of a phenomenology of perception and an ontology of the flesh, provides a 
philosophical framework that brings embodied existence in relation to self and other. While 
Merleau-Ponty was decidedly non-religious in his thinking, his understanding of perception and 
the ways in which it structures how and what persons know, provides new possibilities for the 
body and its learning in Christian theology. Two questions frame our reading of Merleau-Ponty in 
relation to the Christian flesh, ‘What does it mean to exist as a person in the flesh?’ and ‘how does 
this flesh shape the relationship of self to divine?’  
The title of this dissertation, ‘A Christian ontology of the flesh: Word, Symbol, 
Performance’, suggests the centrality of the nature of existence in the flesh, and of its perception 
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of the divine. The study attempts to formulate the ways in which the senses are attuned to the 
divine through the very immanent experience of perception and does so by articulating what it 
means to have flesh structure existence from the perspective of God’s continuous presence to, and 
upholding of, the created order. Here, one approaches flesh from the perspective of God’s 
continued presence to the created order as both human and divine.  
When engaging with questions that relate to the nature of being, one is engaging in the 
study of ontology. The focus of this dissertation, albeit unconventionally so, studies the nature of 
being from the perspective of the flesh. In one sense, this is to engage with Merleau-Ponty’s flesh 
– that designation which describes the ways in which existence is perpetually open to the world 
which influences it. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty’s theorising of the flesh provides a route by which to 
conceptualise the permeability of existence and, therefore, is pivotal in establishing the 
foundations upon which this dissertation builds its own conception of the flesh. In another sense, 
the term calls to mind the doctrine of the incarnation. Flesh here demarcates two worlds melded 
as one: those physical characteristics typically circumscribed by the body, and the spiritual world, 
characterised by the participatory existence that Christ makes possible to all who are founded in 
him.  
As soon as one begins to speak of the incarnation one begins to move in the domain of 
theology proper and so the natural conclusion may be to think of the present investigation as an 
investigation of a theology of the body, this is true. But there is more which this dissertation seeks 
to say particularly as it relates to the flesh: that the flesh, through a person’s thoughts, words and 
gestures, brings into existence a divine reality uncaptured by the language of the body. Here, one 
moves away from Merleau-Ponty’s flesh in its immanent sense to a flesh that effects a change in 
the realm of the transcendent (in the Christian doctrinal sense). An ontology of the flesh thus 
pursues the possibility that actions oriented toward the divine, may quasi-sacramentally make the 
Word present by the Spirit.  
Establishing the difference between a theology of the body and an ontology of the flesh 
falls within the respective outcome which each discipline pursues. Since this dissertation suggests 
that it is reasonable to think of the Christian flesh as a flesh that alters and effects the divine reality 
in which persons find themselves as Christians, it functions as a Christian ontology of the flesh.   
A risk characterises the undertaking, in trying to articulate an ontology of the flesh, one 
may lose the body, once more, to abstraction. To avoid abstractions like this, focus will be given 
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to the doctrine of the incarnation. The writings of a select group of theologians will be read and 
analysed as a means of understanding the relationship between the flesh of persons and the flesh 
of Christ incarnate. Attention will be given, especially, to the ways in which texts can make visible 
the truth of which they speak. The approach thus focuses on the content of their writings as well 
as the form in which such content is presented.10 By paying attention to the stylistic features of the 
text, to the nature of the language used, and to the visceral metaphors employed, the embodied 
expression of the doctrine of the incarnation is allowed to speak for itself through a variety of 
textual mediums. When a text speaks in its own right as the embodied articulation of God-with-
us, the incarnation is expressed in word, symbol, and performance. 
The expression of the incarnate God through word, symbol and performance establishes 
what I would like to call an embodied theology. An embodied theology reads the incarnation from 
the perspective of the sense-perceptual self and its unique grammar of embodied perception. Two 
simultaneous events occur when the incarnation is read through the body; the living Word is 
experienced through the particularity of existence, and the incarnation is re-articulated at the hand 
of a particular time and context. To read the incarnation through the lens of its lived expression 
through the bodily reality of persons, is to take part in God’s revelation in the flesh. This mode of 
taking part may variously be termed participation, union, and deification. All three terms describe 
God’s presence in the created order and the participation of a person as an embodied individual in 
that presence. To speak of participation is, therefore, one mode of articulating existence as it relates 
to the God by whom the created order exists, in whom persons find their ultimate expression, and 
through whom persons are sustained in that expression. When persons partake in God’s revelation 
in this embodied manner, they make the incarnation visible anew within their context and time. A 
new language is born from their engagement with God that is instructive for a Christian ontology 
of the flesh and its pursuit to render new ways of speaking of the body in relation to the divine.  
Within the church today, the body has become a site with its own set of challenges. For 
persons who have experienced trauma, for example, the body is both that which is made in the 
image of the divine, and simultaneously a site where violence has occurred. This simultaneity can 
lead to a disassociation of sorts, of body and God, of earthly and heavenly, and of the experiential 
 
10 I follow the cue of Janet Soskice here who reminds of the significance of paying attention to the 
form and content of theological writing. For further reference see Soskice, Janet Martin. 1987. 
Metaphor and Religious Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press., 37.  
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and ineffable. A myriad of anxieties can arise at these intersections since any disassociation or 
distance between self and God may lead to the erroneous conclusion that God is removed from the 
sense-perceptual self, and thereby absent to the embodied realities of such persons. In response, 
one seeks a framework which recovers the body and its learning for theology by embracing the 
embodied nature of its existence, and by bringing such existence into conversation with a God who 
is both immanent and transcendent to existence.  
Chapter one constructs a vocabulary with which to speak of existence as it relates to the 
embodied and sense-perceptual ways of existing in the world. The key terms are flesh and body, 
two integrated but distinctive expressions of a singular self and its engagements with the world in 
which it functions. Within this dissertation, flesh describes the subjective and individual 
experience of self in relation to a created and divine other.11 Body describes the subjective but 
collective experience of being relationally ordered to a created or divine other.12 Both terms 
describe a complex yet holistic rendering of a person’s embodied engagements with the world, and 
both definitions recognise that being embodied means being shaped and formed by those with 
whom one engages as well as the world in which one exists. The Chapter suggests that a different 
frame of reference, the sense-perceptual self, may help bridge the perceived disparate relationship 
between flesh and body.  
The presence of the created or divine other which defines persons as sense-perceptual 
selves, relates in a Christian ontology of the flesh both to the realm of the immanent and the 
transcendent. The question is however, whether the relationship between immanent and 
transcendent exists in competitive and mutually exclusive terms. Is a rendering of the Christian 
flesh plagued by the binaries of Spirit and flesh, of spiritual and material, and of soul and body? 
Chapter two takes this question as its starting point by re-engaging the critique of a negated 
Christian flesh. The re-reading aims to construct a conceptual framework by which to hold together 
that which seems disparate from another. By establishing a conceptual framework which can act 
 
11 Chapter two will elaborate on these terms. I draw here on Susan Eastman’s innovative readings 
of Paul. Eastman, Susan G. 2017. Paul and the Person: Reframing Paul’s Anthropology. 
Michigan: Eerdmans., Eastman, Susan Grove. 2018. ‘Oneself in Another: Participation and the 
Spirit in Romans 8’. In ‘In Christ’ in Paul: Explorations in Paul’s Theology of Union and 
Participation., edited by Michael J. Thate, Kevin J. Vanhoozer, and Constantine R. Campbell, 
103–26. Michigan: Eerdmans. 
12 See note above. 
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as a foundation for the consideration of the flesh and body in Christian terms, a shift is made to 
the early church’s reception of the one instance within the Christian story where the immanent and 
the transcendent converge, the incarnation.  
The conciliar debates of the early church wrestled especially with the doctrine of the 
incarnation. The debate central to the topic at hand was the nature of Christ’s existence as a human 
and as God. Some rendered Christ fully human but not fully God – that is, Christ was begotten by 
God and therefore existed as a result of God’s creative act. Others rendered Christ fully God but 
not fully human – that is, Christ was so truly God that his existence in the flesh was somehow 
distant to and removed from the suffering that he would have experienced as a person. Both 
renditions present significant problems to the doctrine of the incarnation and the implications it 
has for embodied existence. If Christ was not fully human, he would not have changed the 
ontological status of existence in the flesh, and if Christ was not fully divine, he would not have 
inaugurated persons into God’s divine economy. The absolute affirmation of Christ’s humanity 
and divinity at the incarnation proves essential to the proper articulation of the place and role of 
the flesh in relation to God. The third Chapter sets up a rendition of the incarnation fertile for a 
reading of the flesh as that which takes part in the Second Person of the Trinity while making 
visible the invisible.  
Establishing the ways in which the incarnate Word is present to persons and how such a 
presence transforms the meaning and extent of the flesh, requires further consideration. The fourth 
Chapter describes the ways in which the senses register God’s presence as the incarnate Word. 
The relationship between the visible and invisible is explored with the intent on describing how 
words, thoughts, and deeds can make God incarnate. This incarnational logic supplies one avenue 
for thinking through the dynamics of the body and its perception of the divine by considering the 
relationship of the incarnate Word to the words of the rhetorician and the Christian poet. Both 
groups take Scripture to be normative insofar as its words are inspired by God. A similar logic 
pertains to the words of the sense-perceptual self whose words, while not directly inspired by God, 
still has God as its divine referent and thereby undergoes a transformation. Since words are never 
spoken independently from the body, an examination of words as they relate to the incarnate Word 
is an examination of the embodied nature of texts. These textual modes of speaking through words 
embody and thereby perform an incarnational logic.  
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Self-performative speech rests on the ability of the sense-perceptual self to register the 
divine in its own embodied terms. The unique grammar of perception a person employs to speak 
of the divine, in turn, shapes the ways in which Christ is made incarnate to such a person. Chapter 
five reads one particularly embodied articulation of the divine as instructive for the 
conceptualisation of a theological grammar of perception. Christ revealed to the sense-perceptual 
self, here becomes Christ revealed in feminine and visceral terms. This manner of speaking takes 
the logic of the incarnate Word a step further by clothing the Word in a uniquely feminine 
grammar. With this grammar a new perceptual framework is established whereby those aspects 
that concerns the female body becomes the imaginative landscape in which Christ reveals himself.  
The embodied rendering of Christ’s relation to the female religious person illustrates how 
divine truths may be articulated in embodied terms. Here theological speech becomes self-
involving and inductive. When theology is done through the body, new ways are created for 
speaking about the Word’s presence to the desires, affections, and afflictions that go hand in hand 
with embodied existence. As persons participate in the Word through their very own embodied 
engagements, the manner of such engagements become expressive of the state of relations between 
self and divine other. With this logic of ordering, the senses are not only attuned to the divine, but 
also signal to the presence of the Word. The sense-perceptual self here assumes a gestural posture 
insofar as it signals towards the state of relations between self and divine other.  
Chapter six shows how the relationship between the form and content of theological writing 
presents itself in a literary masterpiece increasingly studied within the discipline of literature and 
theology. Here bodies are to the fore as they serve to gesture to different states of relation between 
self, other, and divine. In continuity with Chapter five, Love orders the senses in Chapter six. Love 
gestures to the divine and serves as indicator of the presence or absence of right relations between 
persons. In their varied depictions in grotesque, reconciliatory, and beatific terms, bodies perform 
through a myriad of postures that which is invisible. By weaving the intricate web of relations that 
constitutes the sense-perceptual self in narratival and poetic form, bodies become the register for 
the reception of the divine.  
The final Chapter brings into relief a theology where the flesh is structured by the Word’s 
incarnation, perception is ordered by the revelation of God’s presence to persons through their 
embodied existence, and finally where the unique sense-perceptual expression of God’s presence 
to persons renders a performative embodied existence. It does so by building on Merleau-Ponty’s 
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phenomenology and ontology which provides the grammar for the intertwining of self and divine, 
and the logic for perception as that which is at the heart of experience and knowledge production. 
Perception, Chapter seven suggests, mediates between the God who is immanent yet invisible, and 
so holds together the embodied and divine. Through perception, Chapter seven shows, persons 
may register the divine affectively, and thereby participate in the life of the Trinity. It concludes 
by suggesting that the loss of the body in Christian theology is not so much a loss, but a latent and 
under resourced dimension of Christian theology. By doing so, it presents the problem of the loss 
of the body as the absence of a theological grammar of perception.  
Before one may consider the implication of a Christian ontology of the flesh as 
performative and sacramental however, one must determine the place of perception to persons and 
their relation to the things of nature. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology with its attempt to return 
the body to philosophy is to be considered. On the one hand, his recognition that persons cannot 
exist independent of their sense-perceptual surroundings, and on the other hand, that persons are 
intertwined with others, are two insights which bring the body centre stage. By allowing Merleau-
Ponty to speak first, the Western philosopher’s embodied philosophy acts as springboard from 
which to take flesh as an integrated, complex constellation of sense-perceptions forward. It is to 
understand personhood as being open to be relationally ordered to self and other.  
In what follows, the body-subject and the manifold ways in which its existence informs 
and is informed by the myriad relations in which it stands, will be considered.13 By focussing on 
the body and its parameters as the defining aspect for an ontology of the flesh, three elements of 
Merleau-Ponty's theorising may be discussed: first, with regards to the role of the agent in the 
world14 – what is the relation of the sensible to the sentient? Second, with regards to 
phenomenology – what is the place and function of the agent in establishing a continuum between 
self and other, and third, how does this interaction establish a continuum of reciprocal existence? 
By starting with Merleau-Ponty, a Christian ontology of the flesh may establish the irreducibility 
of both God and the body. 
 
 
13 Rivera, Mayra. 2015. Poetics of the Flesh. Duke: Duke University Press., 60.  
14 I choose to employ the term ‘agent’ and ‘agency’ in this study because it suggests two 
considerations which need to be borne in mind; that the body is a unity – a holistic entity 
constituted by both the body and flesh and that its functioning in the world is never something 
other than as living, embodied being.   
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Toward a Phenomenology of Perception 
The gradual recovery of the body in Western philosophy started as the examination of embodiment 
and its perceptual engagements. This meant exploring the relationship between a perceiving self 
and the world and examining what the nature of such perception is. The German philosopher, 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), took up this task by spearheading a new field of philosophy, named 
phenomenology. Phenomenology examines existence as it is revealed generally and perceived 
subjectively by a sense-perceptual self.  
Husserl’s theory of double sensation served as a basis for Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology 
of perception, and as a basis for Merleau-Ponty’s friend and peer, Jean-Paul Sartre’s ontology of 
nothingness. Both philosophers introduced the work of Husserl to French philosophy, albeit in 
different ways.15 Although Sartre took Husserl’s theory of double sensation in a different direction 
than Merleau-Ponty did, Merleau-Ponty was still shaped by the theorising of his peer. Both Husserl 
and Sartre thus played a part in the formation of Merleau-Ponty’s unique phenomenology of 
perception, for he ‘was a phenomenologist above all, yet he differed in fundamental ways from 
the three other major phenomenologists, Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre’, writes Taylor Carmen.16 
In Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and Invisible (unfinished), Merleau-
Ponty articulates the differences between himself, Husserl and Sartre. He does so by 
conceptualising his ontology of the flesh, a response to the perceived dualistic structuring of 
existence in Husserl, and the dichotomous relationship between subject and object in Sartre.17 In 
the former, Husserl’s theorising is associated with the object/consciousness binary which describes 
on the one hand, a ‘subject as part of the world, that is, existing empirically’ and on the other hand, 
 
15 Carmen and Hansen note, ‘In the 1930’s, he [Merleau-Ponty] and Sartre both, although 
separately and in different ways, discovered the works of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and 
Max Scheler, introduced them to a French audience, and began to make their own original 
contributions to the field.’ Carmen, Taylor, and Mark Hansen. 2004. ‘Introduction’. In The 
Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, edited by Taylor Carmen and Mark Hansen, 1–25. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 5.  
16 Carmen, Taylor, and Hansen. ‘Introduction’., 1.  
17 Margaret Whitford explains, ‘Rationalism would make consciousness the measure of Being, 
reducing Being to the categories proposed by consciousness. Phenomenology on the other hand 
recognizes that the creation of order through conceptual patterning is limited by the very structure 
of consciousness, in particular the necessity for consciousness to be situated and to be limited by 
its perspective’. Whitford, Margaret. 1979. ‘Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Sartre’s Philosophy: An 
Interpretative Account’. French Studies XXXIII (3): 305–18., 307.  
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a subject existing independently from the world as consciousness.18 At play in the 
object/consciousness binary is the world as it presents itself to the senses, and the shaping of such 
perceptions by the independent subjective and conscious self.19 In the latter, Sartre’s ontology of 
nothingness gives primacy to the conscious self, divorcing perception from the world in which 
such perception takes place. 
Husserl wrestled with the primacy that mind had over body in Descartes’ epistemology. Of 
concern was the self-sufficiency of the mind to perceive the world objectively. For the mind to 
know it must exist relationally, however, and for the mind to exist relationally, it requires a means, 
the body. Mapping the relationship between mind and body also meant mapping the relationship 
between mind and world, a relationship best described by the word intentionality.20 Husserl’s 
theory of intentionality set the stage for the mutual inherence of mind and world (things of nature). 
Intentionality thus described the relationship of the subjective self to things of nature, and how the 
subjective self is the condition of possibility for the things that are perceived. Adam Smith explains 
 
18 Barbaras, Renaud. 2004. ‘A Phenomenology of Life’. In Merleau-Ponty: Perception, Structure, 
Language, edited by Taylor Carmen and Mark Hansen, 206–30. New Jersey: Humanities Press., 
206. 
19 Barbaras further distinguishes these two engagements as the empirical and transcendental 
consciousness., Barbaras, ‘A Phenomenology of Life’., 208.  
20 McIntyre, Ronald, and David Woodruff Smith. 1989. ‘Theory of Intentionality’. In Husserl’s 
Phenomenology: A Textbook, edited by J.N. Mohanty and William McKenna, 147–79., 149.  
‘Husserl’s interest in intentionality was inspired by his teacher, Franz Brentano, who himself 
picked up the term ‘intentional’ from its use in medieval philosophy…Brentano is most famous 
for a very strong doctrine about intentionality. He claimed that intentionality is the defining 
characteristic of the mental, i.e., that all mental phenomena are intentional and only mental 
phenomena are intentional. This claim has come to be known as “Brentano’s Thesis”. But almost 
all philosophers, including Husserl, consider the first half of Brentano’s Thesis too strong. Moods 
such as depression or euphoria are not always “of” or “about” something; and as Husserl notes, 
sensations such as pain or dizziness are not obviously representational or “directed toward” some 
object. Husserl’s interest is in those mental states or experiences that do give us a sense of an 
object, and those mental phenomena are intentional; he calls them “acts” of consciousness. Husserl 
seems to have thought that only states of conscious awareness are intentional, but we need not be 
that restrictive: if there are unconscious beliefs and desires, for example, they too should be 
counted as intentional mental phenomena. See ‘Theory of Intentionality’., 149. For a more 
elaborate exposition of Husserl’s theory of intentionality, see McIntyre, Ronald, and David 
Woodruff Smith. 1982. Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language. 
Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel. 
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that, intentionality mediated between the world as ‘a kind of absolute’ which the mind cannot 
construct, and the world as ‘entirely relative to the existential projects of the bodily subject’.21  
One faculty of the mind by which intentionality functions, is consciousness.22 To be 
conscious of something is to have the mind inclined to that particular thing. It is as Carmen and 
Hansen note, to have ‘consciousness of something, that our mental attitudes are directed toward 
objects and states of affairs in the world.’23 The distinction between the act of inclining oneself to 
an external world and having one’s experience of that world shaped by one’s own subjectivity, is 
a distinction Husserl marked as one between the ‘objects and the contents of consciousness’.24  
David Woodruff Smith frames these two realities by correlating objects of consciousness 
with that which exists ‘outside’ of consciousness, and contents of consciousness with that which 
exists ‘inside’ consciousness. Objects of consciousness describe things of nature that are material, 
 
21 Smith, A. 2007. ‘The Flesh of Perception: Merleau-Ponty and Husserl’. In Reading Merleau-
Ponty: On Phenomenology of Perception, 1–22. London: Routledge., 32. 
22 McIntyre, Ronald, and David Woodruff Smith. 1989. ‘Theory of Intentionality’. In Husserl’s 
Phenomenology: A Textbook, edited by J.N. Mohanty and William McKenna, 147–79., 149.  
‘Husserl’s interest in intentionality was inspired by his teacher, Franz Brentano, who himself 
picked up the term ‘intentional’ from its use in medieval philosophy…Brentano is most famous 
for a very strong doctrine about intentionality. He claimed that intentionality is the defining 
characteristic of the mental, i.e., that all mental phenomena are intentional and only mental 
phenomena are intentional. This claim has come to be known as “Brentano’s Thesis”. But almost 
all philosophers, including Husserl, consider the first half of Brentano’s Thesis too strong. Moods 
such as depression or euphoria are not always “of” or “about” something; and as Husserl notes, 
sensations such as pain or dizziness are not obviously representational or “directed toward” some 
object. Husserl’s interest is in those mental states or experiences that do give us a sense of an 
object, and those mental phenomena are intentional; he calls them “acts” of consciousness. Husserl 
seems to have thought that only states of conscious awareness are intentional, but we need not be 
that restrictive: if there are unconscious beliefs and desires, for example, they too should be 
counted as intentional mental phenomena. See ‘Theory of Intentionality’., 149. For a more 
elaborate exposition of Husserl’s theory of intentionality, see McIntyre, Ronald, and David 
Woodruff Smith. 1982. Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language. 
Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel. 
23 Carmen and Hansen, ‘Introduction’., 5. 
24 Carmen and Hansen, ‘Introduction’., 6. Carmen and Hansen contrast the intentionality of 
consciousness thesis with that of phycological phenomenology when they write, ‘This distinction 
allows us to conceive of intentionality as something different from an irreducible to the causal 
connections between external objects and internal psychological states, for the objects of my 
awareness are not (ordinarily) the contents of my mind; rather, those inner contents constitute my 
awareness of outer objects. Intentional content is not (ordinarily) what I am aware of; it is rather 
the of-ness, the directedness of my awareness’., 6-7.  
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and which exist in space and time, and are in that sense “real” (reale).25 Contents of consciousness 
describe subjective experiences. Experiences are ‘events of consciousness’ and, unlike material 
things which are framed by concrete contexts, events of consciousness ‘are temporal but not spatial 
and so are not “real”. Their essence is that of being a consciousness of something, which does not 
entail their being spatial (§§34-36).’26 Whereas objects of nature are then external to the self and 
so require consciousness to attain them through perception, experiences need no mediation.27  
 The above basic exposition of the relation of the world to a subjective self shows the main 
components of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Its starting point is the seat of 
consciousness, the mind.28 While the mind mediates between sense-perception and experience, the 
external world with its independent objects of nature exists apart from consciousness, and presents 
itself naively, without the prior interference of a subjective self.29 The mind cannot exist 
independently of the body however, and thus finds itself within a binary existence; it exists both 
as consciousness and as a body. To perceive a thing of nature through consciousness is, according 
to Husserl, to experience two events simultaneously.30  
The dual aspects of experience make the self both an object of that which is perceived 
(body), and the condition of its possibility (mind).31 Here, differentiation is made between body 
and mind. It is what, Barbaras, Smith, and others call a ‘dual-aspect’ ontology.32 A dual-aspect 
ontology has the perceiving self take part in two realms of experience simultaneously. The body, 
Husserl divides into ‘Körper’ and ‘Leib’, the former referring to the physical body and the latter 
to the living body.33 It is particularly the living body, with its meaning laden interactions with the 
 
25 Smith, David Woodstruff. 1995. ‘Mind and Body’. In The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, 
edited by Barry Smith, 323–93. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 338.  
26 Smith, ‘Mind and Body’., 337.  
27 Smith, ‘Mind and Body’., 338.  
28 Smith, ‘The Flesh of Perception’., 3.  
29 Beyer, Christian. 2016. ‘Edmund Husserl’. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The 
Metaphysics Research Lab. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/#SinHorInt. 
30 Baldwin, Thomas. 2004. ‘Editor’s Introduction’. In Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Basic Writings, 
edited by Thomas Baldwin, 247–54. New York: Routledge., 247.  
31 Barbaras, ‘A Phenomenology of Life’., 208.  
32 Smith, ‘Mind and Body’., 324. 
33 Smith, ‘Mind and Body’., 324.  
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world that ‘is essential for perception of the world and for being in the world’.34 With regards to 
the role of the body, Smith expands: 
My physical body, the material I, is my body qua physical: this body as defined by purely 
physical attributes of space, time, matter, and causality, and so instantiating the essence 
Nature. By contrast, my living body, the animate-organism I, is this body qua living: "my 
body" as defined by intentional attributes of volition and kinesthesis as well as 
spatiotemporal-material attributes, i.e., my body as that organ which I move by will and 
whose movement I am aware of kinaesthetically.35  
Husserl divides the body into Körper and Leib, while he divides the mind into various faculties 
including, ‘Seele’, ‘Mensch’, ‘Geist’ and the ‘pure I’ (soul, human being, spirit and the ‘pure I’).36 
Smith continues to describe the mental aspects as follows:  
My soul or psyche, the psychological I, is then that aspect of my living body which 
“animates” it, what makes it a living body, a psychophysical animal. And my spirit or 
human I [Ich-Mensch] is then I qua human being: an embodied, personal, social being who 
belongs to the world-of-life, or "life-world" [Lebenswelt], the surrounding world as defined 
not by physics but by everyday life. The empirical I, the I of everyday experience, from 
which all philosophical reflection begins, is the human I. Finally, the pure I is I qua subject 
of intentional experiences or acts of consciousness.37   
The simultaneity of nature and consciousness constitutes a perceiving self as holding to ‘the 
natural, bodily moment’ and to ‘the mental, experiential moment of the I’.38 With the agentic role 
that consciousness plays in perception, a thing of nature transforms into a phenomenon when 
consciousness engages with it. While external things of nature exist independent from the sense-
 
34 Smith, ‘The Flesh of Perception’., 5. 
35 Smith, ‘The Flesh of Perception’., 5.  
36 Smith, ‘Mind and Body’., 324.  
37 Smith, ‘Mind and Body’., 324. 
38 Smith, ‘Mind and Body’., 336. ‘Much as Descartes distinguished the essence of mind (thought) 
from the essence of body (extensions), so Husserl distinguished the essence of consciousness from 
the essence of nature. But whereas Descartes also distinguished the I or res cogitans from the body 
or res extensa, Husserl insisted that the “I” and the “body” are distinct aspects (moments) of a 
single individual – and likewise that, in the event of thinking, the “mental” event and the 
corresponding “natural” event are two aspects (moments) of a single event.’., 336.  
 22 
perceptions of a person, and are presented objectively to the senses, a person’s subjective 
engagement therewith transforms the things of nature into phenomena.39  
Defining the roles that mind and body play in perception is integral to Husserl’s theory of 
double sensation because it provides a structure by which one may analyse perception. 
Phenomenology theorises the relationship between nature and consciousness while also 
interrogating the intersection of these two. At the intersection of consciousness and body, lies the 
task of phenomenological description. Phenomenological description differentiates between 
consciousness which functions apart from the things of nature, and the things of nature itself in its 
description of a phenomenon.40 This phenomenological act, also called the transcendental 
phenomenological method, requires that the perceiving self ‘bracket’ their subjectivity in the act 
of perception.41  
At this point, Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Husserl arises. It is questionable whether a 
perceiving self can truly remove its consciousness from the embodied manner in which that person 
observes the world.42 Can intentionality, a tool of consciousness and a mental state, exist 
independently from the world in which it functions?43 Husserl wishes to account for its possibility 
by using the category of experience.44 It appears Husserl wishes to advance a phenomenological 
conception of intentionality.45 It too fails because, as Merleau-Ponty shows in his Phenomenology 
 
39 Smith, ‘Mind and Body’., 323–24. 
40 This differentiation is the differentiation between the ideal and real. See Carmen and Hansen, 
‘Introduction’., 7.  
41 Christian Beyer further explains, ‘…Husserl demanded (in Ideas) that in a phenomenological 
description proper the existence of the object(s) (if any) satisfying the content of the intentional 
act described must be “bracketed”. That is to say, the phenomenological description of a given act 
and, in particular, the phenomenological specification of its intentional content, must not rely upon 
the correctness of any existence assumption concerning the object(s) (if any) the respective act is 
about. Thus, the epoché has us focus on those aspects of our intentional acts and their contents that 
do not depend on the existence of a represented object out there in the extra-mental world.’    
Beyer., ‘Edmund Husserl’. 
42 Barbaras, ‘A Phenomenology of Life’., 208.  
43 McIntyre, ‘Theory and Intentionality’., 151.   
44 McIntyre, ‘Theory and Intentionality’., 151-2.  
45 As McIntyre and Smith suggest: ‘that intentionality is something we know about first and 
foremost from our own, “first-person” knowledge of our experiences and their “internal” character; 
that it is a property our experiences have in themselves, as subjective experiences, and independent 
of any of their actual relations to the external world; and that therefore intentionality cannot be 
explained from a purely objective, “third-person”, point of view if such a viewpoint cannot 
accommodate this internal and subjective character of our experiences. In so thinking, Husserl 
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of Perception, the senses and the information which it produces as a result of a person’s embodied 
existence, cannot be conceptualised prior to the very fact of existing as a sense-perceptual being 
in the world.  
The irreducibility of the things of nature and of the body’s belonging to such objects, is 
picked up by Merleau-Ponty in his phenomenology of perception.46 As Andreas Nordlander 
shows:  
Merleau-Ponty is clearly a transcendental philosopher…Yet with the discovery of the 
corporeal subject he breaks with this tradition in two important respects: First, by showing 
that the constituting structures are not primarily in the mind, as categories or concepts, but 
in the body as an acquired schema for sensorimotor interaction; and second, by 
consequently insisting that constitution must be reciprocal between the subject and the 
world, rather than unidirectional from some other worldly subject.47  
Merleau-Ponty progresses from Husserl’s thinking by insisting that the body and its engagements 
with the world cannot be bracketed. To exist in the world, and to perceive the things of nature as 
a subjective self, means to have consciousness shape the world with which it engages, and to have 
consciousness shaped by the very same world. A dual-aspect ontology thus falls short in 
accounting for the reciprocity between consciousness and nature.   
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception took stock of the limitations of a dual-
aspect ontology and sought to complete, as Renaud Barbaras suggest, the phenomenology of 
Husserl by developing a phenomenology of life.48 He did so by taking into account the 
irreducibility of the world in which a subjective self exists,49 and theorised an ontology which 
mediated subject and object through the union of their existences.50 The result was a perceiving 
 
holds a phenomenological conception of intentionality. See McIntyre, ‘Theory and Intentionality’., 
152-3. 
46 Barbaras uses the term ‘irreducibility’ in his theorising. I follow his cue. Barbaras, ‘A 
Phenomenology of Life’., 208. 
47 Nordlander, Figuring Flesh in Creation., 30.  
48 Barbaras, ‘A Phenomenology of Life’., 208.  
49 Barbaras, ‘A Phenomenology of Life’., 208.  
50 Barbaras explains, ‘In this sense, I believe, phenomenology is essentially phenomenology of life: 
the problem posed by Husserl in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology (§53) concerning the dual status of the subject – its being both part of the world 
and the condition of the world – is the same as the problem of the status of life. I would like to 
show, then, that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is really a phenomenology of life, which means 
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and subjective self whose sense-perceptions were neither bracketed from its lifeworld nor existed 
independently. Equally so, mind and body are mutually inhering and cannot exist in strictly 
immanent and transcendental terms. Instead, the body inhabits two spaces, the sensing self and 
that which is sensed, thus experiencing double sensation.51  
Merleau-Ponty’s peer and friend, Jean-Paul Sartre, also incorporated Husserl’s 
phenomenology in his theorising.52 Both agreed that the various reductions, or bracketing, in 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology amounted to ‘illegitimate abstractions from the concrete 
worldly conditions of experience’.53 Margaret Whitford describes the differences in approaches 
as: ‘Merleau-Ponty’s primary concern was with the pre-reflective, pre-conceptual areas of 
experiences’ whereas ‘Sartre’s thought is dominated by the problem of human freedom and its 
implication’.54 What Sartre sought to do, was to account for a person’s relation to the world as 
both subject and object in a manner which mediated some tensions found in a transcendental 
phenomenology.  
Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, analyses existence in terms of its objective dimensions 
(en-soi) and its subjective dimensions (pour-soi).55 En-soi roughly translates as ‘being-in-
themselves’ and ‘are non-conscious things, which can be said to have essences, which exist 
independently of any observer and which constitute all the things in the world’.56 Pour-soi 
translates as ‘beings-for-themselves’, these beings ‘are conscious beings whose consciousness 
renders them entirely different from other things.’57 Broadly translated, pour-soi exists 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s thought completes the project of Husserl’s phenomenology. Indeed, we can say 
that Merleau-Ponty’s main purpose, from beginning to end, is to give sense to the Husserlian 
lifeworld as it is described in the Crisis. Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s purpose is to develop a 
phenomenology that takes into account the irreducibility of the lifeworld.’ Barbaras, ‘A 
Phenomenology of Life’., 208.  
51 Nordlander, Figuring Flesh in Creation., 37.  
52 Carmen and Hansen, ‘Introduction’., 5.  
53 Carmen and Hansen, ‘Introduction’., 8.  
54 Whitford, ‘Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Sartre’s Philosophy’., 306. Whitford elaborates, 
‘Although they were both concerned to elucidate the relationship between consciousness and its 
world, in Merleau-Ponty’s cast it was in order to define the nature and limits of our understanding 
of the world, whereas Sartre wants to provide the basis for a philosophy of action.’, Whitford, 
‘Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Sartre’s Philosophy’., 306.  
55 Whitford, ‘Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Sartre’s Philosophy’., 307. 
56 Warnock, Mary. 2003. ‘Introduction’. In Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenology, 
xi–xxi. Abington, Oxon: Routledge., xi.  
57 Warnock, ‘Introduction’., xi. 
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conceptually as consciousness, and en-soi as things of nature. This schema is central as it parses 
the relationship between consciousness and self, and so sets the stage for the consideration of the 
things in nature (objects) as the constituting corporeal schema by which persons apprehend and 
are apprehended.58 Tracing the distinction between being-for-itself and being-in-itself aids an 
existentialist account of perception.59  
Sartre uses the concept of nothingness to mediate between a perceiving self and the world 
which it perceives. On the one hand, nothingness is the foundation from which consciousness can 
identify something as true or contrary irrespective of its actual facticity.60 On the other hand, 
nothingness denies the pre-reflective, subjective self, ‘in which the flux of our mental life is housed 
and from which it flows’.61 The twofold focus expresses the ‘groundlessness and radical freedom 
which characterise the human condition.’62 It is not the case then as it was with Husserl that the 
 
58 Dillon, Martin. 1997. Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology. Second. Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press., 141. 
59 Sartre notes in Being and Nothingness, ‘…reflection has no kind of primacy over the 
consciousness reflected-on. Quite the contrary, it is the non-reflective consciousness which renders 
the reflection possible; there is a pre-reflective cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian 
cogito. At the same time it is the non-thetic consciousness of counting which is the very condition 
of my act of adding. If it were otherwise, how would the addition be the unifying theme of my 
consciousness? In order that this theme should preside over a whole series of syntheses of 
unifications and recognitions, it must be present to itself, not as a thing but as an operative intention 
which can exist only as the revealing-revealed (révélante-révéléé), to use an expression of 
Heidegger’s’   Ibid. xii., Mary Warnock further elaborates: ‘Existentialism is, to an extreme degree, 
anti-Cartesian in this matter: on the one hand, existentialists do not start from “pure consciousness” 
looking out upon a world about which the question arises “How do I know it exists?” On the other 
hand they have no hope of and no interest in a description of a “marvellous new science” of the 
kind envisaged by Descartes. On the contrary, they start all their reflection from the stand-point of 
a consciousness already engaged in an external world, of “impure” consciousness, modified in all 
kind of different ways by its presence in a world of things; and an impersonal or wholly scientific 
account of the world in terms of regularities and causal connexions seems to them inadequate to 
the richness of the world as it is actually experienced’. See Warnock, ‘Introduction’., xii. 
60 As a result, ‘the act of being conscious is precisely the introduction of the separation of 
(self)awareness from its object and of the object from its ground and, of course, the positing of the 
ground itself as part of the object which the awareness is not’. See Gardner, Sebastian. 2009. 
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness: A Reader’s Guide. New York: Continuum International 
Publishing Group., 15.  
61 Gardner, Sartre’s Being and Nothingness., 15.  
62 Onof, Christian. n.d. ‘Jean Paul Sartre: Existentialism’. In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Accessed 23 November 2016. http://www.iep.utm.edu/sartre-ex/. 
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things of nature affect the consciousness, it is rather that the consciousness experiences an atheism 
towards the world in which it exists.63  
A Sartrean existentialism is sceptical of a ‘personalised’ consciousness and advances what 
Sebastian Gardner calls an atheistic consciousness. He explains, ‘[t]he significance of Sartre’s 
expunging of Husserl’s transcendental ‘I’ is to establish a kind of atheism of consciousness, 
directed against our naturally theistic self-conception’.64 An atheism of consciousness implies the 
absence of a pre-determined and prior awareness whereby consciousness is self-reflexive. Here, 
the priority lies instead with describing an object as already existent in the world prior to a person’s 
engagement with it. Hazel Barnes describes the relationship between subject and object in the 
following way: 
We as human beings confront a brute, concrete reality that existed before the evolution of 
conscious life. Into this undefined being, what we call consciousness introduces 
significance, differentiation, form, meaning, and our own purposes. Through our bodies 
we can use this universe, but there is nothing there that could properly be said to be 
responsive to us – only indifferent.65 
Barnes’ description echoes Gardner’s description of an atheist consciousness where Sartre 
is interpreted as saying that consciousness is ‘not itself being but is the source of all 
determination’.66 Scholars reading Sartre employ nothingness as the predominant motif to explain 
the atheistic  consciousness. Nothingness describes the prior existence of the things of nature to 
which the sense-perceptual self comes and experiences as an other.   
The atheist consciousness of a Sartrean ontology, insofar as it has the sense-perceptual self 
stand independent and unaffected by the world in which it exists, stands in contrast to Merleau-
Ponty’s ontology which starts with the shared existence of the conscious self and the things of 
nature. Merleau-Ponty’s starting point is the mutually inhering relationship of body and things of 
 
63 I follow Sebastian Gardner who uses this term to describe Sartre’s concept of nothingness. 
Gardner, Sebastian. 2009. Sartre’s Being and Nothingness: A Reader’s Guide. New York: 
Continuum International Publishing Group., 15.  
64 Gardner, Sartre’s Being and Nothingness., 15.  
65 Barnes, Hazel, E. 2006. ‘Sartre’s Ontology: The Revealing and Making of Being’. In The 
Cambridge Companion to Sartre, edited by Christina Howells, 13–38. Cambridge University 
Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-
sartre/6835C24449652C88885C412FDECB74E6., 14.  
66 Barnes, ‘Sartre’s Ontology’., 14.  
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nature expressed in Husserl’s theory of double sensation. For Merleau-Ponty, it is not only that the 
perceiving self stands in relation to the things of nature but also that the pre-reflexive 
consciousness mediates between these two entities. A pre-reflexive consciousness mediates the 
space between subject and object, between a person’s existence in the world as a body (things of 
nature) and as a consciousness (as subjective reflective self). Unlike the things of nature that are 
indifferent to the atheist consciousness, the pre-reflexive self lives in the world and experiences it 
before any prior conceptualisation takes place.67  
The difference in approach between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, lies with the place and 
function of reflexivity in the theorising of the two contemporaries. Whereas there is the ‘possibility 
of a plurality of subjects’ in Sartre’s ontology, there is the possibility for ‘an intersubjective world’ 
in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology.68 The difference lies with what Merleau-Ponty terms ‘flesh’, a term 
used to describe the continuum of existence between the body and the things of nature. One reads 
in Visible and Invisible (1968): 
…the presence of the world is precisely the presence of its flesh to my flesh, that “I am of 
the world” and that I am not it…One forgets that this frontal being before us – whether we 
posit it, whether it posits itself within us qua being posited – is second by principle, is cut 
upon a horizon which is not nothing, and which for its part is not by virtue of composition.69 
A fundamental reciprocity exists between a person’s embodied existence and the world. Here, 
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh is distinctive for its fluid rendering of existence. There is 
no faculty of consciousness which has primacy over existence in general; subject and object are 
entirely intertwined and inform one another mutually.  
The focus in a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology of perception falls on subjectivity and 
materiality and the spontaneous reciprocal relation between these two entities. This means that the 
subjective and objective faculties are borne from the same being, shares its being and has its being 
perpetually overlap.70 A reciprocity reigns between the conscious engagement of a person in the 
 
67 Whitford, ‘Merleau-Ponty’s Critique of Sartre’s Philosophy’., 308.  
68 Whitford, ‘Merleau-Ponty’s Critique’., 313. 
69 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1968. The Visible and the Invisible. Edited by Claude Lefort. 
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world, and the world’s response to such engagement. The body cannot, therefore, alienate itself 
through its consciousness from the world in which it exists. The body informs and performs the 
consciousness as much as the consciousness informs and performs the body. Martin Dillon argues, 
‘[t]hus, the lived body, as a phenomenon, includes both the immanent agency of my conscious life 
and the transcendence of worldly objects.’71  
The brief sketch of Husserl and Sartre as two prominent figures in the development of 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology solicits preliminary observations. In the first instance, 
consciousness cannot be a pre-determined category of thinking that mediates the relation between 
agent and world. This is so because consciousness radically limits the freedom of both the agent 
and the world. Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception resists a distinction between 
consciousness and nature and opens the relation up between the body and the world. Perception 
arises, in this instance, from the freedom of the agent and the thing of nature as they exist in 
reciprocal relation. A person’s interactions with the world and the consequent content of 
perception that arise therefrom is, therefore, existential. The world is no longer a correlate of 
consciousness and the agent can, therefore, be shaped as much by the things of nature as her or his 
engagement therewith. In the second instance, the mind, soul, psyche, and spirit cannot 
superimpose itself on that which is being perceived. Rather, the motility of persons as embodied 
and responsive agents determines the production of perceptual knowledge. The role of 
synaesthesia and kinaesthesia is central, for reciprocity occurs precisely in the embodied 
engagements of a sense-perceptual self with the world. A Husserlian transcendental consciousness 
thesis is, in this instance, in conflict with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. In the 
third instance, our perceptions of the world are not mediated by an unresponsive abyss but 
determined by the fact that one cannot abstract one’s existence into various capacities of 
consciousness. To dislodge consciousness from its embodied context, is to lose sight of the 
intertwined nature of perception.  
 
Toward an Ontology of the Flesh  
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology gave Merleau-Ponty the theory of double sensation. The 
thesis that consciousness and things of nature interact in a way that suggests their influence on 
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another. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology culminated in a dual-aspect ontology that 
ascribed to consciousness and things of nature two disparate modes of existence. Both Merleau-
Ponty and Sartre viewed a dual-aspect ontology as having shortcomings, and whereas Sartre 
developed an ontology of nothingness, Merleau-Ponty developed an ontology of the flesh. An 
ontology of the flesh builds on a set of lectures Merleau-Ponty presented on the seventeenth-
century philosopher and theologian, Nicholas Malebranche. Merleau-Ponty developed these 
lectures approximately ten years (1947-8) prior to his final work, The Visible and Invisible, which 
began to give an account of a person’s relation to the world both as intimately part of that world, 
and of being shaped by that world.  
One term Merleau-Ponty uses to describe the relation of sense-perceptual self (or sentient 
being) to things of nature (or sensible) is that of ‘dehiscence’. Loosely translated as divergence, 
dehiscence describes the relationship between the sense-perceptual self and the things of nature in 
complementary and not mutually exclusive terms. The term signals Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to 
construct an ontology that holds the shared elements of sentient and sensible, and those aspects of 
existence which distinguish them, together.72 The holding together of the unity and alterity of 
sentient and sensible which dehiscence describes is best illustrated with the example Merleau-
Ponty uses, touch. Two facets of touch are distinguishable, one can either touch (active) or be 
touched (passive). The difference between active and passive is not only the difference in agency 
but also the difference in expression of the one agent in relation to an other.73 
By expressing the shared element, agency, both facets of touch exist as actions done in 
relation to another. This shared relation, termed convergence, marks the possibility for subjectivity 
to take place.74 With the convergence of these two modes of touching, or of the relation of sentient 
to sensible and vice versa, a manner of existing is established which recognises the place and role 
of similarity and difference in the articulation of the sense-perceptual self.  The possibility of 
sentient and sensible to affect and transform another, is the fullest expression of dehiscence. It is 
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not only that sentient and sensible stand in relation to another, but that their presences converge 
and thereby establishes a middle ground by which knowledge may be attained through the 
corporeality of existence. The middle ground is one that Merleau-Ponty later terms flesh.  
The development of the concept of flesh in Merleau-Ponty’s theorising one may trace back 
to the sensuous theology of Nicholas Malebranche. In the Cambridge Companion to Merleau-
Ponty, Judith Butler shows how Malebranche’s sensuous theology understood ‘the order of ideal 
intelligibility’ to be ‘disclosed through sentient experience’.75 Unlike the Cartesian way where 
things of nature are only revealed when a mind engages with it, Malebranche’s sensuous theology 
has things of nature reveal themselves in its own right. The logic of a sensuous theology one may 
map in the words of Thomas Lennon who writes: 
…when I open my eyes, for example, and look at a tree by the roadside, what I actually see 
is something in the mind of God. The idea in the mind of God is the exemplar after which 
the tree was created, with the necessary result that the tree resembles the idea. By knowing 
the idea we are thus able to know the material things.76 
With the origin of the things of nature in the mind of God, objects simultaneously signify those 
ideas and incarnate such ideas through their materiality.77 Such things mediate between sense-
perceptions and that which originates transcendentally (in the mind of God).78 Malebranche’s 
metaphysics makes two important shifts. It affirms that things of nature exist in their own right 
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prior to any sense-perceptual engagement therewith and ascribes to the body (with its sense-
perceptual engagements with the things of nature) the role of articulating what such things reveal.  
A prime example of that which the embodied self reveals, is love. Love exists prior to the 
body and the things of nature. It is worth quoting Butler in full as she explains the dynamic of 
sentient and sensible in terms of love:  
It is not only that I cannot feel anything but what touches me, but that I cannot love without 
first being loved, cannot see without being seen, and that in some fundamental way, the act 
of seeing and loving are made possible by – and are coextensive with – being seen and 
being loved…So to love God is to have God continuously impress his love upon us, and 
the very moment in which we act, in which we are positioned as subjects of action, is the 
same moment in which we are undergoing another love, and without this simultaneous and 
double movement, there can be no love.79 
Expressed in the example of love is a sensuous theology that advances the logic implicit to 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of dehiscence. On the one hand, agencies converge between being active 
and passive, and on the other hand, the presence of another sentient or sensible makes possible the 
expression of love. The relationship between sentient and sensible is, finally, not marked by the 
mastery of the one over the other, neither of the disappearance of the one at the presence of the 
other, but of the simultaneous presence of sentient and sensible without negation or conflation.80 
Malebranche’s intelligibility of divine ideas thesis structures the logic of the relationship 
between sentient and sensible in terms of their mutually transforming effect on another. By 
emphasising their shared corporeality, both sense-perceptual self and thing of nature intertwine. In 
doing so, argues Butler, ‘Malebranche offers Merleau-Ponty the opportunity to consider how the 
body in its impressionability presupposes a prior set of impressions that act on the body and form 
the basis for sentience, feeling, cognition, and the beginnings of agency itself.’81 The centrality of 
the body in parsing the relationship between sentient and sensible, places the sense-perceptual self 
relationally to itself as body and as thing of nature.82 The body is, in this rendering, a ‘sensible for 
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itself’83 and an ‘exemplar sensible’84 by which the invisible is made visible. With the centrality of 
sense-perceptual experience to knowledge, the perceiving self is oriented to the world in a network 
of perceptual permeability.85 The term that describes this perceptual permeability in the work of 
Merleau-Ponty, is flesh. 
Merleau-Ponty introduces the term flesh as a way of constructing a conceptual framework 
by which he expresses the relationship between the sentient and sensible.86 Flesh is the incarnate 
subject which is identified with the Word in Malebranche’s sensuous theology.87 Since Merleau-
Ponty is sceptical of any rendition of transcendence that suggest a flight from the immanent and 
material, flesh becomes the term he  uses to describe the converging relationship between sentient 
and sensible.88 A concession follows, that flesh is not stated in respect to a pre-established body 
or materiality but is rather that which is birthed from the intertwining of the sentient and sensible.  
 
outlines of which it is made, its two laps: the sensible mass it is and the mass of the sensible 
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from above, open to him alone that, if it be possible, would coexist with them in the same world.’ 
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Flesh designates the ontological continuity that exists ‘between humans and other 
beings’.89 In Spell of the Sensuous, David Abram depicts flesh as ‘the mysterious tissue or matrix 
that underlies and gives rise to both the perceiver and the perceived as interdependent aspects of 
its own spontaneous activity’.90 As Butler notes, ‘[f]lesh is not my flesh or yours, but neither is it 
some third thing’.91 Instead, flesh is both sentient and sensible, ‘[i]t dominates, in other words, by 
coming apart: the flesh is that which is always coming apart and then back upon itself, but that for 
which no coincidence with itself is possible’.92 Flesh is thus a principle of incarnation which 
enables both the sentient and the sensible (and vice versa) to be in relationship with another – ‘I 
am truly given to myself’ but also truly given to the perceptual other.93  
Flesh signals a key moment in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology because it overcomes the mind-
body or reason-experience bifurcation by positing a fundamental unity between these aspects of 
embodied existence. On the one hand, sense-perception informs our knowing and on the other 
hand, what is known is governed by the embodied interactions with the world.94 Of importance is 
the fact that for Merleau-Ponty, our engagements with the world bring into existence (makes 
incarnate) that which is given prior to sense perception and manifest when engaged therewith.95 
Merleau-Ponty’s conceptualisation of embodied knowing situates the body and its perceptions in 
continuity with that which it perceives.  
The body is a sensible sentient and so also is the world. There is no gap, no ontological 
priority, and no prioritisation of the subject over the object. Instead, the reciprocal relation between 
the body and its engagements with the world lends itself to a communicative immediacy. Unlike 
a Cartesian legacy, there is in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh no dualism between body and 
mind or experience and reason. Merleau-Ponty breaks away from the philosophical legacy and the 
consequent attempts to overcome this dualism by conceptualising a transcendental consciousness 
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and its intentionality. Instead, his ontology of the flesh illustrates how sentient and sensible are 
perpetually informed by their interactions with another, how knowing is informed by experience, 
and how experience governs knowing.  
Flesh does not then exist as a pre-determined entity superimposed on the things of nature. 
Flesh, instead, makes incarnate the invisible in the visible by founding sense-perception in the 
body and its engagements with the world. Merleau-Ponty’s ontology advances a logic of 
ontological performances, the representation and incarnation of the invisible in the realm of the 
perceptual and embodied. These ontological performances bring into communion the flesh of the 
world and perpetually make incarnate that which grounds existence, namely being. The 
Intertwining, Merleau-Ponty’s last unfinished chapter, gestures to the relational dialectic between 
body and world, visible and invisible, flesh and being.  
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh gives a normatively different framework for 
expressing the relationship between sentient and sensible. It was the sensuous theology of Nicholas 
Malebranche who, by reading Augustine and Descartes, sought to merge the body, God’s divine 
ideas, and a Cartesian epistemology, with another.96 Malebranche’s metaphysics established two 
fundamental perspectives. First, that a givenness precedes the things of nature. Things of nature 
are manifestations of ideas in the mind of God and make visible that which is given prior and 
invisible. Second, coming to know that which is prior cannot occur without acknowledging the 
place of the body and its experiential acquisition of that which is invisible or given. While 
Malebranche ascribes to the Word the role of mediating between the sentient and sensible, 
Merleau-Ponty is sceptical of that which seems distinct and removed from the immanent and 
material. Traces of Malebranche’s metaphysics are found in the relationship of the visible to the 
invisible in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology.  
The concept of divergence or dehiscence plays a central role in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology 
of the flesh. It registers both sentient and sensible as agents and exists actively and passively in the 
presence of another. These entities are never negated or collapsed in the presence of the other, 
rather they converge in a manner that allows for union and alterity. Here, the term flesh is central 
insofar as it establishes a new vocabulary with which to speak of the body not as an intentional 
consciousness, neither as a subject exerted over an object, but as a non-coercive and open entity 
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existing in relation to another. It is an order of engagement by which the I never enjoys primacy 
over the world in which it functions. It must thus, in its being ‘naturally oriented toward the world’, 
be ignorant of itself.97  
With the primacy of the shared corporeality between sentient and sensible Merleau-Ponty, 
through Malebranche, offers a different rendition to the perceived binary of the things of nature 
and of a sense-perceptual self. In Husserl’s phenomenology, a dual-aspect ontology describes the 
relationship between sense-perception and things of nature, where consciousness exerts itself over 
the things of nature. Sartre’s ontology of nothingness expresses the indeterminate relationship 
between subjective self and the things of nature. With an ontology of nothingness, the things of 
nature stand ambiguous to the sense-perceptual self. The primacy of consciousness and the 
subjective self in Husserl and Sartre stands in contrast to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of 
perception and ontology of the flesh.  
 
Towards a Christian Flesh 
A reading of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception finds its culmination in an ontology 
of the flesh. Based on a reading of his lectures on Nicholas Malebranche, and his progression from 
Husserlian phenomenology and Sartrean existentialism, flesh circumscribes two things; the 
continuum of being that exists between self and other, and embodied existence as the necessary 
condition of possibility for perception. With the recognition that being itself is invisible yet 
simultaneously the condition of possibility for embodied existence, a Merleau-Pontian flesh 
designates two facets of a singular reality.  
The integrative rendering of existence is fruitful for the theological investigation of the 
flesh, because the Christian flesh always stands in relation to another that is both divine and 
created. Where the perceptual other in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology restricts itself to the realm of the 
immanent, one need not exclude the register of the divine in a Christian conception of the flesh. 
The flesh of Christ in the incarnation is the embodiment of the divine in the created order and 
continues to be the condition of possibility for the perception of the divine. Instead of introducing 
a dualistic structure where the flesh of Christ and the flesh of persons exist competitively, flesh 
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may be rendered in a complementary way. The incarnation, affirms the materiality of existence as 
the mode by which to perceive self, created other and divine.  
 The question which immediately arises however, is whether Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of 
the flesh with its skepticism of transcendence can contribute to a theology of the flesh? Can 
Merleau-Ponty’s theorising resonate with that which is confessed within the Christian tradition? 
Ola Sigurdson in Heavenly Bodies: Incarnation, the Gaze, and Embodiment in Christian Theology 
responds to this question when he writes: 
In modern times transcendence has come to stand for something that is “far away”. A 
transcendent God, according to this way of understanding transcendence, is not a God who 
is worthy of humanity, because we need a God who is “near” us. If transcendence means 
that something is remote this is correct, but if transcendence could be understood as 
“difference,” it is hardly the opposite of presence or immanence.98  
Sigurdson’s proposal that one read transcendence as difference as opposed to distance is 
instructive. It curtails a rendering of the invisible as that which is detached and removed from the 
embodied and concrete. Transcendence does not translate, in other words, as the invisible detached 
from the realm of the visible, but as the ground of the visible. Sigurdson continues, 
‘[t]ranscendence is not the downfall of the human, but rather her consummation, and this is an 
important insight’.99 The simultaneity does not amount to a zero-sum game, rather, it ascribes to 
embodied existence the dimension of gesturing, performing, and instantiating the divine.  
A Merleau-Pontian phenomenology centers on the intertwining of the visible and the 
invisible, the former is the manifest expression of the latter, and the latter is the ground of 
possibility of the former. Ola Sigurdson echoes this aspect when he writes, ‘Maurice Merleau-
Ponty has argued that the invisible, as a condition for our being able to experience the visible, is 
not something absolutely invisible, but rather “the invisible of this world, that which inhabits the 
world”.100 In this sense, the invisible is grounded in the immanent. Bearing in mind that 
transcendence need not denote distance as much as difference, transcendence and immanence are 
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not mutually exclusive but complementary. The realm of the invisible, instead of being bereft of 
its presence by the transcendent, is instead brought into relief by the transcendent.  
The centrality of the visible and invisible to Merleau-Ponty’s flesh is equally central to a 
theology of the flesh. In the affirmation of presence as difference, whether it be the immanent or 
transcendent, both stand in a state of relation to another. Flesh speaks of a simultaneity of 
presences, of the self to itself and to another, whether it be created or divine. To use the term flesh 
is to hold together two aspects of existence, the invisible and the visible as well as the transcendent 
and immanent. With the said rendering, it is fruitful to employ flesh in the construction of a 
theology of the flesh because the Word becomes flesh at the incarnation. To employ the term flesh 
within the Christian theological context, is also an act of recognition, that Christ incarnate assumed 
no other mode of existence than the affective and embodied.   
Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh, in its recovery of the body for Western philosophy, 
presents itself especially for the retrieval of the body and its learning in the context of Christian 
theology. For an ontology of the flesh presents itself relationally and participatorally. Flesh exists 
at the intersection of relationality and participation insofar as it is the ground of perception, and 
the shared existence which constitutes perception. Flesh orders the sense-perceptual self 
relationally to that which is other than itself. According to the logic of an ontology of the flesh, a 
sense-perceptual self can never stand removed from the realities in which that person exists. It 
shapes and is shaped by those sensible elements which present itself for consideration.  
Within a discipline such as theology which persistently seeks to express itself in embodied 
terms, articulating the body in relation to self, things of nature, and the divine is central, not only 
in its constituting of the Christian flesh, but also in establishing the role that sense-perception has 
in transforming the Christian flesh. Brought back to the critique of the negated Christian flesh, 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of double sensation and ontology of the flesh shows all bodies 
as being open to one another and as being shaped by that other. With the openness with which the 
sense-perceptual self stands in relation to both that which is immanent and transcendent, the next 
aspect to be considered is whether the Christian flesh interpreted as matter and Spirit, of body and 
soul, and of earthly and heavenly, opposes the integrated and holistic rendering of the flesh we 
have discussed thus far.  
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Chapter 2 
Towards a Positive Account of Pauline Flesh 
 
Part of the problematic of a diminished Christian flesh is the fact that the term itself has not fared 
well in modern theologies. Feminist theology, especially, lodges its critique by emphasising the 
part that Paul has to play. According to this line of critique, the Pauline legacy is riddled with 
binaries and dualisms. There are the binaries of body and soul, of matter and Spirit, and of earthly 
and heavenly. Each binary constructs its own way of speaking of the relationship between material 
and immaterial in mutually exclusive ways. Romans 8:6-8 warrants such mutually exclusive 
language when it reads: 
For to set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace. 
For the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God, for it does not submit to God’s law; 
indeed, it cannot. Those who are in the flesh cannot please God.101 
To exist in the flesh is to exist in opposition to the Spirit, this is what a first glance at 
Romans 8:6-8 seems to say. In this instance, flesh denotes a myriad of vices – lust, desire, gluttony, 
immorality – all of which are associated with sin.  
This correlation between flesh and sin has been widely accepted. Georg Werner Kümmel, 
however, distances himself from such a reading when he writes, ‘[t]his connection with sin has 
often been understood as if Paul regarded man as sinful simply because of his attachment to 
material things. That is undoubtedly wrong’.102 Like Kümmel, recent scholarship in Pauline studies 
suggests that the traditional correlation of Paul’s flesh as a sinful flesh is due to various factors 
including the misinterpretation of the time, context and social-location in which Paul writes. On 
the one hand, such misinterpretation loses a truly Pauline anthropology insofar as it perpetuates a 
failed correlation between sin and flesh. On the other hand, the misinterpretation of Paul’s flesh as 
a demonised and thereby negated flesh, falsely keeps alive the notion that the Christian Scriptures 
propagate escapist mentalities.  
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Alongside other New Testament scholars, Susan Eastman is doing important work in 
retrieving Paul’s anthropology for today. In Paul and the Person: Reframing Paul’s Anthropology, 
Eastman speaks of ‘Paul’s person’, a term denoting a multi-layered structure of personhood which 
is determined by various socio-ethical and philosophical influences. The absence of contemporary 
formulations of Paul’s person is due, Eastman suggests, to the relative lack of studies in Paul’s 
anthropology.103 The lack includes ‘a theological aversion to anthropocentric approaches to 
Pauline theology’ and ‘a wariness of reductionist readings of Paul’.104 Attending to Paul’s person 
as Eastman does,105 also means attending to the role that the Word, the Spirit, and the flesh plays 
in Paul’s writings. The book of Romans, especially, is densely populated with the language of 
flesh, body, and Spirit.  
At the intersection of Word, Spirit, and flesh, three anxieties arise. First, a penal 
substitution reading of the Cross in Paul leads, as Tom Wright suggests, to the idea that existence 
in the flesh needs to be vindicated by Christ’s death.106 With this model, Christ suffers for the sake 
of the sins committed in the flesh, a logic which strengthens the thesis that the body and its 
engagements with the world is inherently sinful and as such, needs correction. Second, that Paul’s 
description of the Spirit as life and flesh as death sets their functioning in mutually exclusive terms. 
The choice between life or death readily becomes the choice for the spiritual over the material. 
The error inherent to this proposed mutually exclusive relationship Eastman suggests, is one which 
relates to the construction of sin and its place in Paul’s soteriology.107 The question at hand 
becomes whether one should read sin in Paul’s person as being inherent to the flesh. The final 
anxiety, described by Grant Macaskill, relates to an anthropocentric reading of Paul’s theology of 
 
103 Eastman, Susan Grove. 2017. Paul and the Person: Reframing Paul’s Anthropology. Michigan: 
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105 I take the cue from Eastman when using this term. All future uses are made in recognition of 
her research published in Paul and the Person: Reframing Paul’s Anthropology. See Eastman, 
Paul and the Person., pp. 85-104. 
106 Wright, Tom. 2017. The Day the Revolution Began: Rethinking the Meaning of Jesus’ 
Crucifixion. London: SPCK., pp. 286-7. 
107 Eastman, Susan Grove. 2018. ‘Oneself in Another: Participation and the Spirit in Romans 8’. 
In ‘In Christ’ in Paul: Explorations in Paul’s Theology of Union and Participation., edited by 
Michael J. Thate, Kevin J. Vanhoozer, and Constantine R. Campbell, 103–26. Michigan: 
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the Cross. An anthropocentric reading casts the Cross as the moment of reconciliation between 
human and divine but leaves indeterminate the status of the created order.108  
Addressing these anxieties requires a multi-faceted approach. First, the Cross should be re-
interpreted within the greater salvific drama of God’s vocational covenant with Israel.109 Second, 
one must establish the function of the Spirit in Paul’s theology of the Cross. Here, the governing 
question is whether the Cross inaugurates a new dispensation which is marked by the competition 
of matter and Spirit, and whether the Spirit nullifies the place of the body in a vision of God’s new 
kingdom.110 Third, one must bring the thematic of a royal priesthood in Paul into focus.111 By 
addressing the above three anxieties, the focus falls on the relationship of human to divine. Since 
Paul is the normative starting point for a theological investigation of the flesh, the interplay of 
Word, Spirit and flesh is integral in this pursuit.  
Establishing the interrelationship of the aforementioned can be done by revisiting each 
occurrence of flesh and body in Paul’s writings. This task, however, has already been done and 
points the way forward. Another approach wishes to understand the potentiality of these terms as 
it relates to Paul’s person. The latter approach best describes the intention of this chapter and 
situates the task within Paul’s theology of the Cross and its relation to Word, Spirit and flesh. 
Three New Testament scholars prominent for their contributions to this thematic are Eastman, 
Macaskill and Wright. This chapter borrows from their theorising in its conceptualisation of a 
Pauline flesh as one finds it in the book of Romans.  
 
Establishing the Terrain  
Two terms at the center of Paul’s much contested anthropology are sōma (body) and sarx (flesh). 
For Susan Eastman and Ola Sigurdson, reading Paul’s theology of the body, and retrieving it for 
today, means reviewing Paul’s use of these terms. In their respective constructions of Paul’s 
 
108  Grant Macaskill re-reads the place of pneumatology in Paul and as such makes headway into 
the re-evaluation of Paul’s soteriology. See Macaskill, Grant. 2018. ‘Incarnational Ontology and 
the Theology of Participation in Paul’. In ‘In Christ’ in Paul: Explorations in Paul’s Theology of 
Union and Participation, 87–102. Michigan: Eerdmans. 
109 Wright, The Day the Revolution Began., 263-294. 
110 Wright, The Day the Revolution Began., 277.  
111 Here, a reading of the Epistle to the Romans will show, the relationship between persons and 
God in Paul is encompassing and points to a grander salvific narrative cast in terms of Israel’s 
messianic expectation. 
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anthropology, both Eastman and Sigurdson find in Paul a comprehensive and complex 
constellation of uses for flesh and body. Because Paul’s writings span several epistles, one finds 
different meanings for flesh and body as is determined by the context in which Paul writes, and 
the matters being discussed. It is to be expected, therefore, that Paul should receive so much 
attention, for his epistles not only vary in context and emphasis but also in the articulation of the 
self.  
For Eastman and Sigurdson, sōma in Paul describes the ways in which a person is 
structured individually but always in relation to another. The prevailing presence of the other in 
the constitution of the self, places the body within the social and communal contexts of 
existence.112 Sōma has the potentiality of being relationally ordered to another, and to participate 
in more extensive matrices of relation. Ola Sigurdson suggests ‘[s]ōma designates the person in 
her relationship to God, sin, or neighbour. It is in sōma that the person’s faith is lived out and in 
which she serves God’.113 Each relational matrix in which a body participates is fluid, and can be 
ordered both to the created order and the divine – it can exist in relation to the immanent and 
transcendent.114 While the body is constituted by the matrices of relation in which it exists, its 
subjectivity and autonomy must not be lost.115 ‘There is no freestanding “self” in Paul’s cosmos,’ 
Eastman suggests, ‘nor is there a neutral environment within which human beings may act out 
their personal lives...’116 The body is therefore, ‘an aspect of a person’s whole character in those 
relationships that she stands in’.117 Both Eastman and Sigurdson find in Paul a construction of the 
body as open, as being intertwined with the created order, and as partaking in God’s revelation 
through their embodied existence. 
When reading sōma as that which is particular to an autonomous subjective self who is 
relationally ordered to self, created and divine, sarx assumes a different role in Paul’s writings. It 
is this term that has received a lot of attention when wanting to critique the Christian flesh because 
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it is the aspect of embodied existence most associated with the desires and affections which make 
up who a person is. Sarx receives a lot of attention in Paul’s writing because it is often discussed 
in relation to sin. Notably, the proximity of sarx and sin in Paul’s writings has led interpreters, in 
some instances, to conflate their meaning. With the centrality that affections and desires have in 
orientating a person, and with their tendency to be expressed independently from the body, flesh 
has been interpreted as that aspect of embodied existence which can exert itself autonomously 
from, for example, the soul. 
Sarx like sōma, Eastman suggests, is characterised by the fact that it is open to factors of 
influence.118 The difference between the two lies with the place that sarx occupies in Paul’s 
writings. Sarx circumscribes the powers and affections of a person which is expressed relationally 
through the body. The occurrence of sarx in Galatians and Romans, Eastman writes, ‘suggest a 
pattern of talking about persons in which the self is never on its own but always socially and 
cosmically constructed in relationship to external realities that operate internally as well’.119 Sarx 
is thus the ‘register’ by which a subjective self perceives the world, and by such perceptions, 
engages with the world in which it exists.  
Is sinfulness inherent to Paul’s flesh? According to Eastman and Sigurdson, it is not. It is, 
however, constantly shaped by the relations in which it stands, and can be ordered either to that 
which brings life or that which brings death. Coming to terms with sarx and sōma in Paul does not 
mean differentiating between that which is inherently good or evil, it means locating a person 
within their network of relations and establishing how such a network influences the articulation 
of the self. Paul’s person describes both the realms of the affective and of the social. Here, flesh 
describes the thoughts, habits and desires of a singular being, and body the terms by which a person 
engages collectively.  
Taken together, flesh and body constitute two dimensions of a singular, autonomous self. 
A self, whose body and flesh do not act independently, but in unison, at the influence of the social 
and communal contexts in which it functions. In this openness, Paul’s person has various 
resonances with Merleau-Ponty’s flesh. Both Paul and Merleau-Ponty’s persons are relationally 
ordered to the existence of another, whether the things of nature in phenomenological terms or the 
 
118 Eastman, Paul and the Person., 8. 
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created order in theological terms. And, both map a person’s existing in the ‘mimetic spectrum 
between absolute difference and equivalence’.120  
The similarities between Paul and Merleau-Ponty point to the fact that, like a Merleau-
Pontian flesh, the Christian flesh is an integrated flesh. The difference between the 
phenomenological and biblical articulation of the flesh lies in the objectives of the said approaches. 
Such is the case, shows Sigurdson, when he maps the concern of phenomenology at the hand of 
Descartes’ legacy, and the concern of biblical texts as that of being a resource for a theology of 
the body. Sigurdson writes:  
…in contrast with the phenomenological investigation of the body, in the biblical texts it 
is not a matter of discovering the transcendental structures of the body, but about how it is 
included in an existential drama of salvation, which can also cast new light on the 
understanding of its transcendental structures. The body is in other words already involved 
in ethical, psychological, and theological conflicts.121  
The difference in renditions of the body lies in that biblical texts are not ordered by a Cartesian 
logic. Instead, they seek to account for persons as they are said to relate to the divine. Sigurdson’s 
identification of two modes of approach is helpful because it shows that biblical texts do not 
concern themselves with the dualisms of mind and body that are associated with Descartes.122 It 
also shows that the presence of such dualisms in Christian theology is symptomatic of an 
anachronistic reading of modern philosophical problems into ancient biblical texts.  
While the starting point for phenomenology is the interrelationship of consciousness and 
thing of nature, the starting point for biblical texts is God’s embrace of persons and the 
communication thereof within the created order. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology does not task 
itself, therefore, with accounting for the presence of the divine, especially when transcendence 
denotes distance instead of difference as Ola Sigurdson has shown.123 A Christian ontology of the 
flesh, however, in its affirmation of the place of the transcendent in the embodied engagements of 
persons, does have this task of accounting for existence in the flesh in the presence of God.  
 
120 Eastman, Paul and the Person., 145.  
121 Sigurdson, Heavenly Bodies., 364.  
122 Sigurdson, Heavenly Bodies., 365.  
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material world. See Sigurdson, Heavenly Bodies., 273. 
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With the acceptance that God is the source and foundation of all that is, the question arises 
as to the nature of God’s presence in the created order. In terms of Paul’s relational matrix, one 
may ask how the flesh is ordered by God, and whether there is an instance in the Christian tradition 
that holds human and divine together.  
We have conceded thus far that Paul’s person is one who is relationally ordered by the 
presence of another. Because one can only truly be ordered to another through the materiality of 
one’s existence, flesh and body become registers of perception. In Merleau-Ponty, perception is 
mediated by the order of things. In Paul, perception is mediated by both the order of things, and 
the presence of the divine. Paul’s person thus exists within the created order as an independent 
sense-perceptual self who, through its embodied engagements with the created order, comes to 
know the invisible. At stake here is the question of divine intelligibility.  
Describing the relation that persons bear to the divine and how God reveals Godself to 
persons, is a task associated with theological anthropology. When describing phenomenology and 
theological anthropology alongside one another, the intent is not to cast them as mutually 
exclusive, to the contrary, it is to show the centrality of experience as a register of embodied 
perception and it serves to show the centrality of perception to the conception of self in relation to 
the divine. Both disciplines acknowledge experience as an individual and collective relational 
matrix in which perception takes place. Both pay attention to the self and the set of practices and 
beliefs that govern those interactions.  
 
Reading Paul’s Person in the Book of Romans  
Having schematically laid out sarx and sōma as that which is structured by the affective, social 
and communal matrices of relation in which Paul’s person stands, the next step is to establish how 
such relation is articulated at the hand of the Word who became flesh, and of the Spirit’s mediation 
thereof. In few instances of Paul’s writings do Word, Spirit and flesh intersect as they do in the 
book of Romans. In Paul’s letter to the Romans, his theology of the Cross holds together the 
relationship of flesh to body, of flesh to Cross, and of flesh to Spirit.  
Unlike his other epistles, which address the church of a particular region, Paul’s letter to 
the Romans addresses many small faith gatherings. Its purpose is to secure good credit with the 
gatherings and to present the logic of a new dispensation, or law, in Christ. Themes throughout 
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new dispensation, the place of the Jewish nation, and a description of Christ-like conduct. 
Structurally, the letter divides into four sections: 1-4, 5-8, 9-11, and 12-16.  
In Romans 1:1-4, Paul identifies himself as a continuer of the work already begun by the 
prophets.124 At key moments, the prophets signaled God’s presence to the Israelites. In 
continuation of their work, Paul shows to the Romans the ways in which God’s presence manifests 
to them. The starting point is the created order, which by its very existence testifies to its Creator. 
That God reveals Godself through the created order is a fact Malebranche also accepts in his 
construction of a sensuous theology. For Malebranche, to look upon the created order is to see 
God’s divine ideas made visible to perception. The logic Malebranche draws on is 
characteristically Pauline. Romans 1:20 reads:  
For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly 
perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made...125 
There is in no uncertain terms a correlation between the created order and God’s general revelation. 
Not only does the created order reveal God generally but such revelation is also manifest to the 
senses.  
The correlation between God’s revelation in the created order and its visibility to the senses 
extends to become the criteria of perception for distinguishing the wise and foolish. Those who 
fail to see God in the created order, Romans 1:20b shows, are fools. The possibility of persons to 
either succeed or fail in perceiving God establishes a parallel between the senses and the role of 
perception in coming to know God. For where the created order reveals God in order that persons 
may come to see and know God, a failure to see is a failure of the senses to ascend to their divine 
source. While the senses in themselves can perceive God’s revelation, the matrix of relation by 
which the senses are ordered can cause them to either succeed or fail in perceiving the divine. 
 
124 Beverly Roberts Gaventa explains, ‘Despite the fact (or perhaps because) he is an outsider to 
these congregations, Paul identifies himself not in terms of what we might consider customary 
biographical information (his family, place of origin, education), but in terms of God’s action in 
the gospel.’ See Gaventa, Beverly Roberts. 2011. ‘Paul and the Roman Believers’. In The 
Blackwell Companion to Paul, edited by Stephen Westerholm, 93–107. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell., 
97.  
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Since Paul exhorted the faith gatherings in Romans to attune their senses to their Maker in order 
that they may truly live, having their senses inclined to that which is not God, leads to idolatry.126  
Idolatry as the sense-perceptual failure to attune the senses to the divine, arises in Romans 
where the grander narrative of Israel serves as example. To the Israelites were given ‘the oracles 
of God’,127 the divine revelation of God’s presence to the people of Israel, and to the reign which 
God sought to establish on earth.128 Obedience to the Law of Moses meant being ordered by the 
law, and in being ordered by the law, to have the senses oriented to God’s covenant with Israel. 
Paul expresses the failure of perception under the Law of Moses in terms of a paradox, ‘[f]or I do 
not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate’ (Romans 
7:15). The conflicting experience of wanting to do a thing but acting otherwise brings into relief 
the thematic of sin in Paul’s writing.  
Sin in Romans 1-8, according to Eastman, takes on a ‘spiral structure…in which three 
repetitive, overlapping narratives progressively expand the cast of characters and then intensify 
the personal and emotional effects of Paul’s rhetoric’.129 The three accounts are that of sin as that 
which humans do (1:18-5:12), sin as an ‘agent acting in human history’ (5:12-7:7) and finally, sin 
as that which thwarts the life which should have been resultant from the law (7:7-25).130 All three 
point to the fact that sin can affect the senses and influence the ways in which persons are ordered 
to self, other, and God. In Wright’s reading of sin in Paul, two further dimensions are mentioned: 
In Romans 5 Paul moves quietly from talking about “sins,” plural, to “Sin,” singular. In 
5:12 he talks of “sin” entering the world, bringing death in its train. “Sin” is being treated 
as an active power, more than simply the sum total of all human wrongdoing. This accords, 
of course, with the analysis I have given earlier of how “sin” is actually the result of 
idolatry, in which humans hand over their God-given powers to other “forces,” which then 
enslave them.131  
 
126 Romans 1-3 provides the logic of perception where idolatry is the misapprehension of the divine 
in the things of nature. Wright hones in on this logic in The Day the Revolution Began, pp. 75-80.   
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 47 
Whereas sin results when the self is not aligned with God’s purposes revealed in nature and the 
law, sin also acts independently, thwarting the purposes set out for the law by God. The shift from 
‘sins’ to ‘Sin’ in Romans is suggestive because it points to the need for a new law or 
dispensation.132  
While the Israelites had the Law of Moses, the paradox, as Paul suggests, is that persons 
could not attain to it fully.133 Paul articulates a new law in his reading of the role and the place of 
the Cross in Israel’s salvation history. Here, Abraham serves as a forerunner and as a paradigmatic 
example of the life which is to come when God’s revelation is fully grasped through faith. Through 
his faith, Abraham’s senses and affections were oriented to God and directed to instantiate God’s 
presence and reign on earth.134 Abraham was accredited as righteous because he believed the law 
to be the evidence of God’s reconciliatory plan between Godself and persons, and between persons 
and the created order. His faith ordered his senses to perceive the unfolding of God’s plan for the 
created order.135 A plan that takes the very embodied engagements of persons to be the means by 
which God’s vision is to be realised on earth.  
In Romans, a logic is established by which God’s revelation manifests to the senses through 
the created order and the Law of Moses. The logic places the flesh central to God’s revelation, for 
the flesh is the very means by which God is perceived and known. It cannot be, therefore, that the 
flesh is denigrated or subservient to faith, or the believing self. The logic of perception which arises 
from a reading of Romans suggests the exact opposite, that the senses are alive to God’s revelation 
and that, by being ordered through faith, can perceive such revelation. Whereas Romans 1-4 starts 
with God’s general revelation in the created order and moves to the Law of Moses, Romans 5 
following develops a new dispensation inaugurated by Word, Spirit, and flesh.  
As the rest of this chapter will show, one need not understand this dispensation in a 
supersessionist way. Christ does not nullify the Law of Moses by superseding it. Rather, through 
the Cross, Christ fulfils, and continues to fulfil, the requirement under the Law of Moses that sin 
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134 Gaventa, Beverly Roberts. 2011. ‘Paul and the Roman Believers’. In The Blackwell Companion 
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Spirit, not by the letter. His praise is not from man but from God.’ 
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be made right through reconciliation. In Christ and by the Spirit, persons thus exist in a new, or 
Christo-centric, dispensation 
 
A new dispensation in Christ: Word, Spirit and Flesh 
The nature of God’s intelligibility shifts with the incarnation, for Christ is the fullest expression of 
God’s presence to the created order. Whereas the general revelation of nature served as a norm by 
which the sense-perceptual self would come to perceive God’s presence, and the Law of Moses 
served as a means by which the senses would be ordered to God’s vision of a new kingdom, the 
incarnation is the particular and embodied revelation of God who orders the senses to its fount. 
Reading the book of Romans as primarily concerning the incarnation, however, would be to read 
Paul’s thinking partially.  
The Cross plays a prominent part in the book of Romans. The Cross, Macaskill explains, 
is the moment where Israel’s salvific history and the Christ event converge. He writes:  
While adoption is the substance of the eschatological gift, it is also listed as a privilege of 
Israel in Rom 9:4, and the proximity of that statement cannot be a matter of coincidence. 
The Christ gift is presented in terms that explicitly correspond to the story of Israel. This 
is not simplistically to locate the Christ event within a salvation history in which Israel 
played a preparatory role: rather, it is to consider the adoption of Israel as itself belonging 
to the reality of divine presence constituted by the Christ event.136 
The Cross is the paradigm by which the story of the Jews and Gentiles come together, and 
expresses the covenant between God and Israel under the thematic of adoption.137 It is significant 
that one read the Cross as God’s continued presence to Israel because it establishes the Christ gift 
as a progression on God’s revelation to Israel.  
Within Israel’s narrative, the Cross is the particular and embodied revelation of God’s 
presence to persons. Paul explains, ‘[b]ut now we are released from the law, having died to that 
which held us captive, so that we serve in the new way of the Spirit and not in the old way of the 
written code’ (Romans 7:6). Whereas the Law of Moses ordered the senses to God’s revelatory 
 
136 Macaskill, ‘Incarnational Ontology’., 99.  
137 Macaskill, ‘Incarnational Ontology’., pp. 96 – 7. 
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presence, the Cross ushers in a new dispensation by which the senses are oriented to their fount by 
the Son and the Spirit.138  
When brought into relation with perception, a contrast exists between the Law of Moses 
and the Cross.139 The former highlights the inability of the senses to attain to God fully and the 
latter has the Spirit order the senses. Romans 8:10 – 11 reads: 
But if Christ is in you, although the body is dead because of sin, the Spirit is life because 
of righteousness. If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who 
raised Christ Jesus from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies through his Spirit 
who dwells in you. 
The relationship of the sense-perceptual self to the divine rests on the simultaneous affirmation of 
the Son and the Spirit. It is the Son who reconciles persons to God through their adoption and it is 
the Spirit who actualises such an adoption.  
Darren Sarisky calls, what I have termed a simultaneity of presences, dynamic participation 
in Paul.140 With dynamic participation the Son and Spirit together establish salvation and eternal 
communion with God.141 Both Son and Spirit thus fulfil a role in Paul’s soteriology. Whereas the 
Son liberates, the Spirit establishes a participatory relationship between human and divine. 
 
138 ‘Paul’s pneumatology never stands on its own’, notes Ralph Del Colle, ‘[i]ndeed he can speak 
of the Spirit directly and with the confidence of one who knew the Spirit’s guidance and agency 
in his life (Acts 16:6-10)’. Del Colle, Ralph. 2011. ‘Christian Theology: The Spirit’. In The 
Blackwell Companion to Paul, edited by Stephen Westerholm, 561–74. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
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in ons ledemate gewerk om vrug te dra vir die dood. Maar aangesien ons gesterf het, is ons nou 
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bedeling van die Gees en nie in die ou bedeling van die letter van die wet nie.’ Romans 7:4-6. 
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Eastman concurs with Sarisky that the Son liberates persons by ‘his full solidarity with condemned 
humanity, even to the point of crucifixion as a condemned criminal’.142 The Spirit then fulfills the 
participatory logic of Paul soteriology when the Spirit ‘brings that liberation to fruitful experience 
through indwelling the new community that lives “in Christ”’.143 The simultaneous activity of Son 
and Spirit marks the Cross as the inauguration of the law of grace. The law of grace inducts the 
sense-perceptual self into the corporeal grammar of the Cross, a grammar which conveys the 
suffering of Christ in terms resonant with the suffering of Paul’s persons and the created order.  
Romans 8, in particular, registers the corporeal grammar of the Cross in terms of 
groaning.144 In the first instance, Christ’s cry of dereliction echoes the groaning of the created 
order.145 In the second instance, the Spirit is present to such groaning. Between the groaning of 
persons and the groaning of Christ on the Cross, the Spirit carries both human and divine.146 In the 
Spirit’s presence to the Son and the sense-perceptual self, the Spirit is cast in Trinitarian context.147 
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witness of the Spirit with “our spirit” expressed in the communal, public cry to God as “Father,” 
is also such an inner-divine and yet also embodied human communication. In both instances, 
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God of generous love?’ Wright, The Day the Revolution Began., 293.  
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The Spirit makes God known to persons, and communicates the life of persons within the Trinity. 
The plural use of ‘our spirit’ in Romans 8:16 lends to this reading when it states, ‘[t]he Spirit 
himself bears witness with our spirit that we are children of God’.148 Likewise, God is present to 
persons through the Spirit, Romans 8:26 reads, ‘for we do not know what to pray for as we ought, 
but the Spirit himself intercedes for us with groanings too deep for words’. The Spirit thus 
communicates the needs of persons to the Trinity and ministers to persons.  
In the said formulations, the relationship between Son and Spirit is integral to the 
correspondence which exists between the flesh and the Spirit. Where Christ’s crucifixion 
establishes a radical communion between self and Son, the Spirit actualises the union between Son 
and Paul’s person. It would be wrong at this stage to suggest that the Spirit’s work is ad extra as 
though the Son accomplishes it all. To the contrary, it is by the Spirit that the law of grace is 
realised in the believer, it is by the Spirit that life in the flesh becomes life in Christ, and it is 
through the Spirit that the self already partakes of the resurrection body.  
Rather than placing flesh and Spirit in a competitive relationship to another, Paul’s 
language of flesh and Spirit points to the salutary effect that the Son and the Spirit has on the 
senses.149 In the first instance, the Spirit pours out the love communicated through the Cross in the 
hearts of believers (Romans 5:5). In the second instance, it is by the Spirit’s activity in persons 
that their flesh can partake of Christ’s flesh.150 To live according to the Spirit is, therefore, to live 
as a sense-perceptual self whose engagements with the created order are defined by the Spirit’s 
communication of God’s presence to the senses. Having the Spirit order the senses does not 
annihilate the agentic self but perfects it so that it may truly see and know its divine origin.151 Here, 
flesh and Spirit are cast in embodied terms. On the one hand, the senses are the primary mode by 
which persons perceive the created order. On the other hand, the Spirit perpetually reveals God’s 
presence to the senses in the materiality of existence. A convergence takes place in Romans 8:16 
between the Spirit who communicates divine truths to persons and the flesh through which such 
truths are communicated.  
 
148 Romans 8:16 
149 Sigurdson, Heavenly Bodies., 373.  
150 Ayres, Lewis. 2011. ‘Augustine’. In The Blackwell Companion to Paul, edited by Stephen 
Westerholm, 345–60. Oxford: Blackwell., 354.  
151 Romans 8:16 
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To read Paul’s use of flesh and Spirit in dualistic terms is to misinterpret the role that the 
senses have in perceiving God incarnate, and the place of the Son and Spirit in bringing persons 
into union with God.152 Neither the work of the Son nor the work of the Spirit diminishes the place 
of the sense-perceptual self in relation to the divine. The relationship of flesh to Spirit in Paul is 
not one of matter versus Spirit but of matter and Spirit. The shift in articulation makes all the 
difference since such language now points to the new relational matrix which the Cross inaugurates 
and which the Spirit instantiates in the lives of Paul’s person. When Paul speaks about life under 
the law of grace, Spirit and flesh are constantly held together.153 It may thus be helpful, as Wright 
suggests to read the relationship of matter and Spirit, as Messiah and Spirit.154  
By articulating Paul’s theology of the Cross as Messiah and Spirit, the intersection of 
Word, Spirit, and flesh may be extended to the collective existence of persons. The Spirit 
establishes a union between persons, between the sense-perceptual self and Christ, and between 
persons (as a unified collective) and Christ. Here, Christ is the head and advocate for the 
community of persons, and the Spirit is the mediator of the relations between community and 
Christ. Robert Jewett similarly finds that ‘Paul’s language “reflects a collective type of charismatic 
mysticism in which God’s Spirit was thought to enter and energise the community as well as each 
member”’.155 Persons under the law of grace find themselves continuously shaped by the Spirit’s 
communication through the materiality of their existence.  
Notably, when the new body of believers dwell in Christ under the law of grace, Christ 
communes with each individually and communally. It follows that if unity exists between the Spirit 
who indwells each person, and therefore indwells persons as a collective entity, the body of Christ 
shares a graced existence established through the Cross. According to this logic, the Spirit indwells 
persons and so makes Christ present and known to them. Christ, in turn, manifests a new communal 
mode of being, one to which persons are continuously assimilated.156 The rendering of the Son and 
 
152 Ola Sigurdson is equally of the opinion that Paul’s language of flesh and Spirit does not 
entrench a substance dualism. See Sigurdson, Heavenly Bodies., 373.  
153 Del Colle, ‘Christian Theology: The Spirit’., 562.  
154 Wright, The Day the Revolution Began., 277. 
155 Robert Jewett, Romans: A Commentary (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 490-1. In 
Eastman, Susan Grove. 2018. ‘Oneself in Another’., 112.  
156 Eastman, ‘Oneself in Another’., 113.  
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the Spirit’s presence to persons both individually and collectively renders the body of Christ 
cosmically.157  
The conceptualisation of the body of Christ as that which holds individuals and 
communities in being through the Son and the Spirit in Paul, is one which extends to the created 
order. The cosmology of the Cross pertains, therefore, first to the relation of Christ to persons, and 
second to the created order. Just as Romans 8 casts the Spirit as bearing the groans of persons, the 
same chapter also casts the Spirit as bearing the groans of the created order. Romans 8:22 reads, 
‘[f]or we know that the whole creation has been groaning together in the pains of childbirth until 
now’. Wright interprets Paul’s words as pertaining to the task that the Cross has in reconciling 
persons to God, and the task that the Cross has in reconciling persons to the created order – ‘[t]he 
work of the Cross is not designed to rescue humans from creation, but to rescue them for 
creation’.158 He continues: 
Paul does not say that Jesus dies “so that we can go to heaven” ...For Paul, exactly in line 
with Revelation and other early writings, the result of Jesus’s achievement is a new 
creation, a new heaven-and-earth world in which humans can resume their genuinely 
human vocation as the “kingdom of priests,” the “royal priesthood.”159 
Paul’s theology of the Cross is the restoration of both persons and the created order as a vision of 
the new creation that Son and Spirit inaugurate. This vision of reconciliation is not an escapist 
 
157 According to Eastman, the cosmic rendering of the body of Christ is normatively different to 
the cosmologies Paul would have been exposed to during the time of his writing. Paul’s person is 
one who is both corporeally grounded and influenced by the network of relations in which they 
exist. The latter is referred to by scholars as an openness to be cosmologically ordered. During 
Paul’s time of writing, he would have been exposed to several cosmologies. One of these was 
Stoicism. Stoic cosmology saw the material world as being infused by the divine. Here, ‘the divine 
Logos is on a continuum with and immanent in everything’. There is no human ascent or divine 
descent in this instance. Instead, a ‘person is already participating in this God-saturated world, 
already has the spark of divine reason implanted within’. To participate in this world, is therefore 
‘a matter of enacting what is truest about oneself in the givenness of a rationally ordered world’. 
Unlike a stoic cosmology, Paul’s intertwining of flesh and Spirit is unique for its emphasis on 
Christ’s assimilation to the human condition, and the Spirit’s transformation of that condition. See 
Eastman, Paul and the Person., 142.  
158 Wright, The Day the Revolution Began., 290.  
159 Wright, The Day the Revolution Began., 267-8. 
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reconciliation, as Tom Wright argues,160 where the status of the created order is left indeterminate. 
Instead, the created order is placed within the reconciliatory logic of flesh and Spirit 
To consider the interrelationship of Word, Spirit and flesh in Paul is to consider his 
soteriology.161 In Romans, a Pauline soteriology develops at the hand of Christ’s crucifixion,162 
the inauguration of the law of the Spirit who gives life, and the graced manifestation of a new 
creational order. The messianic rule which comes about as a result of the Son’s death and 
resurrection, and the Spirit’s carrying of the human disposition, has God both immanent and 
transcendent to the created order. Considering the grand narrative of Romans, Paul’s soteriology 
unfolds less along the traditionally assumed line of penal substitution than a Messianic and priestly 
line.163 With the latter, the emphasis falls on the restoration of human persons in order that they 
may, as was intended at creation, establish God’s perfect reign on earth. Romans 1-8 advances a 
Trinitarian logic of the Cross by which it places Christ central to Israel’s history.164  
Scholars reading Paul’s theology of the Cross within a Christ-gift paradigm, correlate the 
Spirit’s indwelling of persons under the law of grace with the indwelling of God’s presence in 
Exodus 29:45-46. In Exodus 29:45-46 God declares God’s intention to dwell amongst the 
Israelites. Macaskill suggests: 
…divine presence is specifically associated with covenant. The nation of Israel has a 
special status, one that demarcates it from all other nations, one that is reflected in the 
Passover celebrations, and is now understood in relation to the Christ gift.165 
Here, the emphasis lies in God’s desire to be amongst a community of persons relationally ordered 
to Him. Christ who is the Passover lamb once and for all establishes the possibility for community 
 
160 Wright, The Day the Revolution Began., 299-327. 
161 Wright, The Day the Revolution Began., 271.  
162 Grant Macaskill notes that it would be erroneous to place the incarnation central to Paul’s 
thinking, Paul focuses rather on the Cross and its salvific and unificatory function. See Macaskill, 
‘Incarnational Ontology’ 87–102. 
163 Macaskill, ‘Incarnational Ontology’., 93.  
164 So, Tom Wright argues: ‘Ultimately we have to choose between a proto-trinitarian framework 
for understanding Paul’s view of Jesus’ death and a quasi-pagan one...Romans brings us back 
sharply to the former. Even when theologians and preachers have seen this danger and have 
insisted that what was achieved on the Cross was the direct result of the Father’s love, when the 
goal is Platonized (“going to heaven”) and the human role is moralized (“good and bad 
behaviour”), the structure of the implicit story will still run in the wrong direction. Wright, The 
Day the Revolution Began., 289.  
165 Macaskill, ‘Incarnational Ontology’., 93. 
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and the indwelling of the Spirit in persons. This new relational existence, the work of Macaskill, 
Eastman and Wright suggest is a new-found paradigm of filiation through the Cross.  
When the Cross is read as the simultaneous activity of the Son and the Spirit, new 
paradigms of filiation are rendered in Paul.166 First, the incarnation is the ground of possibility for 
union with Christ. Christ’s assumption of flesh establishes the equality of relations between human 
and divine by assuming that which he intended to heal. Following scholars who read Paul’s 
soteriology as a commentary on Israel’s messianic narration, Christ’s death and resurrection then 
bridges the ontological gap between human and divine. Second, the Cross orients the senses to its 
fount through the law of grace by the Spirit. In the Spirit, the senses partake in the new paradigm 
of filiation which the Cross inaugurates. Existence under the Law of Moses is now the selfsame 
existence under the law of grace.  
With Paul’s rendering of the flesh a graced exchange takes place between life in the flesh 
and life in the Spirit. Paul’s purpose is to communicate God’s presence in the lived and embodied 
existence of persons. Christ is the perfection of flesh under the law of grace, and the Spirit makes 
communion between Christ and persons possible. The Spirit furthermore intercedes for persons in 
groans that are beyond words. Whereas it is the same Spirit who lives in each believing person and 
the body of Christ, the Spirit remains present to each person then and now. Notably, Paul’s 
soteriology unfolds as an embodied and sustained rendering of an already graced community in 
the present realm of existence. It is the case for those first recipients of Paul’s letter in Rome, as it 
is for churches reading Romans 1-8 today.  
There are two elements to Paul’s soteriology, life in the flesh, and life in Christ by the 
Spirit. Whereas one may mistakenly think that these two realms exist in opposition to each other 
in a quasi-cosmic battle, this reading of Romans shows otherwise. The occurrences of flesh and 
Spirit denote, a reading of Romans 1-8 suggests, two paradigms of filiation. Whereas Romans 1-
4 concerned itself with unrighteousness as a result of a misplaced paradigm of filiation, Romans 
5-8 sketches existence through the logic of grace. With the pneumatologically laden Romans 8, 
Paul’s theology of the Cross is one characterised by a Trinitarian paradigm of filiation.167  
 
166 Paul predicates ‘Jesus as God’s own Son (Rom. 8:3. 32), the firstborn, or only, son. The rest of 
humanity possesses, in light of this one, the status of adopted children; they have received the 
Spirit of sonship.’ Van der Kooi, Cornelis. 2018. The Incredibly Benevolent Force: The Holy Spirit 
in Reformed Theology and Spirituality. Michigan: Eerdmans., 63.  
167 Wright, The Day the Revolution Began., 276-94. 
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Flesh and the Cross in Paul 
From a reading of Romans, the flesh is understandably central to Paul. It is central to God’s 
revelation to persons through the created order and the Law of Moses, it is central to the incarnation 
and the Cross, and it is central to a new dispensation under the law of grace. With the centrality of 
the flesh to Paul’s theology, the senses are perpetually implicated in the grammar that the Cross 
establishes. The Cross, as a progression in God’s revelation within Israel’s history, establishes a 
new corporeal grammar by which persons are to relate to God.  
In its semantics of groaning, the Cross orders the senses to their fount through the Son and 
the Spirit. Reading the relationship of the senses to the Cross, as Eastman, Macaskill and Wright 
suggest, must be done in relation to Israel’s covenantal relationship with God. When abstracting 
the Cross from Israel’s history, it loses its unique articulation of the sense-perceptual self in relation 
to God. As the moment where God avails to the senses a participative norm by which to know God 
and be known by God in bodily terms, the Cross instantiates God’s continued initiative to 
commune with persons.  
To read the flesh as occasioning the Cross would be to misinterpret the reconciliatory role 
of the Cross in Paul’s vision of God’s new kingdom. Flesh and body in Paul, denotes more than 
mere matter. Flesh circumscribes the affective dimension of a person’s existence. It speaks to how 
the sense-perceptual self has their senses oriented to the Cross through the Son and by the Spirit. 
Without the senses, a sense-perceptual self cannot perceive the Cross as the particular revelation 
of God nor can it be ordered to the divine. Likewise, the body is central to Paul’s theology. It, like 
the flesh, is open to be ordered by another. In the book of Romans, that other is the Trinity revealed 
through the Son and ministered to persons by the Spirit.  
The Cross establishes Christ’s cosmic body, whereby persons exist both in relation to God 
and to others. The reconciliatory relationship between God and persons extends, as a reading of 
Romans 8 shows, to the created order. The new kingdom of God inaugurated through the law of 
grace includes the flourishing of the created order. Paul’s theology of the Cross does not leave the 
created order indeterminate, instead it places the created order within the reconciliatory logic of 
flesh and Spirit, and flesh and creation. Paul’s theology of the Cross gives persons the task of 
establishing God’s new kingdom on earth.  
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This then is the logic of the Messiah and Spirit: the senses are oriented to God’s grand 
vision for the created order through Christ who is the fulfilment of the law and the final 
reconciliation between God, persons, and the created order. By the Spirit, the flesh of Paul’s person 
is united with Christ’s flesh, establishing a new paradigm of filiation which orders and transforms 
the senses. From the outset of the Christian narrative, the Spirit is present: The Spirit is manifest 
at creation when life is breathed into all that is.168 The Spirit is present to the prophets, and those 
who ensured the continuance of the Davidic line. The Spirit is present to Mary at the annunciation. 
The Spirit confirms the messianic vocation of the Son at his baptism. And, the Spirit is present to 
Christ’s call of dereliction, and the Spirit is given to all at Pentecost. Paul’s person, through Christ, 
is the final revelation of God’s vision for a new kingdom established in the present. As the 
perfection of the imago dei through Christ, Paul’s person manifests God’s presence on earth, and 
so becomes, in his or her own right, evidence of God’s reconciliatory vision in Christ.  
Paul’s theology of the Cross, in its transformation of the sense-perceptual self’s existence 
in relation to the divine, establishes a corporeal ontology. Insofar as it is the Spirit who makes God 
immanent to persons, it is also the Spirit who makes persons immanent to God. To be immanent 
to God is to be grounded in Christ by the Spirit who perpetually upholds such relations. This 
qualification is important because it resists any conflation of God and person in Paul’s theology of 
the Cross. Paul’s theology is suggestive because it provides a paradigm of filiation where persons 
are distinctive and yet assimilated to a cosmic reality greater than themselves. In Paul’s 
cosmological re-ordering of the flesh, the Word and Spirit together establish a logic of union and 
participation. In doing so, it renders the self open not only to the realm of the immanent but also 
to the realm of the transcendent.  
Several conclusions may now follow: Regarding the critique that Paul advances body 
negating sentiments and a dualistic rendering of existence, Paul’s unique soteriology provides the 
answer. Paul’s soteriology rests on the doctrine of participation where persons partake in Christ 
who is the second person of the Trinity. By existing in Christ, the existence of the sense-perceptual 
self is rendered in sacramental terms. The sense-perceptual self has God immanent to their 
existence. As to the relationship of the phenomenal flesh to the flesh of Scripture, the two terms 
 
168 Studebaker Jr., John A. 2016. ‘Theology Proper: The Lordship of the Holy Spirit’. In Third 
Article Theology: A Pneumatological Dogmatics, edited by Myk Habets, 55–76. Minneapolis: 
Fortress., 66. 
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vary in their scope and meaning. We may recall Sigurdson’s suggestion that the flesh of Scripture 
describes the relationship of the sense-perceptual self to the God who is both transcendent and 
immanent to human existence. Here, transcendence denotes difference rather than distance.169  
To be in the flesh, Paul argues, is to be cosmically ordered to another. To be in the body of 
Christ, Paul further argues, is to be cosmically ordered to the Word and the Spirit. Here, the 
immanent and transcendent converge in the person of Jesus and in the working of the Spirit. The 
body of Christ has the Spirit immanent to it in every way. It is the Spirit who establishes an 
ontological continuum between self and other persons, and between self and divine. It is also 
through the Spirit that persons may come better to know God’s will. The body of Christ is, 
therefore, an immanent and transcendental body. This rendering of the flesh need not oppose the 
flesh of phenomenology, as Sigurdson has comprehensively explained.170  
To map Paul’s theological anthropology is not for the faint of heart, not least because his 
corpus spans at least eight Epistles and is exhaustively interpreted by scholars. The body within 
Christian discourses is hotly debated and is widely blamed for negative renderings of embodied 
existence. This chapter attempted to participate within the debate on life in the flesh as Paul frames 
it. It started with a reading of Paul’s somatology in terms of flesh and body. Sarx and sōma were 
shown to function within a complex cosmology that straddles the line between sin and grace. Next, 
we identified Romans as an Epistle which holds together the realms of experience and a robust 
Trinitarian theology. Romans 1-8 presented itself especially as a framework for reading Paul’s 
theological anthropology along the lines of Christology, pneumatology, and soteriology. The final 
section focused on the relations between flesh and Spirit in a Trinitarian context and established a 
contemporary discourse.  
 
 
  
 
169 Sigurdson, Heavenly Bodies., 273. 
170 Sigurdson goes into great depth when explaining the similarities and differences between the 
flesh of Scripture and the flesh of phenomenology. Sigurdson, Heavenly Bodies., 363-6.  
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Chapter 3 
Athanasius and God Incarnate 
 
Without the absolute affirmation that Christ was both human and divine, the flesh of the sense-
perceptual self cannot partake in Christ’s divine economy. A reading of Paul’s person in the book 
of Romans has disclosed a rich discussion on the nature of embodied existence in the presence of 
God. The Cross forms a central part in a Pauline reading of the flesh since it is through the Cross 
and by the Spirit that a new paradigm of filiation is brought to bear. Paul’s characteristic use of 
sarx and sōma delineates the realms of the affective and relational as the modes by which the self 
is ordered to the human and the divine. Such re-ordering can occur through the Son and the Spirit, 
who together conform the self to the divine.  
We have found in Chapter two that Paul’s anthropology is not riddled with dualisms, and 
that one can retrieve in Romans a positive account of flesh and body. In order for us to see what 
implication a positive Pauline anthropology has for a Christian ontology of the flesh, we need to 
establish next the part that the incarnation plays. For it is specifically Christ’s perfect union of 
human and divine that is key to an embodied and participatorial anthropology. 
The language of union depends on two doctrinal affirmations: the absolute divinity and 
humanity of the incarnate Son, and the absolute equality of the Spirit to the Father and the Son. 
Within the conciliar debates of the early church, few were as determined to argue for the Son’s 
divinity and the Spirit’s equality than Athanasius of Alexandria. Athanasius’ writings develop a 
doctrine of the Son and the Spirit which renders the life of the Trinity manifest to the sense-
perceptual self. Uniquely articulated in his dictum, ‘God became human in order that [hu]man 
could become God’,171 Athanasius’ writings provide a unique grammar which maps the life of the 
sense-perceptual self in relation to the divine. 
 
171 I take the occurrence of ‘man’ in the text to mean human insofar as Athanasius employs no 
hierarchy of male or female in his writings. Furthermore, the use of ‘man’ is a generic term in his 
texts referring to the collective. For these reasons, ‘human’ is an appropriate (and characteristically 
modern) substitute. Athanasius of Alexandria. n.d. ‘Orationes Contra Arianos: Four Discourses 
against the Arians.’ In NPNF2-04. Athanasius: Select Works and Letters, translated by Philip 
Schaff. Christian Classics Ethereal Library. Accessed 10 February 2017. 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf204.html., §9, 827-8.   
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One of the well known writings of Athanasius is On the Incarnation, a text that expounds 
the incarnation as God’s visible-making through the materiality of existence. The incarnation 
thereby gives to persons a corporeal grammar by which to perceive the divine. Here, the Spirit 
conforms the sense-perceptual self to the Christo-centric grammar of the incarnation. This 
grammar of the incarnation finds its truest expression through the Spirit. By holding the Son and 
Spirit together, Athanasius is deeply Pauline in his thinking. To Athanasius, it is the Spirit who 
conforms us to Christ; it is the Spirit who gives us life; it is the Spirit according to whom we live; 
it is the Spirit who makes us children of God, and finally, it is the Spirit who is co-eternal and 
indivisible from the Father and Son. To be incorporated into Christ’s economy is to have one’s 
existence shaped by the Spirit. 
In the Son’s economy, and the Spirit’s mediation of that economy, the sense-perceptual 
self exists within the life of Trinity. One finds a logic of perception advancing in this simultaneous 
affirmation of Son and Spirit as the Spirit continuously transforms and enlivens the senses. With 
such a transformation, the sense-perceptual self incrementally grows toward God through its 
enactment of its Christo-centric existence. The implication of the sense-perceptual self and the 
divine in Athanasius’ writings sets the stage for a theory of perception constituted by the Son and 
the Spirit. In its affirmation of the humanity and divinity of Christ communicated to persons by 
the Spirit, Athanasius’s writings present themselves especially for consideration in the 
construction of a Christian ontology of the flesh. This is because his writings avail a theological 
framework of perception that renders new insights for a reading of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of 
the flesh.  
Whereas Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh establishes the sense-perceptual self as one 
who is inextricably interwoven with the things of nature, Paul’s writings register the Cross as the 
predominant framework by which the sense-perceptual self is ordered to the divine. Athanasius’ 
writings take us further by developing a key component of a Christian ontology of the flesh, a 
grammar of perception informed by the Son and the Spirit. It is integral to establish the place of 
the Son and the Spirit to perception because perception is constantly defined at the hand of new 
embodied realities, and new modes of engaging with the world.  
Athanasius’ writings have received renewed interest in contemporary scholarship. In God, 
Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay ‘On the Trinity’, Sarah Coakley focusses on Athanasius’ 
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pneumatology and the transformative presence of the Spirit to persons.172 To her, a re-reading of 
Athanasius’ Letters to Serapion concerning the Holy Spirit suggests a progression in the father’s 
thinking from a predominantly Christo-centric discourse in On the Incarnation to a more 
pneumatology-centred articulation of the self in relation to the divine. The development avails, as 
Coakley shows, a language by which the Spirit is constantly present to the self.173 As yet under-
emphasised, but explicit through contemporary theorising, is the role that the Spirit plays in giving 
shape to perception. Athanasius’ Letters to Serapion concerning the Holy Spirit provides new 
avenues for thinking through the Spirit and the embodied existence of the sense-perceptual self.  
 
Divine and Human: The Foundations of a Christian Ontology of the Flesh 
That God becomes human in order that persons may know God more intimately, presents itself 
especially for consideration. The place of the flesh in a Christian ontology, On the Incarnation 
reads, starts with the doctrine of creation ex nihilo (out of nothing), where God brings into 
existence all that is by His Word. While it is the Word that was spoken at creation, by whom all 
things are moved and through whom creation receives their being, it is the Father and the Spirit 
who together enable the Word’s creative role.174 Athanasius explains, ‘[t]he immanence, or 
intimate presence and unceasing agency of God in nature, does not belong to the Word as distinct 
from the Father, but to the Father in and through the Word, in a word to God as God’.175 That the 
Word is spoken as the ‘let us make’ of Genesis 1:26ff, suggests the intimate communion which 
exists within the Trinity.  
The nature of God’s bringing into existence all that is by his Word is characteristically 
done so ex nihilo. The ‘out of nothing’ is instructive for the differentiation it makes between 
creation and Creator. Creation brings two aspects into relation with another, the immaterial Word 
 
172 Coakley, Sarah. 2013. God, Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay on the Trinity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. See also Coakley, Sarah. 2015. The New Asceticism: Sexuality, 
Gender and the Quest for God. London: Bloomsbury.  
173 Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self., pp. 132-141. 
174 Athanasius of Alexandria. 2011. On the Incarnation: Saint Athanasius. Translated by John 
Behr. Popular Patristics Series 44B. New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press., §1., pp. 49-50.  
175 Athanasius of Alexandria. n.d. ‘Dei Incarnatione: On the Incarnation’. In NPNF2-04. 
Athanasius: Select Works and Letters, edited by Philip Schaff. Vol. 4. Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, II. Michigan: Christian Classics Ethereal Library., 226.  
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who is outside the bounds of time and the created order which exists in materiality and time. On 
the Incarnation reads:  
From it [creation] we know that, because there is a Mind behind the universe, it did not 
originate itself; because God is infinite, not finite, it was not made from pre-existent matter, 
but out of nothing and out of non-existence absolute and utter God brought it into being 
through the Word.176 
Creation is an intentional act whereby God brings all that is into being. God is hereby immanent 
to the created order and yet transcendent to it. Existence in the materiality of the flesh thus marks 
two moments, the first where God brings into existence from non-existence, and the second when 
such existence receives the image of God. This ontological differentiation between creature and 
Creator is instructive because it places the Word central to the mediation of the sense-perceptual 
self and the divine.  
The incarnation is the expression of God’s mediation of the ontological gap between 
creature and Creator in the Second person of the Trinity. In this regard, Athanasius writes:  
Existing in a human body, to which He Himself give life, He is still Source of life to all the 
universe, present in every part of it, yet outside the whole; and He is revealed both through 
the works of His body and through His activity in the world…At one and the same time 
this is the wonder, as Man He was living a human life, and as Word He was sustaining the 
life of the universe, and as Son He was in constant union with the Father.177 
In the passage above, there are two ways of reading the existence of the created order considering 
the Word: in the beginning when the Word brings flesh into existence, and in the incarnation when 
the Word brings this flesh into eternal communion with God. The two manners of reading the 
incarnation simultaneously affirms God’s intention to commune with the created order, and to 
have Christ as the condition of its possibility. Athanasius confirms, ‘He, indeed, assumed humanity 
that we might become God. He manifested Himself by means of a body in order that we might 
perceive the Mind of the unseen Father.’178 Christ’s assumption of flesh thus brings persons into 
eternal communion with God. In doing so, the sense-perceptual self receives the Word’s corporeal 
grammar through which to know God and be known by God.  
 
176 Athanasius. On the Incarnation. §1, 3.  
177 Athanasius, ‘Dei Incarnatione’, §17.,19.  
178 Athanasius, ‘Dei Incarnatione’., 69.  
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Christ can provide a corporeal grammar to persons because he knew all facets of this 
embodied existence intimately. Notably, Athanasius places emphasis on Christ’s own sense-
perceptual existence when he writes: 
The Saviour had not a body without a soul, nor without perception, nor without a mind, for 
neither was it possible that, when the Lord become Man for us, His body should be without 
a mind; nor was it body only, but soul also that attained salvation in the Word Himself and 
being truly Son of God, He, the same, became also firstborn among many brethren…It was 
the same who spat corporeally as Man, but Divinely, as Son of God, opened the eyes of the 
man born blind, who suffered in flesh, as Peter said, but Divinely opened the tombs and 
raised up the dead. 179   
One finds this emphatic emphasis on the bodily nature of Christ’s existence in the context of his 
debate with Arius.180 It was important for Athanasius to lay claim to this materiality because, 
without the unequivocal acceptance that God became human in order that humans may partake in 
God, the incarnation becomes meaningless.  
The incarnation changes everything with respect to the place of the sense-perceptual self 
in relation to the divine. In the first instance, the incarnation is the image of the Creator presented 
to sense-perception. With the revelation of God in human form, humans perceive God with the 
same register of perception with which Christ perceived the world. The Christ who cried, laughed, 
and got angered is the same Christ who knows our cries, laughter, and anger. Through his earthly 
life, Christ knows every aspect of the affective self intimately. With this rendering, God is not a 
disinterested or distant divine, but immanent and present to the self in all its facets. In the second 
instance, the incarnation sets up a continuum between the God who creates in the image of the 
 
179 Athanasius of Alexandria. 1881. ‘Treatise I: The “Tome” to Those at Antioch’. In The Later 
Treatises of S. Athanasius, 3–16. Oxford: Oxford University Press., §7, 11-2.  
180 This reading diverges drastically from the assertion that Athanasius prioritises divine 
assumption over embodied existence in the argument that Christ’s human existence functions as a 
secondary tool to – in assistance of – the divine. In defense of Christ’s absolute humanity and 
divinity, David Gwynn writes: ‘However, Athanasius still preferred to hold hypostasis and ousia 
as synonyms. He did not have the benefit of the Cappadocian redefinition of hypostasis, which in 
turn made possible the understanding of the Incarnation at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 as the 
hypostatic union of two natures in one person. Nor was he as adept as his great successor Cyril of 
Alexandria in his attribution of the properties of each of Christ’s two nature to the other through 
the communication of idioms’. See Gwynn, David M. Athanasius of Alexandria: Bishop, 
Theologian, Ascetic, Father. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012., 103. 
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divine and the person who is that image. Insofar as the incarnation makes visible the invisible and 
transcendent God, persons may know God through the words, thoughts, and actions of the Word 
incarnate. The Word who thus acts as revelation also acts as promise, for knowing God in bodily 
terms and being known by God in bodily terms evidences a relational continuum between self and 
God.  
The relational continuum that the incarnation establishes is one that starts with persons in 
Genesis 1:26ff as made in the image of God and follows in their being conformed to their Maker 
in the incarnation. The place of the sense-perceptual self in the doctrines of creation ex nihilo and 
the incarnation, a reading of Athanasius’ writings show, is central to God’s divine economy. Here, 
Creation is the first ‘act’ in God’s creational plan, and the incarnation, the second. During both 
acts, persons are inaugurated into God’s presence. Whereas persons participate in God’s creative 
presence as creation, they also partake of the Word’s embodied revelation in the incarnation. A 
person’s relation to God should, accordingly, be interpreted from the standpoint of a God whose 
Trinitarian speech brings into existence all that is.  
Both the Word and persons are central to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, for persons are 
created as sense-perceptual beings in order that they may know their Creator. By perceiving the 
created order which manifests God’s presence to creation, persons attune their senses to God, and 
in doing so orientate their senses to the divine. As beings created in the image of God, persons too 
witness to God’s presence manifest through their very existence.  
 
Mixing Metaphors: The Annunciation and Virgin Birth as Second Creation Narrative 
Two grammars of perception which are pertinent to a reading of creation ex nihilo and the 
incarnation are the annunciation and the virgin birth. For, ‘existing in the form of God, [Christ] 
took the form of a servant, and was born Man, of Mary, according to the flesh, for our sakes’, 
describes Athanasius.181 One can read the incarnation through the annunciation and virgin birth as 
a second creation narrative. Where it is the Father who brings into existence all that is, the Son by 
whom creation is spoken into being, and the Spirit through whom form is given to chaos,182 the 
 
181 Athanasius expounds the implication of divine assumption ex Maria in ‘Treatise I: The “Tome” 
to Those at Antioch’., §7, 11-12. 
182 Tanner, Kathryn. Christ the Key. Current Issues in Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010., 20-1. 
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Trinity’s creative activity is equally present in the incarnation. The virgin birth underscores 
Christ’s entering of the world in the flesh of existence by the Holy Spirit who acts as the enabler 
of the divine exchange between God and mother. With the Spirit’s mediation of God’s presence at 
the annunciation, the virgin birth is the pivotal point at which flesh is united with the Second person 
of the Trinity.  
Two parallel narratives arise: at creation, where the Spirit broods over chaos and life 
springs forth and at the incarnation, where the Spirit indwells creation (the flesh of Mary) and the 
eternal, immutable, Word is born. The logic of creation in Genesis gets inverted with this reading 
of the virgin birth. Whereas God first brings into being that which is ontologically distinct from 
Godself – the created order – in creation ex nihilo, God then brings into being that which is 
ontologically at one with Godself – the Word – in the incarnation. Likewise, whereas creation ex 
nihilo is God’s bringing into being out of nothing, the incarnation is God’s gracing of the womb 
of Mary with the divine. In both instances, the place of the Spirit is central to this inversion, for 
without the Spirit hovering over creation, life would not have come forth. Without the Spirit’s 
impartation, therefore, the incarnation would not have occurred in the way it did.183  
Mary bears the eternal and immutable Word in the flesh because of God’s Trinitarian 
activity in her. With the inverted creational account, the emphasis falls on God’s initiative to 
articulate the relational existence of persons to God once more through the Word who takes on the 
materiality of existence. Here, persons are relationally ordered to God first, through the Word who 
is their condition of possibility and second, through the incarnate Son in whom and through whom 
persons are united with God. A second creation narrative arises, in this instance, insofar as persons 
take part in God’s self-revelation through the Word. Whereas creation ex nihilo has persons taking 
part in God’s revelatory presence within the created order, the incarnation has persons taking part 
in the Word who orders them relationally to the Trinity.  
The incarnation articulates a Christo-centric anthropology as the Word by whom life is 
brought into existence, the Spirit who gives shape to chaos/void, and the Father who initiates such 
 
183 Stated in terms of the telos of creation: Maximus the Confessor employs a definition that helps 
to clarify the potentiality of nihil. Nihil characterises that which cannot exist in itself and for itself. 
Contrary to nihil, when the Word creates, he gives to creation a telos ‘that for the sake of which 
all things are, though itself for the sake of nothing.’ Thunberg, Lars. 1965. Microcosm and 
Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor. Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup., 52. 
Taken from PG 91, 1072 C.    
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creative activity in order that persons may perceive God in terms of their own sense-perceptual 
existence. As to the challenge posed by contemporary scholarship regarding the necessity of the 
incarnation through the virgin birth (especially since virginal births are a popular trope in pagan 
mythologies for women who had conceived by ‘unsavoury’ means);184 the virgin birth recasts 
Genesis 1-3 as God’s loving embrace. It is an embrace which graces the flesh of humanity with 
the potentiality to participate in God through the Word by the Spirit. The creational inversion, as 
I have called it, gives Christianity a language and imaginative landscape by which to understand 
the telos of the flesh. It is a salutary rendering because the virgin birth and the incarnation set the 
body center stage in the salvific relation of self to the divine.185  
Our re-reading of the incarnation as a creational inversion emphasises the relationship 
between the Spirit and flesh in Athanasius’ writings. A reading of Works on the Spirit casts the 
Holy Spirit as the person of the Trinity who mediates the union of Christ’s flesh with that of the 
sense-perceptual self’s flesh. Athanasius invokes 1 Corinthians 2:10-12 when he writes regarding 
the Spirit, ‘we have not received the spirit of the world, but the Spirit that comes from God, that 
we might know the gifts bestowed on us by God’.186 The Holy Spirit actualises existence in the 
flesh because of the Spirit’s indivisibility with the Trinity. The Holy Spirit transforms the status 
of persons in Christ. Athanasius shows when he writes, ‘[c]reatures are from nothing, whereas 
the Spirit is from God’.187 Regarding the created order’s existence: ‘[c]reatures receive life, 
whereas the Spirit gives life’.188 In its origin: ‘[t]he Father creates all things through the Word in 
 
184 Artman-Partock, Tali. 2017. Grotesque Bodies, Divine Words: On the Body in Religious 
Texts. University of Cambridge. 
185 Further engaging with the debate as to whether the virginal birth and incarnation really 
happened historically, is a discourse beyond the scope of this chapter. What may be noted at this 
point, is the weight which the virginal birth bears in the description of the hypostatic union: 
‘Hypostatic union means that God the Word, that is one hypostasis from the three hypostases of 
the divinity, was not united to a previously existent man…but in a womb of the holy Virgin 
fashioned for himself from her in his own hypostasis flesh ensouled by a rational and intelligent 
soul, which is human nature.’ See Riches, Aaron. 2016. Ecce Homo: On the Divine Unity of Christ. 
Michigan: Eerdmans., 119. The prominence of the virgin birth in Justinian’s definition, Athanasius 
parallels in On the Incarnation and his Contra Arianos. 
186 Athanasius invokes 1 Corinthians 2.10-12 in his defence of the role of the Holy Spirit in 
communicating within the Trinity as well as to creation. See Athanasius, Works on the Spirit., 
§1.6.8, 62.  
187 Athanasius, Works on the Spirit, §1.22.1, 87.  
188 Athanasius, Works on the Spirit, §1.23.2, 89.  
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the Spirit’.189 In in its communion with God: ‘[w]e participate in God through the Spirit’,190 and 
in creation’s bearing of God’s image: ‘[t]he Spirit is the Image of the Son’.191 The Holy Spirit is 
the divine agent who is eternally God and perpetually working in the sense-perceptual self.  
Premised on the role of the Holy Spirit at the annunciation, the virgin birth reconfigures 
the Genesis account. By the Spirit, the created order comes to partake in Christ’s divine reality and 
through the Spirit’s agency, the flesh of the created order is held in the Son.192 This relationship 
between Spirit, Son, and persons, is circular and reciprocal in its nature. On the one hand, there is 
the exitus – God’s speech goes forth by way of the Holy Spirit who is coeternal with the Word. On 
the other hand, there is the reditus – creation exists by the renewing agency of the Holy Spirit. 
Persons thus exist in the Word by the Spirit’s agency and therefore also partake eternally ‘in God’s 
divine nature’.193  
Regarding the circular matrix of relations between God and the created order, Athanasius’ 
letter to Adelphius is striking. He writes: ‘[w]herefore He is very God, existing one in essence with 
the very Father; while other beings, to whom He said, ‘I said ye are Gods,’’194 had this grace from 
the Father, only by participation of the Word, through the Spirit.195 A reading of Works on the 
Spirit establishes the Spirit as the One who communicates between persons and God, as the One 
who actualises existence in the flesh, and as the One who alters the way that the senses come to 
perceive the divine. Flesh and Spirit hereby continuously intertwine and determines the corporeal 
grammar by which God is known to persons. It is by way, therefore, of both the virgin and the 
Spirit that a discourse on the flesh develops. 
 
189 Athanasius, Works on the Spirit, §1.24.5, 91. 
190 Athanasius, Works on the Spirit, §1.24.1, 90.  
191 Athanasius, Works on the Spirit, §1.24.7, 91. 
192 ‘De Decretis: Defence of the Nicene Definition’ NPNF2 - 04. Athanasius: Select Works and 
Letters, edited by Philip Schaff, Vol. 4. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, II. Michigan: Christian 
Classics Ethereal Library, n.d. §13, 506. 
193 Athanasius of Alexandria. ‘Treatise V: Letter to Adelphius’. In Later Treatises of S. Athanasius, 
61–71. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1881. §5, 65-6.  
194 Athanasius quotes John 14.9 here.  
195 Athanasius of Alexandria. n.d. ‘Orationes Contra Arianos: Four Discourses against the Arians.’ 
In NPNF2-04. Athanasius: Select Works and Letters, translated by Philip Schaff. Christian 
Classics Ethereal Library. Accessed 10 February 2017. 
http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf204.html., §9, 827-8.   
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Although the incarnation is predominantly associated with the Word who becomes flesh, 
Athanasius’ pneumatology casts the incarnation as a Trinitarian creative act. The Father and Spirit 
are equally present to the act of creation which takes place at the annunciation and the virgin birth 
and are therefore also present to persons in the Word. In his defense of the Nicene definition, 
Athanasius writes: 
But as we, by receiving the Spirit, do not lose our own proper substance, so the Lord, when 
made man for us, and bearing a body, was no less God; for He was not lessened by the 
envelopment of the body, but rather deified it and rendered it immortal.196 
With the embodied continuum of the Word, the Word’s incarnation instantiates the ultimate second 
creation narrative whereby creation ex nihilo becomes creation ex Verbi. The former sets the 
Trinity as the condition of possibility for the created order, and the latter shows the Word to be the 
condition of possibility for participation in the divine. The incarnation is, therefore, an act of re-
creation by which the created order (embodied existence, in particular) exists ex Verbi.  
The incarnation evidences God’s intention to be in relation with the created order in the 
Word who becomes flesh for creation. The incarnation thus places equal emphasis on the integrity 
of embodied existence and the centrality of that existence as the paradigm of filiation with the 
divine. Our reading of the incarnation, in its imaginative re-narration through the immaculate birth 
and Holy Spirit, frames a new relational matrix by which persons partake in the divine economy. 
Two distinctive moments arise at this intersection of creation ex nihilo and creation ex Verbi, that 
of the Word by whom persons are brought into being, and that of the Word who is the condition 
of possibility for their union in Christ.  
Creation understood as that moment where God speaks life into existence establishes the 
incarnation as the eternal perpetuation of life in the flesh of Christ. The propensity for life which 
results from existence in the Word whose flesh becomes our own, shows communion with God as 
being the telos of creation. In his Festal letters, Athanasius expands:  
 
196 Athanasius, ‘De Decretis’., §13, 506.  
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For the Word is near, Who is all things on our behalf, even our Lord Jesus Christ, Who, 
having promised that His habitation with us should be perpetual, in virtue thereof cried, 
saying, ‘Lo, I am with you all the days of the world.197 
We find here that the incarnation initiates a movement from nothingness to relational existence.198  
If Christ is Life, then persons as bearers and partakers of life are connatural (not coessential) with 
the Word. Connaturality does not equate to a direct parallelism between the Trinity’s being and 
created being. It implies instead, that persons are created by the Logos and not from the Logos.199  
What motivation is there for framing the incarnation as creation ex Verbi? The answer is 
twofold: first, it expounds Athanasius’ thematic preference for reading creation ex nihilo and 
second, it shows his unwavering conviction that the body is central to his theocentric anthropology. 
In no way does Athanasius eschew the body, for it ‘speaks of God’s self-revelation as true 
revelation and yet as veiled revelation’.200 Creation ex Verbi underlines the centrality of the body 
as divine self-disclosure while refusing an a-somatic understanding of existence. Athanasius does 
not seek to liberate the body from itself in discourses of the soul but to confirm the body as a 
prerequisite of existence.201  
A reading of the incarnation as creation ex Verbi provides the doctrinal foundation for the 
consideration of the flesh as on the one hand, the sense-perceptual self who engages with the 
created order affectively and on the other hand, the aspect of existence which is founded in Christ. 
The flesh which arises as the result of God’s utterance at creation is the same flesh which the Word 
assumes when establishing eternal communion.202 The word ‘flesh’ thus denotes on the one hand, 
 
197 Athanasius of Alexandria. ‘Festal Letters: Letter XIV’. In NPNF2 - 04. Athanasius: Select 
Works and Letters, edited by Philip Schaff, Vol. 4. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, II. Michigan: 
Christian Classics Ethereal Library, n.d., §1, 1318.  
198 Athanasius of Alexandria. ‘Treatise III: The Epistle to the African Bishops’. In The Later 
Treatises of S. Athanasius, 23–44. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1881. §5, 32-3. 
199 Athanasius of Alexandria. ‘The Epistle to the African Bishops’, §7, 35-6.  
200 Pettersen, Alvyn. 1990. Athanasius and the Human Body. Bristol: The Bristol Press., 6. 
201 Pettersen, Athanasius and the Human Body., 82.  
202 What Athanasius is known for, is his refusal of duality, confusion, or denial in the union of 
Word and flesh in ‘nature and reality’. Instead, Christ’s ‘divinity and humanity are “so related” 
that the humanity of Jesus “is” only insofar as it is “in the mode of existence of the eternal Word 
of God”. As such, Christ’s assumption of the flesh affirms creation’s belonging to the Trinity. 
Aaron Riches draws here from Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/2, The Doctrine of the Word of 
God, trans. G. T. Thompson and Harold Knight, ed. G. W. Bromley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1956), pp. 13-165. See Riches, Ecce Homo., 107.  
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the locus of the created order’s existence and on the other hand, the nature of its existence in the 
Word.  
What arises in our mixing of creation metaphors is a theology of the flesh distinctive to an 
Athanasian Christo-centric anthropology. Here, the en-flesh-ment of the Word is the condition of 
possibility for embodied existence to be participative in God’s economy. Christ’s assumption of 
human nature speaks, not only of the dignified existence of humanity but also of its newfound 
identity in the Word.  
Creation ex Verbi describes the ways in which the image is conformed to its Maker, and in 
being conformed, how the image participates in a reality greater than itself. The nature of the flesh 
changes when the incarnation is seen to be the event whereby there is the actual transformation of 
the sense-perceptual self. The sense-perceptual self is transformed into the likeness of the Word 
and has the Spirit perpetually present to itself. The Spirit ministers to the sense-perceptual self, 
rendering their existence revelatory. Existence in the Word by the Spirit renders the sense-
perceptual self in union with God, participating as sign and symbol of God’s sustained desire to 
be in communion with persons.  
 
The Corporeal Grammar of the Cross 
In the previous section, our discourse on the flesh culminated with a rendering of embodied 
existence as salutary. With a salutary existence, Christ’s flesh is the means of salvation for the 
sense-perceptual self. This describes the fact that the incarnation as creation ex Verbi, assigns to 
existence in the flesh a new ontological status. The incarnation describes not only the act whereby 
Christ assumes the materiality of existence, it also describes the rest of Christ’s existence as sense-
perceptual self – his ministry, death, resurrection, transfiguration, and ascension.  
The Cross adds a further dimension to our creation ex Verbi analogy, Christ’s identification 
with the materiality of existence and its propensity to return to dust. According to Athanasius’ 
letter to Epictetus, the Cross is that moment where Christ conforms himself to the death which 
marks existence in the flesh.203 In relation to a theology of creation ex nihilo and creation ex Verbi, 
 
203 Athanasius of Alexandria. ‘Treatise IV: Letter to Epictetus’. In The Later Treatises of S. 
Athanasius, 45–60. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1881. §6, 53. 
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the Cross brings a redemptive reading of embodied existence to the fore.204 Athanasius accordingly 
writes: 
For what the human body of the Word was suffering, this the Word, being present with it, 
referred to Himself, that we might be enabled to partake of the Godhead of the Word…And 
the incorporeal One Himself was present in the passible body, and the body had in itself 
the impassible Word, who was abolishing the infirmities of the body itself. And this He 
was doing, and thus it came to pass, in order that He, receiving what was ours, and offering 
it up in sacrifice, might abolish it, and thereafter might clothe us with what was His, and 
cause the Apostle to say, This corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must 
put on immortality [1 Cor. 15:53]. 
It is both Christ’s existence as passible body and metaphysical Word which founds the equality 
between human and divine. In the first instance, the Cross sanctifies the flesh. It does so by 
restoring the flesh to the fullness of being prescribed by the Imago Dei.205 The restoration takes 
place when the human and divine converge ‘perfectly with the eternal will of the Father and are 
realized in the pro nobis the Son accomplishes in perfect freedom’.206 In the second instance, the 
Cross justifies the flesh through the reconciliatory work of the Son and the Spirit. When Christ 
assumed flesh, he sanctified and graced humanity by transforming the human nature He assumed.  
With the sanctification and justification of the flesh, a Christo-centric anthropology arises 
consisting of two movements: assumption and predication. With the former, Christ’s assumption 
of the flesh secures kinship207 with the created order. With the latter, that kinship becomes the 
condition of possibility for communion with the divine. This Christo-centric anthropology one 
finds in Athanasius’ writings rests on the Word’s agency in setting up relation first, between 
 
204 ‘On the salutary appearing of Christ, and against Apollinaris’, see Athanasius of Alexandria. 
Later Treatises of S. Athanasius. A library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church. Oxford: Parker 
& Co., 1881., §2, 117.  
205 Bouter, Athanasius van Alexandrië en zijn uitleg van de Psalmen., 261-2.  
206 Riches, Ecce Homo, 110.  
207 I follow Janet Soskice’s articulation of the relationship between human and divine in terms of 
kinship. See Soskice, Janet M. 2007. The Kindness of God: Metaphor, Gender and Religious 
Language. Oxford: OUP. 
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persons, and second between human and divine.208 The Word’s simultaneous presence to persons 
and to the Trinity underscores a relational ontology.  
A relational ontology affirms that, by the Cross, a person’s ontological status is re-cast in 
terms of their subsistence in the Word’s economy. Such an ontology rests on the notion that the 
Trinity, prior to creation, existed as three persons in perfect unity. Once the creational act was 
completed and the Word assumed flesh, there was a perfect unity between the flesh of the created 
order and Christ. Within our embodied existence, a relational ontology translates as God’s divine 
self-disclosure and communication of divine attributes through the life of the Son and the ministry 
of the Spirit. In the first instance, existence is situated in the Word’s ordering of creation and the 
manifestation thereof in the working of creation. In the second instance, humanity’s corporeality 
(flesh) is founded upon the Word’s flesh. We cannot, therefore, properly articulate the Cross 
without insisting that God assumed on the one hand, the flesh of existence and on the other, the 
burden of that existence.209  
The imagery of Christ’s assumption of the flesh of existence Athanasius expounds on in 
his Defence of Dionysius where he uses Eucharistic language to describe Christ’s relation to 
persons. He writes: 
For like as the husbandman is not the vine, so He that came in the body was not the Father 
but the Word; and the Word having come to be in the Vine was called the Vine, because 
of His bodily kinship with the branches, namely ourselves.210 
The semantics of feeding present to the above passage, Athanasius further articulates in the logic 
of participation that the Eucharist establishes. Athanasius explains, ‘He by His living Word 
 
208 Davis, Stephen, J. 2008. Coptic Christology in Practice: Incarnation and Divine Participation 
in Late Antique and Medieval Egypt. Oxford Early Christian Studies. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press., 24.  
209 My translation of Peter Bouter’s exposition on Athanasius’ reading of the Psalms. ‘Bij Ps. 94,3 
verbindt Athanasius schlepping en verlossing: omdat Christus de Schepper van de mens is heft Hij 
de mensheid lief en is gekomen om haar te verlossen. Ook na die zondeval onderhoudt God Zijn 
schepping door Zijn zorg en voorzienigheid zodat de gehele gang van de natuur een vrucht is van 
Gods wijsheid en macht die voor de mens een verwijzing is naar God als ‘de bouwmeester’ van 
hemel en aarde’. Bouter, Athanasius van Alexandrië en zijn uitleg van de Psalmen., 261-2.  
210 Athanasius of Alexandria, ‘De Sententia Dionysii: Defense of Dionysius’. In NPNF2 – 04. 
Athanasius: Select Works and Letters, edited by Philip Schaff, Vol. 4. Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, II. Michigan: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, n.d., §12, 548.  
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quickeneth all men, and gives Him to be food and life to the saints; as the Lord declares, ‘I am the 
bread of life’.211 
To illustrate the ways in which Christ’s body is the 
participative norm for the created order, one may consider 
the visual representation of John 6:46 in the 1469 painting 
by Friedrich Herlin titled Der Eucharistische 
Schmerzensmann (The Eucharistic Man of Sorrows) 
which hangs in the Stadtmuseum Nördlingen, Germany.212 
It depicts Christ standing in a Cross-like position with 
grape vines and wheat growing from his feet illustrating, 
through the semantics of feeding, how persons are held in 
Christ’s being. The semantics of feeding visually unfolds 
as a communicant kneels in expectation of being 
nourished. The communicant represents not only the 
observed, but also the observer, to whom Christ gazes.  
The filiation that the Eucharistic Man of Sorrow portrays, one reads in the Orationes 
Contra Arianos where Athanasius writes:  
Because of us then He asked for glory, and the words occur, ‘took’ and ‘gave’ and ‘highly 
exalted’, that we might take, and to us might be given, and we might be exalted in Him; as 
also for us He sanctifies Himself, that we might be sanctified in Him.213 
The symbolism evokes two modes of feeding: in life through the Word’s upholding of it, and in 
faith, in Christ’s nourishing persons through the Eucharist. The Cross physically re-enacted in the 
Eucharist, is the perpetual assumption of life re-created in the Word. By giving his body, Christ 
sustains and upholds the life that is perpetually granted to those who partake in him. Klaus Krüger 
 
211 Athanasius of Alexandria. ‘Festal Letters: Letters VII’. In NPNF2 - 04. Athanasius: Select 
Works and Letters, edited by Philip Schaff, Vol. 4. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, II. Michigan: 
Christian Classics Ethereal Library, n.d., §4, 1284.  
212 Hancock, Bannon. 2014. ‘The Scandal of Sacramentality’. 2014. 
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213  Athanasius of Alexandria. n.d. ‘Orationes Contra Arianos: Four Discourses against the Arians.’ 
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better explains the dynamic at play when he affirms that that which ‘cannot be 
represented…infuses the image in the way that the ineffable…enters language; and that just as the 
invisible pervades what is visible, so too the inaudible reverberates in what is heard’.214 As with 
the sacraments then, the flesh of Christ mediates the cosmic body that is the church. It does so 
more concretely in the ritualistic consumption of the Eucharist. 215  
The relationship between the Cross and Eucharistic feeding gives shape to what we have 
described as a relational ontology in Athanasius’ writings. This ontology arises where Christ’s 
giving is one’s receiving and one’s receiving is partaking not only of Christ, but of the greater 
cosmic body of Christ. Within the realm of embodied existence then, a relational ontology 
translates to God’s divine self-disclosure and communication of divine attributes in the 
everydayness of life. In the first instance, existence is situated in the Word’s ordering of creation 
and the manifestation thereof in the working of creation. In the second instance, humanity’s 
corporeality (flesh) is founded in the Word’s flesh. Here, Christ is both incarnate and the principle 
of life. He is ‘the very temple of Life’.216 Christ is the temple, also, of the body of Christ, the 
cosmic matrix of graced relations in which persons exist. The body of Christ, which is the church, 
renders this cosmic constellation sacramentally insofar as the church belongs to the Word whose 
body is the communal body.217  
The incarnation and the Cross serve both as a realistic transformation of creation and as a 
sacramental transformation. In the former, embodied existence is transformed and deified by the 
Word’s ontological restoration of its existence. In the latter, embodied existence gestures to the 
divine as the origin of its existence, and it partakes in that existence sacramentally through the 
 
214 Krüger, Klaus. 2015. ‘Mute Mysteries of the Divine Logos: On the Pictorial Poetics of 
Incarnation’. In Image and Incarnation: The Early Modern Doctrine of the Pictorial Image, edited 
by Walter S. Melion and Lee P. Wandel, 39:76–108. Intersections: Interdisciplinary Studies in 
Early Modern Culture. Leiden: Brill., 82. The quote is taken from Krüger’s formulation of a 
sermon by Bernardino de Siena which was delivered at Florence in approximately 1425. It is said 
considering a visual depiction of the Annunciation by Antonello de Messina, Virgin Annunciate 
(ca. 1475-76), 77.  
215 This echoes the many ways in which Catherine of Siena understood her relationship with Christ; 
her everyday existence was an active partaking in Christ’s body and a partaking of Christ’s body.  
216 Athanasius, Orationes Contra Arianos., pp. 26, 42. There is thus a further dimension to 
Athanasius’ theological consideration of existence in the flesh. It is situated within a redemptive 
reading of Christ’s existence, where the passion is central to the redemption of existence in the 
flesh. Athanasius, On the Incarnation., 48.  
217 Pettersen, Athanasius and the Human Body., 45. 
 75 
church’s practices.218 Based on the imagery of Eucharistic feeding, one may make a parallel 
analogy in terms of life: Christ is Life and he gives this Life to persons with the incarnation, Cross 
and resurrection. When Christ graces persons with the Life which He is, persons become partakers 
in a Life that surpasses its current existence. The very fact, therefore, of being able to commune 
with God through the Word establishes life as sacramental. A being that is unto God – a being for 
God219 – where humanity and creation show forth God’s creative agency and craftsmanship. 
Persons partake Eucharistically in this life as a gesture to the new Life which is celebrated in 
Christ. Within the logic of sacramentality lies the logic of revelation.  
 
Revelation and the Sense-Perceptual Self 
According to the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, the whole created order bears the image of God 
through the original creative act, ‘let us make [hu]man…according to our image’ (Genesis 1:26). 
The incarnation, Cross, and resurrection adds a further dimension. The sense-perceptual self exists 
in Christ and bears the likeness of the Second person of the Trinity. On the Incarnation reads:  
…He has made all things out of nothing by His own Word, Jesus Christ our Lord…He 
gave them a further gift, and He did not barely create man, as He did all the irrational 
creatures on the earth, but made them after His own image, giving them a portion even of 
the power of His own Word; so that having as it were a kind of reflexion of the Word, and 
being made rational, they might be able to abide ever in blessedness, living the true life 
which belongs to the saints in paradise.220 
In the passage above, a corollary exists between the Word who is ‘God’s lavish bounty of being’221 
and the Word who founds such existence in terms of the Imago Dei. Being created in God’s image 
describes God’s desire to be in communion with persons, and to found such communion through 
embodied existence. The bestowal of God’s image on persons who receive their being through the 
 
218 While I understand Athanasius’s theological anthropology to be both sacramental and realistic, 
Stephen Davis has articulated his disagreement with such conceptualizations of Athanasius’s 
anthropology. See footnote 67, Coptic Christology in Practice, 14.  
219 Petterson, Athanasius and the Human Body., 103. 
220 Athanasius, ‘Dei Incarnatione’, §3., 262.  
221 Athanasius, ‘Dei Incarnatione’., 226.  
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Word places the materiality of existence central to God’s plan for the created order.222 Existing in 
the flesh here marks the telos of persons.223  
For Mark Baddeley, that God creates persons in his image is a key signifier of the 
prominent place that the sense-perceptual self has in God’s creative plan. This is the case, 
especially as it relates to Athanasius’ writings. Baddeley explains, ‘[f]rom this…Athanasius 
deduces that God does not create people in order that they might obey the commands he gives 
them…Instead, God created people simply so that they will exist as human beings.’224 Baddeley 
describes the logic present to Athanasius’ interpretation of Genesis 1-3 when he writes:   
Human existence is for God an end in itself, not a means to an end. Only once this primary 
end is realised are human beings then under a secondary obligation to perform whatever 
the Word commands them to do…225 
Existing as one who lives as an embodied and sense-perceptual self within the created order is 
God’s meaning for persons. God creates in God’s image so that the sense-perceptual self may 
perceive the divine and attune the senses to its fount.  
There is a revelatory logic to the relationship of image and Maker, Alvyn Pettersen 
explains, ‘[i]n principle, therefore, the created order is a manifestation of the Logos, realized in 
and through each individual who is made in the rational image of God’.226 If the sense-perceptual 
self bears witness to God’s creative activity by being made in the image of God,227 then the senses 
reflect their Maker, and in doing so, conform to the Word. Athanasius unpacks this dialectic when 
he writes:  
But let them learn that he whose likeness to God has not been produced by virtue and the 
act of willing has also freedom of changing his will; but not so is the Word, unless indeed 
His likeness to the Father is so far from being essential, that it is but partial and analogous 
to the human. Now, this is what belongs to us, who are brought into being, and whose 
 
222 In what follows flesh describes that aspect of existence which is uniquely registered by persons 
in terms of their sense-perceptions.  
223 Baddeley, Mark. 2015. ‘An Exploration of Athanasius’ Strategies for Reading Genesis 1-3’. 
Phronema 30 (1): 115–36., 131. 
224 Baddeley, ‘An Exploration of Athanasius’., 131 ff. 
225 Baddeley, ‘An Exploration of Athanasius’., 131.  
226 Pettersen, Athanasius and the Human Body., 85.  
227 Anatolios, Khaled. ‘The Witness of Athanasius at the (Hoped-for) Nicene Council of 2025’. 
Pro Ecclesia XXV, no. 2 (2016): 222-36., 226.  
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nature is created. For we too, although we are not able to become like to God in essence, 
yet imitate Him as we are improved by virtue; a privilege, too, which has been granted us 
by the Lord...228 
The created order in the doctrine of creation ex nihilo witnesses to God’s creative activity in the 
world and partakes of God’s creational presence. An embodied continuum is required, however, 
by which the sense-perceptual self can attain to the Word and partake of that particular and 
embodied revelation of God. Alvyn Petterson writes: ‘[f]or both in his incarnate life and in his 
existing transcendentally beyond death, the body of the Logos is recognised as the prior necessity 
for the Christians’ corporate existence, as its source and origin’.229  
Because humanity has lost its ability to live in the fullness intended at creation, it only 
partially reveals God’s being. As a result, sin may be depicted as an assault on the senses; it is the 
moment where creation suffers amnesia230 and becomes deaf, blind and numb to God’s revelation 
within the flesh of creation.231 John of Damascus helpfully describes the logic in the following 
way: 
For we see images in created things intimating to us dimly reflections of the divine; as 
when we say that there is an image of the holy Trinity, which is beyond and beginning, in 
 
228 Athanasius of Alexandria. ‘The Epistle to the African Bishops’, §7., 35-6. 
229 Pettersen, Athanasius and the Human Body., 45.  
230 To the claim that Christ’s assumption of the flesh implied his assumption of sin Athanasius 
scoffs, for the capability to sin is one of the will which influences the flesh. Schaff elaborates in 
the words of Athanasius: ‘Wherefore, saith he, ‘the Son of God came to destroy the works of the 
devil;’ what works? That nature, which God made sinless, and the devil biased to the transgression 
of God’s command and the finding out of sin which is death, did God the Word raise again, so as 
to be secure from the devil’s bias and the finding out of sin’. Orationes Contra Arianos, §43, 713-
14, cf. footnote 2064. Interestingly, in his tenth festal letter, Athanasius describes virtue as being 
philanthropic and sin as being misanthropic; an interesting categorization of sin – sin is therefore 
life negating and inherently oriented against humanity. See Athanasius of Alexandria. ‘Festal 
Letters: Letters X’. In NPNF2 - 04. Athanasius: Select Works and Letters, edited by Philip Schaff, 
Vol. 4. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, II. Michigan: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, n.d., 
§4, 1293. Athanasius continues, in his XIII’th festal letter, to call God philanthropic. See Festal 
Letters: Letters X’. In NPNF2 - 04. Athanasius: Select Works and Letters, edited by Philip Schaff, 
Vol. 4. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, II. Michigan: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, n.d., 
14, 1313. 
231 Athanasius of Alexandria. ‘Contra Gentiles: Against the Heathen’. In NPRF2-04. Athanasius: 
Select Works and Letters, Vol. 4. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, II. Michigan: Christian Classics 
Ethereal Library, n.d., §41, 240-1. 
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the sun, its light and its ray, or in a fountain welling up and the stream flowing out and the 
flood, or in our intellect and reason and spirit, or a rose, its flower and its fragrance.232  
Athanasius has a similar approach when he describes the right contemplation of the world as the 
contemplation of the ‘Word who framed it’.233 In our contemplation of the world, we contemplate 
God’s workmanship. As God’s workmanship ourselves, Christ renews our image through our 
union with him.  
To illustrate the logic of the Imago Dei and how Christ renews our image, Athanasius 
recalls Egyptian burial portraits like those we know from Fayyūm.234 These burial portraits are 
naturalistic paintings painted on wood that are attached to coffins. Over time, however, the image 
painted on the wood fades. In Athanasius’ discussion of the burial portraits, the logic of the Imago 
Dei is such: likened to the fading image of the burial portrait, the flesh is limited in its ability to 
reveal God. The Word, however, by being hypostatically unified in divinity and humanity, renews 
life in the flesh and makes communion possible. The Word, therefore, perpetually renews the 
fading image that is embodied existence. The preservation of both the image and the wood makes 
Athanasius’ corporeal understanding of the incarnation explicit: ‘the body is understood to be not 
only the bearer of the soul, but also the indispensable setting for the soul’s (and its own) 
renewal’.235  
Contrary to the burial portraits which image the deceased, Athanasius’ analogy ascribes to 
embodied existence a revelatory logic. As agents who are renewed by the Word who is God, 
embodied existence has the potential of making known, or manifest, the Word’s imprint in the 
very embodied nature of their existence. Understood in this way, life itself manifests the gift of 
everlasting communion with God, inaugurated in the present and fulfilled in that which is to come. 
This existence in the Word is sacramental because it proclaims God’s sustained presence to the 
world.  
Remaining with the analogy of art, the role of the flesh in informing sense-perception 
serves as a mark and imprint of God’s communion with creation. Life in the flesh is salutary 
because it both gestures to the divine and bespeaks God’s presence in the embodied present. Peter 
 
232 St John of Damascus. Three Treatises on the Divine Images. Translated by Andrew Louth. 
Popular Patristics Series 4. New York: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2003. 
233 Athanasius, Contra Arianos, §11., 680.  
234 Davis, Coptic Christology in Practice., 17. 
235 Davis, Coptic Christology in Practice., 17.  
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Bouter advances a similar logic when he sees in Athanasius’ anthropology, the preservation of 
embodied existence. He remarks that, instead of there being ‘a flight from materialism’, there ‘is 
the sanctification of matter, of which Christ’s bodily resurrection is symbolic’.236 As a result, 
creation is the graced space where life unfolds as the arena of God’s presence. On the one hand, it 
is the instrument of perception and on the other hand, it is one locus for perceiving God.  
That persons are created for the sake of themselves, and that such persons are created by 
the Word, expresses a relational logic of the doctrine of creation. Persons are made according to 
the image of God which anchors their embodied existence within God’s divine economy. In On 
the Incarnation, the materiality of existence is described as good, and as existing in accordance 
with God’s vision for the created order. For God to create according to God’s image further 
establishes that persons are created as communal and relational entities. To exist as the image of 
God, is therefore to exist as a person who is made for existence in the flesh and constituted by that 
existence in relational terms. That God is present to the created order means that the Word is the 
condition of possibility for existence in the flesh.  
Word, Spirit, and Perception 
Athanasius’ doctrine of the Son and the Spirit advances a unique grammar of perception. The life 
of the sense-perceptual self is transformed by the new existence it receives through the Son’s 
divine economy and the Spirit’s ministry. Both Word and Spirit hereby attune the senses to the 
God in whom and through whom the sense-perceptual self has its existence. To have one’s senses 
attuned to the divine in this manner is the telos of perception.  
In Athanasius’ writings, one finds a logic of perception advancing that has its own 
soteriology unfolding. In the first instance, the sense-perceptual self is created according to the 
image of the divine. The image pertains to the ontological union which is established through the 
incarnation as much as it does to the senses. In the second instance, the existence of the sense-
perceptual self is constantly defined by its desire to be ordered to its fount and so to be attuned to 
the divine. Being ordered to the divine is characterised by the sense-perceptual self’s incremental 
growing toward the divine. Within this realm, both the corporeal and experiential exists as 
perceptual categories by which union in the divine is expressed. In the final instance, the Spirit is 
 
236 This is my translation of Bouter. Bouter, Athanasius van Alexandrië., 88.  
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the means by which the senses are incrementally transfigured to perceive within their own 
embodied existence the creative presence of God.  
The logic of perception rendered through the Son and the Spirit, casts the body and its 
perceptions as salutary. That is to say, existence in the flesh is governed by the Son’s indwelling 
presence and the Spirit’s transformation of the self. What Athanasius does for a Christian ontology 
of the flesh, is establish a grammar of perception which is governed by the logic of the life of the 
Trinity. The flesh is central herein since the Trinity is present to creation ex nihilo, incarnation, 
and the Cross. Formulating such presence in corporeal terms hints at an incarnational logic of the 
flesh. One which must be founded in the life of the Trinity and expressed in terms of the words, 
thoughts, and deeds that usher from the sense-perceptual self.  
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Chapter 4 
Augustine and the Logic of the Word Incarnate  
 
‘In him we live and move and have our being’, these words of the apostle Paul echo in Athanasius’ 
theology of the incarnation.237 The incarnation avails to the sense-perceptual self, Paul and 
Athanasius’ writings show, a corporeal grammar by which to perceive God who is transcendent. 
For Athanasius, the incarnation is that occasion where God’s assumption of the materiality of 
existence changes the ways persons may perceive God in bodily terms. The logic of the incarnation 
thus presents a new mode of existence in the flesh through the Word and by the Spirit.  
We learned in Athanasius’ writings how persons perceive God through the materiality of 
their existence. What has been left unsaid, however, is how such perception translates into the 
thoughts, words, and deeds of the sense-perceptual self. This further dimension suggests that each 
individual with their particularity and unique perception of divine presence can express the Word’s 
presence anew. In doing so, the sense-perceptual self may make God known in bodily terms. How 
the sense-perceptual self is said to do so is the question which concerns us next.  
Like Athanasius, Augustine reads the incarnation as the affirmation of God’s presence to 
persons, and like Athanasius, Augustine is influenced by Paul’s writings.238 That persons live and 
move and have their being in Christ, is pivotal to Augustine’s consideration of how the Word is 
present to Christians in their bodily circumstance. Because of the Pauline influence in Augustine, 
a similar set of questions regarding the status of the body concerns his writings. Consonant with 
the critique Paul receives, Augustine faces the critique that his focus on the Fall and sin inhibits a 
proper reading of the body in theology. The criticism against Augustine is that the body in his 
writings is an ‘anxious body’, one weary of the materiality of existence in which and by which it 
exists in the presence of God.  
And yet as a rhetorician, Augustine would have been keenly aware of his embodied 
existence. He would have known that speech, the primary means by which a rhetorician persuades, 
 
237 Acts 17:28 
238 Tarcisius Van Bavel expands on the Pauline influence in Augustine in terms of the Totus 
Christus. See Van Bavel, Tarcisius. 1998. ‘The “Christus Totus” Idea: A Forgotten Aspect of 
Augustine’s Spirituality’. In Studies in Patristic Christology, edited by Thomas Finan and Vincent 
Twomey, 84–94. Portland: Four Courts Press. 
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is an entirely embodied activity. Speech is characterised by vocalisation, requires that each breath 
be perfectly coordinated with words, and that each consequent gesture be done with the body’s 
willing. Words, through the lens of the rhetorician, are not abstract renderings but embodied 
activities, intimately linked with the expressive mannerisms of the body. When words are 
embodied activities, the content of such words are connected with the form in which they are 
expressed. Insofar as words carry meaning, the ways in which they are expressed by the sense-
perceptual self give unique and particular form to the content of speech. Between the form and 
content of speech, new possibilities are rendered for thinking through theological writing.  
Words play a particularly important role within the Christian tradition, so Augustine’s 
Christological interpretation of Scripture suggests. On the one hand, words are immanent and 
embodied, and on the other hand, words refer to that which is transcendent. The interplay of 
immanent and transcendent suggests the nature of God’s revelation in Scripture. The incarnation 
establishes the correlation between words and Word. That the living Word finds expression 
through the words of Scripture is one aspect for consideration. Another aspect for consideration is 
that the selfsame living Word is expressed in the incarnation. With the relationship of metaphysical 
Word to incarnate Christ, words bring into relief God’s continued presence to persons through 
their own words, thoughts, and deeds.  
Establishing the ways in which words, as embodied actions, can manifest the presence of 
the divine, can be done by reading Augustine’s Christological interpretation of Scripture and the 
incarnation. Contemporary scholars whose theorising adds to a reading of the incarnate Word in 
Augustine are Carol Harrison and Janet Soskice. Carol Harrison’s set of lectures, ‘Confused 
Voices: Sound and Sense in the late (Wild) Augustine’239 and ‘Sound and Silence in Augustine’s 
Christological Exegesis’240, develops the concept of speech as the intersection of sign and symbol. 
Signs and symbols have two things in common, they make manifest that which is invisible, and 
they make immanent that which is transcendent. Janet Soskice in ‘Aquinas and Augustine on 
Creation and God as “Eternal Being”’ and The Kindness of God, highlights how words exist in 
relation to the living Word, and how to consider such expressions relationally. In poetry, Malcolm 
 
239 Harrison, Carol. 2018. ‘Confused Voices: Sound and Sense in the Late (Wild) Augustine’. 
Pusey House, Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1-20. 
240 Harrison, Carol. 2018. ‘Sound and Silence in Augustine’s Christological Exegesis’. Pusey 
House, Oxford: University of Oxford., 1-19. 
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Guite’s Faith, Hope and Poetry: Theology and the Poetic Imagination and Trevor Hart’s ‘Through 
the Arts: Hearing, Seeing and Touching the Truth’ are prime examples of how words can signal to 
the Word incarnate.  
Establishing words as embodied actions, as having a divine referent, and as making visible 
divine presence through the particularity of existence, is central to a Christian ontology of the flesh. 
The motivations for outlining these three dimensions lies with a reading of the Christian flesh as 
that which has the Word present to it and as that which manifests such presence through sense-
perception. An incarnational reading of embodied existence builds on the three tenets of a Christian 
ontology of the flesh established thus far: first, that the sense-perceptual self is open and ordered 
by the existence of another. Second, that the flesh is an integrated entity which exists in the Word 
by the Spirit. Finally, that the incarnation is the affirmation of the absolute humanity and divinity 
of Christ. Augustine’s writings add to a Christian ontology of the flesh by indicating how the Word 
is incarnate to persons through their thoughts, words and deeds.  
  
Augustine and the Incarnate Word 
The relationship of the living Word to words begins with a reading of speech in the creation 
narrative. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo, Janet Soskice suggests, is less about ‘the beginning 
of time or the origins of the universe so much as with the recognition that “all that is” comes from 
God [and] has its being in relation to God’.241 This is the point Augustine makes when the existence 
of persons appear as evidence of a God who brought all that is, into being. Confessions accordingly 
reads, ‘“[w]e exist”, they tell us, ‘because we were made. And this is proof that we did not makes 
ourselves. For to make ourselves, we should have had to exist before our existence began’.242 The 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo asserts that all that exists, exists as a result of ‘[t]he Trinity, one God, 
of whom are all things, through whom are all things, in whom are all things.’243   
While the existence of creation evidences a Creator, speech also witnesses to the created 
order which came into being by way of God’s speech. The correlation is made in Confessions 
 
241 Soskice, Janet M. 2014. ‘Aquinas and Augustine on Creation and God as “Eternal Being”’. 
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242 Augustine. 1961. Confessions. Translated by R. S Coffin. London: Penguin Books., Book XI, 
256. 
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Book XI, when Augustine writes, ‘[i]t must be therefore be that you spoke and they were made. In 
your Word alone you created them’.244 The first word to be spoken according to the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo, is the Word by whom all that is, is brought into existence.245 God’s initial 
address, ‘let us make [hu]man in our image’ in Genesis 1:26 attests to this.246 That creatures exist, 
is witness to God’s creative act; that persons speak and express themselves through words, 
witnesses to God’s creative act through the living Word. Unlike human speech, the Word that was 
spoken at creation, is the silent, eternal, and immutable.247 This Word brought creation into being, 
and this Word is the condition of possibility of all human speech.  
The Word who was spoken at the beginning of time, is also the Word who manifests 
himself in time, so Soskice suggests in her reading of Augustine’s sermon on Psalm 121 which 
interprets Exodus 3:14. According to Soskice’s reading, the immutable Word and Christ incarnate 
are the selfsame person. Christ is the pre-existent Word spoken at creation,248 and the Word in 
whom and by whom everything is uttered eternally as ‘God with us’.249 ‘We are perhaps shocked’ 
Soskice appropriately notes, ‘but why so?’ She continues, ‘it is entirely biblical to see Christ as 
Creator, to see him identified as the Word through whom all things came into being (John 1, 
echoing Genesis 1)’.250 This then, is the second aspect of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo: the pre-
existent Word in whom all that is, finds its existence, is the selfsame Word who was revealed as 
Christ incarnate. The Word who was conceived by the Holy Ghost and born of the virgin Mary so 
that the sense-perceptual self may know God not only by the fact that he or she exist but also by 
the fact that they are expressive and speaking beings.   
Establishing the correlation between the silent, immutable Word and Christ incarnate is 
important for the part that it plays in the reading of words as signs. A distinction exists between 
things and signs. Whereas the former is easily translated as objects which signify nothing more or 
less than themselves, the latter is more encompassing. On Christian Doctrine reads, ‘[n]o one uses 
words except as signs of something else; and hence may be understood what I call signs: those 
 
244 Augustine, Confessions, XI, 6, 258.  
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things, to wit, which are used to indicate something else’.251 Signs thus signify by way of existing 
both as objects in their own right, and as inhabiting the referential spaces to which they gesture. 
Augustine uses the example of objects in Israel’s covenantal relationship with God. Moses’ staff, 
Jacob’s stone pillow, and Abraham’s ram are all objects, but when used to refer to God’s activity, 
become signs.252 When an object signifies divine activity, its divine referent transforms its 
meaning.253  
The same logic goes to show for words that have the Word as their referent. Since words 
can act as a sign of the living Word who is transcendent to persons, it is necessary to establish how 
something can be universally present to a person without inhabiting the realm of the material. 
Words which have the invisible or divine as referent, Augustine calls ‘spiritual thoughts’.254  
Sermon 341 reads: 
But you, staying here, see the same thing in your mind as he does, though he is staying so 
far away, and the whole of it shines on you, the whole of it is seen by him; because things 
that are divine and immaterial are whole everywhere.255  
Spiritual thoughts are invisible and yet ever-present to persons wherever they are grasped. When 
spiritual thoughts are understood, they are comprehended in their entirety because their referent is 
the eternal, immutable and transcendent Word. How spiritual thoughts are said to do so is a matter 
which pertains to the relationship of the Word to Christ incarnate.  
Establishing how something can be universally present to a person without inhabiting the 
realm of the material necessitates a reading of the pre-existent Word and Christ incarnate. In 
Confessions Book XI, the relationship is articulated in terms of the Word being spoken at creation 
and the incarnation when it reads:  
The eternal reason is your Word, who is also the Beginning, because he also speaks to us. 
So he tells us in the Gospel by word of mouth. Your Word, the Beginning, made himself 
audible to the bodily ears of men, so that they should believe in him and, by looking for 
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him within themselves, should find him in the eternal Truth, where the one good Master 
teaches all who listen to him.256 
Only insofar as the Son mediates the truth of God’s existence in time and does so in a manner that 
may be known by human persons, can human persons fathom the infinite and incorporeal Word. 
For the senses cannot attain to the immutable Word who was spoken at creation but can, as Soskice 
suggests, attain to the God who is God for us.257  
Christ incarnate who came as God for and with us, establishes a corporeal grammar by 
which the transcendental may be made known in bodily terms. On Christian Doctrine translates 
the incarnation as a moment where God is made manifest to the senses. It reads: 
And though He is everywhere present to the inner eye when it is sound and clear, He 
condescended to make Himself manifest to the outward eye of those whose inward sight is 
weak and dim.258  
The life of Christ establishes the embodied parameters by which persons perceive God. It is the 
case first, because ‘all created things, invisible and visible alike’ are made in the ‘immutable 
Word’259 and second, because the selfsame Word who indwells all that is, simultaneously revealed 
himself in the flesh. The incarnation inaugurates a new perceptual framework to which a person’s 
affective powers may be attuned. By attuning the senses to the divine, the words of the sense-
perceptual self become expressive of the Word’s indwelling presence.  
The words of Scripture, Augustine’s own reflections show, present words as they are 
transformed in the face of the divine. Through the indwelling presence of the Word, the words of 
Scripture sign to the invisible and transcendent God to whom the senses are attuned.260 Augustine’s 
reflection in Book XIII of the Confessions expresses the dynamic:   
You answered me, for you are my God and your voice can speak aloud in the voice of my 
spirit, piercing your servant’s deafness. ‘Man, O man’, your voice rang out, ‘What my 
Scripture says, I say. But the Scripture speaks in time, whereas time does not affect my 
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word, which stands for ever, equal with me in eternity. The things which you see by my 
Spirit, I see, just as I speak the words which you speak by my Spirit. But while you speak 
those words in time, it is not in time that I speak them.’261 
Words of Scripture attest to God’s presence to persons who, through their words, give voice to 
God in time. By giving words to God’s presence in time, words become incarnational through the 
fact that they make visible the invisible and give form to the transcendental. This is because the 
Word communicates divine truths to persons by the mediation of the Spirit.  
In her set of lectures, Carol Harrison finds a similar incarnational logic in Augustine’s 
writings. She describes the logic by reading the words verbum and vox as two registers of 
perception in Augustine’s Christological interpretation of Scripture. One example in Augustine’s 
writings where verbum and vox come into play is Book XIII of the Confessions where Augustine 
says, ‘[f]or a while I draw a breath of fragrance when my soul melts within me and I cry out in 
joy, confessing your glory, like a man exultant at a feast’.262 Two moments make up Augustine’s 
experience: the moment where he draws his breath in and has his soul melt within him – verbum, 
and the moment when he cries out, confessing God’s glory – vox.  
Verbum translates as ‘word’. It describes the internal thought or concept which a person 
apprehends but cannot express in words. It is the truth that ‘drops’ into the sense-perceptual self 
because of the Spirit’s illumination. Vox describes the inarticulate cry of Augustine, and his 
articulate confession of God’s glory, as that of giving ‘voice’ to something. Vox thus circumscribes 
the articulate and inarticulate sounds that issue forth because of Augustine’s comprehension of the 
Word. Both verbum and vox instantiate the sense-perceptual self’s responsiveness to the Word’s 
presence to them. The example of John the Baptist provides a similar case. His cries of the coming 
Messiah began when he received ‘word’ of the Messiah and continued when he proclaimed the 
Messiah’s coming in the desert. John the Baptist is prominent because it is his voice which rang 
out in the desert proclaiming the coming of the Messiah. It was this uttering, both prophetic and 
realised, which availed to those persons who were to receive Christ, a context within which to 
receive Him, and a language with which to articulate Christ’s divinity.263  
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The postures of speech present to Augustine and John the Baptist, are significant for the 
fact that they were uttered as an expression of the Word’s presence to them. Harrison explains: 
The voice, then – whether confused or articulate – whether it is John the Evangelists’ belch, 
the jubilus of the Psalmist, the cry of John the Baptist or an articulate human word – is an 
inchoate cry until it responds to and converts toward the creating and redeeming Word of 
God.264   
It is not, as Harrison shows, that the Word is present to the speech of persons alone, but that such 
speech is transformed in nature because they have a divine referent.265 At stake on the one hand, 
is the ‘gestural’ nature of words – that the sound which comes forth, whether inchoate or 
intelligible, gives voice to the invisible. At stake on the other hand, is the sacramental nature of 
words. Here, words refer to that which is transcendent to itself, while simultaneously making 
visible, or immanent, the divine to which it refers.266  
The gestural posture of speech, which is transitory and unintelligible in its uttering, and the 
sacramental posture of speech, which is open and grasping,267 are both characterised by the fact 
that the sense-perceptual self is the means by which the invisible is made visible. Although they 
are seemingly abstract, words are embodied actions which, through voice and speech, give form 
to the Word. It is important that a correlation be made between the corporeality of speech and the 
incorporeality of the Word since the doctrine of the incarnation suggests that Christ is present to 
persons as an embodied and sense-perceptual being. Augustine is keenly aware of the incarnational 
role his words assume when he, in Confessions book XII, likens his speaking with that of Moses’.  
Enacted in Confessions book XII, Augustine finds himself mimicking, repeating and 
performing the very same act as Moses, of receiving the Word of God and using human words to 
describe and ‘clothe’ the immutable, unchanging and invisible God.268 Augustine’s words, like 
those of Moses, have a divine referent whose presence is immanent to them. The words of 
Augustine and Moses are incarnational insofar as the immutable Word provides the substance of 
their speech. For Moses and John the Baptist, as for Augustine, the inspiration of speech comes 
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from the pre-existent Word who was incarnate as Christ, and now is the head of the body of Christ. 
Harrison explains, ‘Augustine’s basic point…is that something only exists when it receives form 
and that for human beings this only happens when we turn towards our Creator’.269 When speech 
is turned toward its Maker, it is transformed and, in being transformed, reaches beyond itself to 
the invisible and transcendent.  
Speech, in a reading of Augustine’s writings, is an entirely embodied activity. The sense-
perceptual self, in its response to the Word who manifests his presence to persons, utters either 
that which is incomprehensible or that which is intelligible in response to such presence. When 
words and speech are uttered in response to the Word’s presence, they make visible, or give shape 
to, the invisible. Because, as Harrison has shown, these sounds and words uttered have no ordinary 
referent, the Word transforms their scope and meaning. The very words of persons function 
sacramentally where they make known divine presence and have the divine present to them. The 
two postures of speech in Augustine as Harrison has identified them, make headway in describing 
how words can sign to the divine.  
Augustine’s Christological interpretation of Scripture affirms that the pre-existent Word is 
the selfsame Word who assumed the materiality of existence and is attested to in the words of 
Scripture. The words of Scripture, the logic of signs suggests, gesture to the living Word. The 
words of Scripture also gesture to the Word, who is its source and origin, both as pre-existent Word 
and as incarnate Christ. Following the logic of the pre-existent immutable Word through whom 
creation receives its existence and in whose incarnation the materiality of existence is transformed, 
the Word establishes a new mode of existence for the sense-perceptual self. Christ’s holding 
together of persons and Creator graces the sense-perceptual self with the ability to make known 
God’s presence in bodily terms. The incarnation of Christ perfects the relationship between the 
sense-perceptual self and the divine and establishes the sense-perceptual self as a sign of God’s 
indwelling presence.  
A reading of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, through the Christological interpretation of 
Scripture, shows the incarnation to grace the sense-perceptual self with a corporeal grammar by 
which to know God. God’s indwelling presence was manifest to those persons who recorded the 
words of Scripture. Their words not only attest to God incarnate but also to God’s continued 
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presence to persons through word, thought and deed. By articulating the continued presence of the 
Word to the speech of persons, the sense-perceptual self has the potential of making visible the 
presence of the Word. Each sense-perceptual self has their senses uniquely oriented by the 
indwelling presence of the Word, and as such, expresses the divine in a myriad of new and 
embodied ways, which give to the sense-perceptual self the status of being a sign of God’s 
indwelling presence.  
 
The Sense-perceptual Self as Sign  
Augustine’s Christological interpretation of Scripture puts forward a logic of the incarnation with 
which the sense-perceptual self may find new ways of unveiling the invisible Word. While the 
incarnation transforms the nature and status of words as signs, the incarnation also transforms the 
status of persons from whose speech words flow forth. This is because the incarnation, according 
to Augustine’s Homily on John 1:1-11, speaks of Christ’s immanence not only to the words of 
persons but also to their lived and embodied realities. Paul’s Damascus road experience arguably 
sets out the logic in the clearest way.270 On the road to Damascus, Jesus asks Paul ‘“Saul, Saul, 
why persecutest thou me?”271 Notably, here Jesus identifies the collective with himself. Christ 
identifies those groups of people whom Paul was persecuting as his very own self.  
According to the patristics scholar, Tarcisius van Bavel, the account recorded in Acts 9:4 
influenced Augustine deeply. Van Bavel writes, ‘[i]t is beyond any doubt that Augustine bases his 
idea of the Christus totus, the whole Christ, on the texts of Paul’.272 Augustine’s Homily on 1 John 
1:1-11, does two things: it explains Christ’s presence to persons at the hand of the incarnation – 
‘...because “the Word was made flesh, and dwelt in us”’273 – and it articulates the mystical 
incorporation of persons into the body of Christ – ‘[t]o that flesh the Church is joined, and so there 
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is made the whole Christ, Head and body’.274 On Christian Doctrine accordingly reads, ‘this is our 
highest reward, that we should fully enjoy Him, and that all who enjoy Him should enjoy one 
another in Him’.275 One may conclude from Paul’s Damascus road experience that in the 
incarnation, death and resurrection of Christ, Christ’s body becomes a sign of a new body. 
Augustine’s writings on this mystical body of Christ is also known as the doctrine of the Totus 
Christus – the whole Christ. 
With Christ’s incorporation of the collective in his body, the body of Christ becomes 
sacramental. The body of Christ not only refers to something divinely other than itself, it also 
embodies Christ’s presence. This is the argument behind Peter’s apostolic charge, Augustine notes, 
‘[f]or if in Peter’s case there were no sacramental symbol of the Church, the Lord would not have 
said to him, “I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: whatsoever thou shalt loose 
on earth shall be loosed in heaven...”’276 The church, as a sign and sacrament of the Word incarnate, 
has Christ’s presence immanent to it. Augustine notes, ‘[f]or the Church is His body, as the 
apostle’s teaching shows us; and it is even called His spouse’.277  
The body of Christ is a dynamic reality for it describes not only the union that exists 
between Christ and his body but also the union that exists between members of the body. Paul is 
cited, once more, in On Christian Doctrine when Augustine writes: 
But when you have joy of a man in God, it is God rather than man that you enjoy. For you 
enjoy Him by whom you are made happy, and you rejoice to have come to Him in whose 
presence you place your hope of joy. And accordingly, Paul says to Philemon, “Yea, 
brother, let me have joy of thee in the Lord.” For if he had not added “in the Lord,” but had 
only said, “Let me have joy of thee,” he would have implied that he fixed his hope of 
happiness upon him...278   
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Christ is the foundation of the union which exists between persons and is the source which binds 
the members of the body together. But so also is the body to its head, shows Van Bavel, the body 
is the fullness and realisation of Christ.279  
The term ‘corporate’, Van Bavel clarifies, suggests the concept of mutual inherence, of the 
individual in the collective and collective in the individual.280 With this rendering to act as an 
individual is to act as and for the collective. Likewise, to act as collective is to act as and for the 
individual. Van Bavel continues: 
Since the moment Jesus left this world, He needs our hands to reach out to the destitute, 
He needs our eyes to see the needs of the world, He needs our ears to listen to the misery 
of others, He needs our feet to go to persons to whom nobody goes.281 
The body of Christ is a dynamic corporate body that makes visible Christ’s presence in the 
corporeality of existence. The status of the Totus Christus, is one of equality with the Son.282 It is 
the very concrete embodiment of Christ on earth. It is Christ’s presence, not as a spiritual body – 
this is the future and heavenly disposition,283 but as the corporeal and physical material body. 
There is no flight from the material to the spiritual, only the absolute affirmation that it is in and 
through the body that persons realise Christ in everyday life.  
Whereas the created order signs to its Creator, the Totus Christus has its Creator immanent 
to its existence. The status of the sense-perceptual self transforms when the Word inhabits it. By 
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unveiling the Word in the everydayness of life, the body as individual and collective entity, exists 
sacramentally. The body of Christ is thus the sacramental existence of the Word, for it finds its 
origin in the pre-existent Word spoken at creation, it finds its salvation in the incarnate Son who 
perfectly holds together the human and divine, and it finds its culmination in the Totus Christus 
where Christ is the bridegroom and the church the bride.  
When Christ indwells persons, and persons partake of His revelatory presence, an 
incarnational logic arises. The doctrine of participation in Augustine’s writings, best describes his 
logic. In Darren Sarisky’s analysis of Augustine’s interpretation of Paul, he finds two modes of 
participation: ontological and dynamic. Ontological participation is grounded in the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo and describes God’s continued presence in the created order. Here, God is 
present to all that exists, while simultaneously being ontologically distinct. Darren Sarisky 
explains, ‘[o]ntological participation points to the asymmetrical dependence that exists between 
God and all else: everything depends on God, while God depends in no way on anything’.284 
Whereas ontological participation pertains to the relationship of created to Creator, the second 
mode of participation pertains to the sense-perceptual self’s partaking of God’s revelation. 
Soteriology proper, dynamic participation considers how persons partake of God’s revelation as 
the Word incarnate. Sarisky explains: 
Because of the human person’s status as a member of the created world, entirely dependent 
on God, the holiness or Christ-likeness that a human being demonstrates is precisely a 
derived virtue. It exists in the person, but it does so as a function of divine grace. The 
dynamic aspect of human participation in God accentuates human existence in time: 
humans are mutable beings, who can change as time passes, and they ought to progress in 
their participation in God as their lives unfold.285 
When persons thus participate in the Word dynamically, the incarnate Word defines their 
engagements and orders their existence. This is due, one must be reminded, to the fact that the 
incarnation is an entirely Trinitarian act. Each person of the Trinity has a unique role in actualising 
the union which the Word establishes between the sense-perceptual self and God. Augustine 
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writes, ‘there is no separation of operations; there is no dissimilarity of substance; but there is one 
Father who is God, one Son who is God, one Holy Spirit who is God’.286 The inseparability of the 
Trinity translates the incarnation as the Triune act by which God is revealed to persons through 
the Son by the mediation of the Spirit.  
To affirm the presence of God to persons by Word and the Spirit is to affirm the mediation 
between God and human. In the doctrine of the Fall, the sense-perceptual self and its potential to 
embody the Word is inhibited by the presence of sin. Sin mars, so to speak, the embodied 
manifestation of God’s presence to persons. The effect which sin has on persons is shown in On 
Christian Doctrine: 
We have wandered far from God; and if we wish to return to our Father’s home, this world 
must be used, not enjoyed, that so the invisible things of God may be clearly seen, being 
understood by the things that are made, - that is, that by means of what is material and 
temporary we may lay hold upon that which is spiritual and eternal.287 
The world which so concerns Augustine is the world as it relates to the sense-perceptual self whose 
senses are disordered by sin. When existing as one whose life is not characterised by the life and 
death of Christ, the senses seek and desire that which can only satisfy them temporarily. For the 
sense-perceptual self continuously longs for her or his Creator who equally yearns to have the 
sense-perceptual self oriented to Godself.  
Augustine enlists the language of yearning himself when he famously says, ‘you made us 
for yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest in you’.288 In the doctrine of the Fall, the 
logic of yearning and of finding rest is articulated in the doctrine of grace. Where sin mars the 
believing self’s postures of speech, grace re-narrates and orients the senses of the believing self to 
the Word who defines their ontological status. Grace shapes the existence of each sense-perceptual 
self, for ‘if human beings are created from nothing, their very existence and continuance in being 
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is a work of creating and continually sustaining grace’.289 Grace has a liberating effect, it enacts 
the divine proclamation that the realm of the corporeal is the realm in which faith, hope and love 
is lived and expressed. Grace permeates this existence, for grace transforms speech into the 
salutary witnessing of the Word incarnate through the mediation of the Spirit. Each person 
accordingly has the choice to live their existence as one who is ordered by the Spirit’s inspiration 
and orientation, and to live a life which makes visible the truth revealed by the invisible God.  
The Fall, with its prominent role in the contemporary reception of Augustine’s theology, 
has a role to play, but the Fall is not the defining characteristic of the Christian existence. Instead, 
the divine inworking of grace elevates the status of embodied existence to that of the realm of the 
revelatory logic of the Word, where persons participate in God’s divine economy through their 
union with the Son and working of the Holy Spirit. The role that the Spirit plays in the life of the 
sense-perceptual self Augustine delineates in his Sermons on the Liturgical Seasons which reads: 
…twice, too, did He [Christ] give the Holy Spirit. He gave one Spirit, and He alone gave; 
He gave unto unity and yet He gave twice. In the first place, after He rose again He said to 
His disciplines: ‘Receive the Holy Spirit,’ [John 20.22] and He breathed upon them…Later, 
promising to send the Holy Spirit, He said: ‘You shall receive power when the Holy Spirit 
comes upon you’ [Acts 1.8]’…290  
It is through the ministry of the Spirit that the sense-perceptual self can perceive God’s presence 
and articulate such a presence in their own bodily terms.291 It is through the Holy Spirit that God 
is embodied in a myriad of ways: in history – ‘in our individual histories and in that of our 
world’,292 and as the One through whom we experience delight in the presence of God as restored 
human beings.293  
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In the Holy Spirit’s unity with the Godhead, and in the Spirit’s evocation of love and desire 
in persons, the sense-perceptual self can express the divine presence affectively.294 The Spirit 
fulfils at least two roles in the life of the sense-perceptual self: the Spirit acts as enabler, 
conforming persons to God; and the Spirit acts as agent, transfiguring persons. In the 
transfiguration of the believing self, the utterances which flow because of that transfiguration, act 
as a witness of God who is invisible and incorporeal, and yet present to persons. When embodying 
the ineffable God, whether in terms of love or in terms of varying postures of speech, the role that 
the Holy Spirit plays in configuring the witness of each individual gives to that witness a 
characteristically incarnational character.  
In the doctrine of the Totus Christus, Christ is the condition of possibility for speech to be 
incarnational. It is not that the words which the sense-perceptual self utters are divine in 
themselves, but that words, when uttered in response to the living Word, give expression to God’s 
presence in them. The sense-perceptual self exists as a member of the body in union with Christ. 
All incarnational speech must, therefore, be grounded in the incarnation and the Totus Christus. 
The body of Christ, with Christ pantocrator as head, can bring forth the immutable Word in its 
finite articulations of Christ’s presence only where its speech is signified by its divine referent. 
At the heart of the Totus Christus lies the doctrine of participation, which finally grounds 
the sense-perceptual self in the Word, who is its condition of possibility. When persons exist in 
union with Christ, they partake of Christ’s revelation and have their senses ordered to the Spirit’s 
mediation of that revelation. Each sense-perceptual self uniquely expresses the presence of the 
Word whose incarnation provides a new corporeal grammar with which to understand the 
relationship of self to God. It is noteworthy that the unique expression of the Word’s presence to 
persons manifests through the sense-perceptual self. Expressing the divine in the flesh incorporates 
the particular embodied existence of each person and brings that existence to its perfection. While 
the very nature of perception is transformed, it is done in a manner that advances the integrity of 
the sense-perpetual self.  
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Enlisting Christian Poets: The Word Incarnate  
The sense-perceptual self exists both as a sign and as a sacrament of God’s presence. The 
incarnation accounts for the sacramental nature of words, as does the Spirit’s provision of a new 
corporeal grammar by which the sense-perceptual self exists in relation to the divine. How the 
sense-perceptual self daily makes manifest the presence of God is the question which next 
concerns us, for without an account which explicitly incorporates the body in its rendering, the 
potentiality of the flesh remains in abstraction. Next to be considered then, are the ways in which 
the Word’s presence is manifest to persons through their embodied expression of the Word. At the 
intersection of living Word and embodied description are the words of the poet.  
Two contemporary Christian poets who reflect theologically on the incarnational nature of 
poetry are Malcolm Guite and Trevor Hart. In Faith, Hope and Poetry: Theology and the Poetic 
Imagination, Guite describes the modes by which the sense-perceptual self registers the divine. 
The first mode is apprehension. Apprehension falls within the imagination’s capacity to give 
meaning to the invisible and silent – to give conceptual boundaries to meaning and clothe the 
invisible in the visible. Apprehension here parallels verbum in Harrison’s analysis of Augustine’s 
writings. It is the sigh which Augustine utters when he becomes aware of God’s divine indwelling 
to his senses.  
The second mode by which the poet registers the Word is through comprehension. 
Comprehension functions within the realm of reason, giving coherence to the shapes that the 
imagination apprehends. Guite explains: 
What imagination does here is to discern that the outer shapes or forms are in fact pregnant 
with meaning, to realise that things unknown can be made known by being embodied, not 
in mere copies of nature, but through imitations of nature, so that the things between heaven 
and earth presented to our senses are so re-presented in the poet’s art that they ‘body forth’ 
the invisible, that they turn into shape, and so into comprehensibility, truth and experience 
that would otherwise have been either inaccessible or only accessible once and for a 
fleeting moment – apprehendable perhaps, but also irretrievable.295  
The act of giving shape to the invisible Word expresses the place of vox in Augustine’s writings. 
When words clothe the invisible Word, they body forth God’s divine presence.  
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When defining these two modes of knowing the divine in this way, neither reason nor the 
imaginative will enjoys precedence. Instead, the two are mutually inhering and dependent on 
another. In the simultaneous enactment of the imagination and reason, a conceptual performance 
takes place which has as its referent the divine Word made incarnate. In both instances, the 
metaphysical Word grounds all speech in the divine, and the incarnate Son, concretises such 
speech in the realm of the corporeal. The two modes of perception simultaneously perform the 
grasping of the presence of the Word and the articulation of that presence in terms resonant with 
the particularity of a person’s existence. In both instances, the Spirit communicates to persons the 
divine truths made manifest by their existence in the body of Christ and as the body of Christ.  
That the sense-perceptual self apprehends and comprehends the Word, is integral to its 
unique embodied expression of the Word. The imagination cannot but be grounded in the 
materiality of its existence. The sense-perceptual self thus gives shape to the invisible through its 
own unique corporeal grammar as it is registered by the imagination. One Scottish poet who was 
adamant about the embodied nature of speech as it pertains to God, was Edwin Muir. Muir is 
referenced by Guite for the critique that Muir renders of theological speech which has lost sight of 
the incarnate God. Edwin Muir writes in his Incarnate One:  
…How could our race betray 
The Image, and the Incarnate One unmake 
Who chose this form and fashion for our sake? 
 
The Word made flesh here is made word again 
A word made word in flourish and arrogant crook. 
See there King Calvin with his iron pen, 
And God three angry letters in a book, 
And there the logical hook 
On which the Mystery is impaled and bent 
Into an ideological argument. 
 
…The merry and the sad, theorist, lover, all 
Invisibly will fall: 
Abstract calamity, save for those who can 
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Build their cold empire on the abstract man…296 
The absolute centrality of corporeality to the incarnational structure of words is present to Muir’s 
critique of ‘abstract calamity’. According to his critique, words stripped of the corporeal grammar 
with which the sense-perceptual self registers the divine does injustice to the revelatory logic of 
the incarnation.  
The alternative to abstract calamity, Muir’s Incarnate One further shows, are words where 
the invisible and embodied mutually inhere. This, Trevor Hart shows in ‘Through the Arts: 
Hearing, Seeing and Touching the Truth’, is the crux of the incarnation, that the incarnation gives 
persons the framework by which to express God incarnate in their own bodily terms. Hart writes: 
…the same Word which was formerly spoken to humankind in order to evoke response has 
now finally itself become human and, as it were, incorporates to itself within itself, 
becoming the one human in whose life a fitting response and correspondence to God’s 
speaking may be seen…297 
Hart’s quote indicates that the embodied speech which ushers forth from the sense-perceptual self 
is a fitting articulation of the indwelling presence of the Word, for the incarnation shows embodied 
existence to be the very place where God manifests himself.  
The incarnate Word establishes a continuum by which God and sense-perceptual self meet 
each other in the person of Christ. While it may be claimed that the senses may fail and 
misapprehend the divine, the Word who was incarnate now mediates the senses by being their 
condition of possibility. In the first instance, the immutable Word gives the created order the 
grounds for expressing God’s creative activity in the here and now.298 In the second instance, it is 
God incarnate who graces the sense-perceptual self with the corporeal grammar by which to 
register the Word’s presence to persons. With each utterance the sense-perceptual self makes, its 
words manifest the participatory relationship it enjoys in the Word who is the head of the body of 
Christ. The incarnation accounts for the potential that the sense-perceptual self has in showing 
 
296 Muir in Guite, Faith, Hope and Poetry., 29. 
297 Hart, Trevor. 2001. ‘Through the Arts: Hearing, Seeing and Touching the Truth’. In Beholding 
the Glory: Incarnation through the Arts, edited by Jeremy Begbie, 1–26. Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic., 16-17.  
298 Soskice, ‘Aquinas and Augustine’., 196.  
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forth God’s creative presence in persons, and the Spirit accounts for the ways in which the sense 
are oriented to God. 
The embodied renderings of the incarnate Word, Guite and Hart suggest, are at the center 
of the words of the Christian poet. The words of the poet, Muir’s critique shows, also pertain to 
speech which has the divine as its referent. Insofar as Muir lodges his critique against theology in 
abstraction, his promoting of embodied speech is suggestive because it points to the prominence 
of the body in apprehending and comprehending the Word in ways which make anew Christ 
incarnate today.  
 
The Incarnate and Performative Word 
The incarnate Word in Augustine’s Christological interpretation of Scripture sets the logic for the 
embodied perception of God. One understands such perception to mean both the transformation of 
the sense-perceptual self at the hand of the incarnate Word, and the incorporating of a new 
corporeal grammar by which to perceive the divine. Words, Carol Harrison and Malcolm Guite 
have shown, are the primary ways in which such an embodied dynamic is manifest in Augustine’s 
writings. In the first instance, words signify. They sign to that which is other than themselves while 
simultaneously inhabiting the realm of the signified. Words are, therefore, particularly suited to 
describe the relationship of words to the Word who indwells the sense-perceptual self. In the 
second instance, words are embodied articulations of the sense-perceptual self. Although they 
seemingly exist as abstract and removed, words find their unique expression through the particular 
lived realities of a sense-perceptual self. Insofar as words are the articulations of persons who 
relate to the world in embodied ways, they too carry within themselves a unique embodied register 
of perception.  
Words of Scripture, Augustine’s Christological interpretation of Scripture show, are a 
collection of embodied articulations capturing the indwelling presence of God. Scripture evidences 
God’s sustained activity in the lives of persons. This is the logic first, of the doctrine of creation 
ex nihilo and second, of the incarnation. When God was born to this world as a human, a whole 
new order of perception was brought into being. It is characterised by the life of Christ and the 
corporeal grammar which his death, resurrection and ascension provides to the sense-perceptual 
self. The incarnation, we must remember, is the moment where existence in the flesh is transfigured 
at the hand of Christ’s existence in the flesh. The sense-perceptual self exists in Christ’s 
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grammar as though it were their own. In fact, the flesh of Christ is the flesh of the sense-perceptual 
self insofar as Christ’s life is the new corporeal grammar in which the sense-perceptual self 
participates. For in Christ, persons not only perceive God in sense-perceptual terms, they are 
incorporated into Christ’s personhood by the ministry of the Spirit.  
The intimate union between the life of persons and the life of Christ rests on the doctrine 
of participation inherent to Augustine’s writings. When persons participate in Christ, their words 
are sacramental – their words make incarnate the indwelling presence of the Word to the sense-
perceptual self. A distinction should be made at this point between words spoken in general, and 
words which are oriented to God. Words spoken in general do not have a divine referent and as 
such do not advance an incarnational logic. Words that are spoken in response to God do have a 
divine referent and make visible the presence of the Word. The latter form of speaking, the example 
of John the Baptist in Harrison’s analysis shows, is a particular posture of speech. It is a worshipful 
posture where the senses are attuned to the divine and exists as a response to the divine whether in 
incomprehensible utterances, or in comprehensible words. In this instance, words are not only 
made in response to God but also evidence the responsive sense-perceptual self whose existence 
is unified with the Word.  
Because speech which responds to God is restricted in its ability to express the God who 
is Creator of all that is, a Christo-centric aesthetic grounds all speech in Christ incarnate. The body 
of Christ has its existence formed by the incarnate life of Christ, by the ministry of the Holy Spirit, 
and by the Father’s holding all that is in being. Here, the Totus Christus plays a significant part in 
establishing an aesthetic of the life of Christ. The Christo-centric aesthetic of the body shapes the 
manners in which speech bodies forth the communicative Word. Insofar as the corporeal grammar 
of Christ founds a Christo-centric aesthetic, the expression of the body of Christ manifests 
differently in different contexts.  
The words of the Christian poets, Guite and Hart’s writings suggest, is one expression of 
the relationship between God as communicative Word and the expression thereof through a 
Christo-centric corporeal grammar. The words of the poet apprehend and comprehend God’s 
presence and express such presence in terms of the sense-perceptual self’s unique embodied 
register of perception. The mode by which the poet thus speaks of the divine is a speech which is 
grounded in the body. The poet is not isolated in his or her uniquely embodied manner of speaking. 
The rhetorician, as Augustine shows, similarly exists at the intersection of speech and living Word. 
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Because speech which responds to God is necessarily situated in the body and founded by the 
Word, the incarnational logic of words to Word may also be termed performative.  
Another way of putting the incarnational logic, and this is key, is the concept of 
performance. The poetic voice performs the unity of the visible and invisible, central to the lives 
of persons as existent in the body of Christ. Such performance expresses itself anew in the lives of 
persons. It is the case with the poet, as it is with the mystic whose speech presents itself as an 
embodied uttering forth of the Word whose presence is manifest to the self through the particularity 
of their own existence. In this instance, the sense-perceptual self incorporates her or his own 
existence into the articulation of the Word.  
The act of performance functions as the moment where the sacramental existence of 
persons expresses anew the relationship between human and divine. With the aforesaid in mind, 
our next two chapters turn to two examples of performative speech that are deeply informed by a 
Christo-centric corporeal grammar but express that grammar in two diverse and unique ways. 
These two figures are Julian of Norwich whose register of perception is feminine, and Dante 
Alighieri whose poetic imagery describes the various states of relationship between self, other and 
divine.  
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Chapter 5 
Julian and the Passion 
 
In Augustine’s writings, the logic of the incarnate Word is instructive for a Christian ontology of 
the flesh because words make visible the invisible and are incarnational. The Christological 
interpretation of Scripture, the doctrine of participation, and the doctrine of the totus Christus are 
three modes by which the Word is present to the lives of persons in their everyday and embodied 
existence. From the words of the rhetorician and the poet arises a uniquely embodied perception 
of the divine where words make visible the invisible. Central to this register is a theologically 
informed imagination that yearns to have the senses attuned to the divine, so the Christian poets 
shows as they enlist a grammar of perception unique to their context and time. Augustine’s 
quintessential refrain, ‘you made us for yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest in 
you’, here serves as testament.299  
We find in Augustine’s writings then a logic of the incarnate Word that sidesteps any 
anxiety surrounding the role of the body in the perception and articulation of the divine. For it is 
through the very bodily modes of expression such as speech, that the invisible is made visible in 
Augustine’s writings. It is the case with speech, as with other sense-perceptual engagements, that 
the senses register the divine in a grammar that is conceptually closest to their own embodied 
circumstance. A medieval mystic whose speech is similarly clothed in her own corporeal grammar, 
is Julian of Norwich. Her unique feminine grammar of perception constantly transforms her 
theological imagination by rendering, for example, God as her Carer, Lover and Maker.300  
Whereas Augustine uses words as a paradigm of perception, Julian goes a step further; she 
provides the words with which she registers Christ’s presence to her. With this differentiation in 
the manners of speaking between Augustine and Julian, we transition in our conceptualisation of 
a Christian ontology from words as they make God incarnate, to words as they perform this 
incarnational presence. The performative in Julian’s writings, anchors abstraction in the very 
visceral register of the Cross. Christ’s blood, its drying, dripping, and Christ’s discoloration, all 
become part of Christ’s Trinitarian address to her.  
 
299 Augustine. 1961. Confessions. Translated by R. S Coffin. London: Penguin Books., 21.  
300 Julian of Norwich, Julian of. 2015. Julian of Norwich. Revelations of Divine Love. Translated 
by Barry Windeatt. Oxford World’s Classics. Oxford: Oxford University Press., 56. 
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Julian’s near-death experience precipitates her visceral visions of Christ on the Cross. On 
her deathbed, she receives the words of the priest who administers her last right to her, saying: 
‘[d]aughter, I have brought you the image of your Saviour. Look at it and take comfort from it, in 
reverence of him who died for you and me’.301 From her gazing, she receives sixteen ‘shewings’ 
or visions. She first captures these showings in a short text and then meditates upon them over the 
course of twenty years in what becomes her long text. When the meaning of each vision drops in 
her understanding, Julian gives words to Christ’s address of her thereby providing a unique script 
for her revelations.  
With Julian’s unique register of perception, a lens is given to the ways in which the sense-
perceptual self performs the corporeal grammar of the Cross. Notably, Julian provides a uniquely 
embodied register for the Love which the Cross communicates to her. Of significance for this study 
is the correlation between the content of the meaning of the Cross and the form in which it presents 
itself.302 As an example of performative speech, Julian’s Revelations of Divine Love holds within 
its nexus the perception of the divine relayed through the grammar of experience.  
 Julian’s own context of experience is that of suffering. The bubonic plague killed countless 
people and during this period, the loss of loved ones and neighbour was commonplace. Even 
though Julian did not die from the bubonic plague, her own near-death experience warrants a 
grammar which incorporates loss and suffering. As one who lived in a convent and had anchoritic 
duties, it is very likely that Julian would have been exposed to the suffering of others, and in her 
duties of praying and reading Scripture, would have sought a means by which to make the Cross 
pertinent to those to whom she was ministering. Both her suffering and that of Christ’s, places the 
Cross central to her writings. We thus find in Julian a reading of the Cross shaped by her own 
grammar of suffering.  
At the intersection of the embodied and theological, the flesh is the perceptual norm with 
which the self engages with the world. The flesh, a reading of Paul shows, encompasses the 
purpose and the plan of the Cross. The Cross brings the self into union with the divine through the 
 
301 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 4.  
302 In Janet Soskice’s comparison of Julian and Augustine’s speech and writing, she showcases the 
importance that paying attention to form and content in theological writing has. See Soskice, Janet. 
2007. The Kindness of God: Metaphor, Gender and Religious Language. Oxford: OUP., pp. 134 
– 35.  
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Second Person of the Trinity. Without the absolute humanity and divinity of Christ, the sense-
perceptual self is left unchanged by the incarnation as an act of re-creation. The life of Christ 
provides the corporeal grammar by which the sense-perceptual self comes to know itself truly as 
made in the image of God. When the Word and the Spirit align the senses, they are systematically 
attuned to the divine. In their registering of God’s presence, the senses make known through word, 
thought, and deed, the indwelling presence of the divine. Julian goes one step further by reading 
the life of Christ on the Cross in terms of her own embodied circumstance.  
The schemata of Julian’s life construct a uniquely feminine grammar of perception which 
not only registers divine presence but appropriates and performs such presence in a reading of the 
Cross as Trinitarian speech. Julian’s writings act as the gateway for a Christian ontology of the 
flesh from where the expression of the divine through a corporeal and visual grammar occurs in a 
theologically coherent manner.  
 
The Corporeal Grammar of the Cross  
Between Christ’s bleeding, discolouring, and drying flesh and his intimate address to her, Julian’s 
writings constantly hold together the sensory and theological. Julian’s visions of the Cross advance 
a unique grammar of perception. This is because, Denys Turner suggests, ‘[t]he Cross is the 
embodiment of her theological epistemology as such; for Julian theological knowledge is 
cruciform, and the tensions between love and death that meet in the Cross are exactly replicated in 
the conflicted experience of her even-christen’.303 The Cross is both Julian’s topos and method.304 
As topos, Christ’s suffering on the Cross resonates with the loss Julian was exposed to. As method, 
the Cross in Julian’s writings is the truest expression of God’s love and compassion for her.  
Julian’s unique grammar of perception thus starts with her own embodied existence and moves 
toward the Cross as it finds articulation through her understanding.  
The ways in which Julian perceives the Cross is inseparable from the grammar she uses to 
articulate the revelations she has of Christ’s love. The Cross occasions two moments for Julian, a 
moment of reconciliation between self and divine, and a moment whereby the senses are 
conformed to the meaning of the Cross. Chapter 27 of Revelations of Divine Love reads:  
 
303 Turner, Denys. 2011. Julian of Norwich, Theologian. London: Yale University Press., 22.  
304 Turner, Julian of Norwich., 22.  
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That same humbling which was revealed in his Passion was revealed again here in this 
compassion, in which there are two ways of understanding our Lord’s meaning. One was 
the bliss to which we are brought, in which he wants us to rejoice. The other is for comfort 
in our suffering; for he wants us to know that it will all be turned to glory and advantage 
by virtue of his Passion, and to know that we do not suffer alone but with him, and to see 
in him our foundation, and to see that his pains and his self-abnegation so far surpass all 
that we may suffer that it cannot be fully comprehended.305 
In Julian’s writings, the Cross is both an event and an articulation of God’s being. It articulates 
God’s compassion with Julian, and it expresses the Love which orders her affections. As an event, 
the Cross enacts the suffering and loss that Julian experiences. As an expression of God’s being, 
the Cross articulates God’s initiative to know Julian in her suffering and to do so in Christ’s very 
embodied existence. The simultaneous affirmation of being and event establishes Cross as that 
place where the sense-perceptual self finds its truest expression of the union which Christ brings. 
In its enactment of life and death, and of suffering and salvation, the Cross exists in Julian’s 
writings as a paradox. Paradox expresses the tension between God’s bountiful expression of love 
and desire to be in communion with her through the Cross. The tensions expressed in the Cross 
are not necessarily relieved because paradox plays a prominent role in Julian’s unique perceptual 
grammar of the Cross. The unresolved paradox of the Cross and its visceral depictions is 
characteristic of what literary scholars call the aesthetics of the grotesque. The category of the 
grotesque can be interpreted theologically, Ola Sigurdson shows, in his reading of the literary 
scholar Wolfgang Kayser, and philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin.306  
Kayser theorises the grotesque from the standpoint of the period of Romanticism to 
Modernity and defines the term as that which evokes the sense of alienation and estrangement. 
Bakhtin theorises the grotesque from the period of the Middle-Ages to the Renaissance and finds 
the grotesque to be of the liberative order.307 The latter expression is fecund for a theological 
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discourse since a liberative reading of the Cross breaks away from various orders of things.308 
Julian’s own understanding of the Cross also breaks away from the order of things since her 
register of the Cross casts Christ’s suffering in terms of delight, awe, and reverence.  
The centrality of paradox, of the abandonment of the order of things, and of the visceral 
register of Julian’s showings, points to a unique corporeal grammar of the Cross. One which seeks 
to meditate on the meaning of the Cross for the sake of articulating Christ’s unique address to her. 
Julian wishes to understand the meaning of the Cross for herself, this is clearly seen in her desire 
to inhabit the circumstance of the Cross. She writes: 
It seemed to me I wished that I had been there at that time with Mary Magdalene and with 
those who were lovers of Christ, so that I might have seen in the flesh our Lord’s Passion 
which he suffered for me, and so that I could have suffered with him as others did who 
loved him.309  
Julian’s desire is significant because it articulates an embodied reading of the Cross where the 
sense-perceptual self provides the grammar by which to read the truth enacted by the Passion. 
Julian gives to the Passion her own meaning based on the understanding she receives from the 
visions she has of Christ.  
Two registers of perception are central to Julian’s request, the embodied and that which 
develops in her understanding. When Julian states, ‘[a]t the same time as I saw this bodily vision, 
our Lord showed me spiritually in a vision how he loves us’,310 the realm of the sensory and the 
spiritual are held together. Also described as the relationship between flesh and spirit, this double 
register of perception provides a new framework for thinking through Julian’s visions as an 
embodied act. On the one hand, shows Alexandra Barrat, Julian’s register of perception may be 
articulated as an almost ‘scientific detachment’ when observing the wounds of Christ. On the other 
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hand, writes Marion Glasscoe, Julian’s understanding of the Cross resembles a psychologically 
aware account of the suffering of Christ.  
Writing on the former, Alexandra Barrat notes how Julian ‘does not dwell on Christ’s 
‘pains’ for their own sake. Rather, they act as a frame for other revelations or ‘ghostly sights’, even 
while the ‘bodily sight’ in all its varieties continues’.311 Instead of reading the Cross for the sake 
of its brutality, the realism with which Julian accounts for the body of Christ serves as an occasion 
to let ‘Christ’s Passion speak for itself’.312 Writing on the latter, Marion Glasscoe identifies 
Julian’s psychological rendering of Christ’s in the following terms: 
Her understanding of the Incarnation is not expressed in the intellectual albeit imaginative 
terms of Hilton, but experienced as a catalyst which transfigures everyday experiences. 
Julian uses the language and assumption of medieval theology but her text is shaped by 
literary means to convey creatively her psychological understanding of the realities such a 
theology seeks to discover.313 
Julian’s psychological approach to the Cross emphasises Christ’s conformity to her own bodily 
realities and vice versa. With such a reading, Christ is not a disinterested divine, but a God who is 
intimately present to her own embodied realities.  
Julian’s embodied response to the Cross maps a new corporeal grammar. Such a grammar 
expresses itself first, when the sense-perceptual self identifies with the Passion narrative and 
second, in the personalisation of the Cross. Julian’s unique perception finds its expression in the 
words that she ascribes to Christ. Although Julian never explicitly states that she intends to give 
Christ her words, the words which Christ speaks are those which occur at the hand of Julian’s 
embodied perception of Christ made known to her. The dual register, of the sensory and the 
spiritual together establishes an embodied manner of speaking about God. Julian performs, so to 
speak, her understanding of the Passion by assigning to her visions a script unique to her time, 
context, and social location. By doing so, Julian’s visions illustrate an awareness that God intends 
to commune with her, and that she should thereby continuously be conformed to the Love which 
the Cross reveals.  
 
311 Barrat, Alexandra. ‘Stabant Matres Dolorosae: Women as Readers and Writers of Passion 
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The scheme of reading the Cross whereby Christ’s flesh is discussed in minutiae, and the 
suffering of Christ is rendered in terms of Julian’s unique existential framework, makes subtle 
changes to the theology of the Passion. In the first instance, Julian’s emphasis lies not with Christ’s 
suffering but with Christ’s compassion with her own suffering. In the second instance, the detailed 
register of Christ’s wounds refuses any glossing over, Christ’s wounds are the point of the Cross, 
especially since the Church will grow from Christ’s side. Although death evidences the Cross, the 
Cross is also the birth of a new place. When Julian thus rejoices in Christ, she rejoices in the 
intimate nature of Christ’s address of her. The address is the ultimate expression of Love perceived 
through her own corporeality.  
 
Julian’s parable of the Cross  
To make sense of Julian’s unique grammar of perception, one needs to consider the place of 
soteriology in her reading of the Cross. Julian’s writings express her embodied theology in the 
vision of the Lord and Servant which she receives and meditates upon for some twenty years. The 
parable captures a conversation within the Trinity cast in terms of Christ who speaks to the Father. 
The conversation reads:  
And then he [Christ] sprang forward very readily at the Father’s will, and at once he fell 
very low into the Virgin’s womb, having no regard to himself nor to his cruel pains...And 
so I saw the Son standing, expressing what he meant, ‘Look, my dear Father, I am standing 
before you in Adam’s tunic, all ready to start off and to run. I wish to be upon earth to do 
what is to your glory when it is your will to send me. How long am I to remain longing for 
this?’314 
Three things are noteworthy in the parable: Christ’s falling into the virgin’s womb, Christ who 
stands before God as human, and Christ’s intense desire to bring to fulfilment God’s plan for the 
created order. First, Christ’s falling into the virgin’s womb suggests God’s initiative to meet 
persons in terms resonant with their own existence, the incarnation. The vision that Christ has for 
persons is one that embraces the materiality of their existence. Second, that Christ is clothed in 
‘Adam’s tunic’ anchors the incarnation in the created order. Christ’s embrace is a comprehensive 
embrace which incorporates persons into his economy. The created order is then the realm in which 
 
314 Windeatt, Julian of Norwich., 113. 
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such incorporation is manifest. Finally, Christ’s intense longing to do what is to God’s glory, sets 
the logic of the Cross up in terms of God’s sustained desire to be in communion with persons.  
That Christ is ‘all ready to start off and run’ is a significant metaphor because running 
metaphorically denotes the Fall. Per illustration, Adam eagerly seeks to please God, but in his 
earnestness, falls. Christ also runs, but instead of falling, he transforms Adam’s tunic. The 
metaphor is one of salvation, Julian however renders it differently. Adam’s falling is cast in terms 
of his eagerness to please God. The falling of the servant, or the sin of the servant, is one borne 
from the desire to do that which is to the glory of God. The account is instructive because it casts 
the sense-perceptual self as one who is attuned to God’s creative presence in the created order. The 
senses yearn to be in relation with the divine, and so in its grasping, orients itself to that which is 
made by the Maker and not the Maker itself. Christ, however, restores the potential of the senses 
by assuming Adam’s tunic and thereby ordering them to God.  
Julian’s parable of the Lord and Servant casts Adam’s relation to Christ differently than, 
for example, Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo. Cur Deus Homo renders sin as the articulation of the 
ontological disjuncture between God and self. In this instance, Christ repairs the fracture by being 
an atoning sacrifice on the Cross.315 In Revelations of Divine Love, however, sin is the result of the 
failure of the senses to be wholly attuned to God.316 Caroline Walker Bynum similarly shows, 
‘Julian saw sin as a necessary (if painful) part of being human and that her theory of union with 
God did not involve “stages” the soul “passed beyond” but, rather, a continuity of self, a becoming 
fully human with Jesus’.317 The difference between Anselm and Julian’s approach lies in their 
different emphases of the Cross. Whereas Anselm speaks of atonement and reconciliation, Julian 
speaks of equality and union.  
Grace Jantzen finds an interesting contrast between Julian’s and Anselm’s soteriology. 
Jantzen suggests that Anselm’s model is one of atonement whereas Julian’s model is one of 
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restoration. In line with a sense-perceptual rendering of sin described thus far, Jantzen formulates 
sin as it occurs in Julian’s writings as fragmentation. Jantzen writes:  
The blame, rather, is part of our own confusion, our self-blame, the unproductive sense of 
guilt and worthlessness which make us feel that we are utterly unlovable even – or 
especially – in the sight of God, and that he could not possibly love and want us. It is this 
blame and self-loathing which Jesus has taken upon himself, coming to show us his endless 
love and the endless love of the Father to us, so that we find dignity and worth and 
integration in that love of his.318 
Sin as self-fragmentation, as Jantzen articulates it, is a manner of existing in the world which is 
characterised by an amnesia, a forgetfulness that persons are created in the image of God, and that 
their existence is made to witness to God who is their Maker.  
Considering a medieval reading of the lower and higher parts of the soul, the lower part 
which is the sensory being of the embodied soul, loses its feeling – so to speak – for the divine 
presence in a person’s life.319 Sin is perceptual failure, a failure to know and love God as originally 
intended for the created order. Humanity still has its sensory being founded in the Word, but its 
condition has been altered. Implicit to this assertion is an ontological and existential statement: 
ontologically, sin has no place in the divine economy because it cannot exist as an entity that 
originates in God and similarly, has no place in the union that exists between the self and God. 
Existentially, the loss of the senses’ ability to perceive God’s eternal delight, evokes a 
disorientating blow to the sensory being – sin comes as an immense trauma to the human 
imagination.320 Understood in this manner, sin is not the ontological estrangement from God 
 
318 Jantzen, Grace. 2000. Julian of Norwich. Mystic and Theologian. New Edition. London: SPCK., 
198-9.  
319 Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast., 289-90.  
320 When delineating the blame that humanity carries Grace Jantzen writes: ‘The blame, rather, is 
part of our own confusion, our self-blame, the unproductive sense of guilt and worthlessness which 
make us feel that we are utterly unlovable even – or especially – in the sight of God, and that he 
could not possibly love and want us. It is this blame and self-loathing which Jesus has taken upon 
himself, coming to show us his endless love and the endless love of the Father to us, so that we 
find dignity and worth and integration in that love of his.’ Jantzen, Julian of Norwich., 198-9. 
Similarly, Margaret Palliser echoes the existential rendering when she finds a distinction in the 
Revelations of Divine Love between sin in its own right, and the effects it has on persons. She 
continues, ‘Julian concludes that sin has real significance historically, but not ultimately: however 
sin may distort the image of God in us on the historical plane, ontologically we are still capax dei’. 
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rather, it is the continued perceptual failure to see God’s work in creation and the embodied self. 
In terms of the agency of humanity, sin is the failure of the embodied self to actualise itself as 
being made in God’s image and likeness. With this loss, the Second person of the Trinity restores 
the senses through His corporeal grammar. The interrelationship of the sense-perceptual self, the 
revelatory presence of God, and the attuning of the senses to the divine, is a rendition of salvation 
which is unique to Julian’s embodied theology. A sense-perceptual approach to sin shows the 
Cross to be the moment where the Second Person perfects the senses. Likewise, persons are known 
by their eagerness to be attuned to God rather than by some inherent sinfulness.  
The articulation of sin as that which is inherent to persons vis-à-vis a rendering of sin as 
sense-perceptual failure has significant implications for an embodied theology. In its deepest 
sense, the loss of self and the abandonment of the order of things – as seen in the grotesque Cross 
of Christ, informs the way in which Julian sees the embodied self in relation to the divine. Sin is 
when the sensory being suffers from perceptual failure and is unable to see God in the 
everydayness of life. The senses are both blind and dumb to God’s presence in the here and now. 
The embodied self fumbles about, so to speak, trying to grasp what it cannot comprehend. So, the 
‘blinds’ are never so truly lifted than when persons see themselves as Julian does in Christ.  
Rendering sin as sense-perceptual failure is one seen in Paul’s letter to the Romans, and in 
Athanasius’ logic of the incarnation. The parallels are important because they place Julian’s sense-
perceptual rendering of sin and the Cross in terms of the apostles and the theology of the early 
church. Here, Julian herself illustrates the transformation which occurs when the senses are attuned 
to the divine by the Word. Her restorative reading of the Cross illustrates how her senses are 
ordered to the divine and thereby reads the Cross in a manner which is closest to her own existence.  
A restorative model of the Cross sees the self as one whose self-fragmentation is 
transformed in the face of the Servant who is God. The sense-perceptual self has its senses entirely 
re-ordered by the Cross and the logic of Love which it expresses. Both its paradoxical and 
grotesque register enacts a de-establishment of the order of things. A restorative model of the Cross 
thus gives to the Passion a different entry point. This is so, argues Kerrie Hide, ‘because it 
concentrates on God’s gracious love for human beings expressed in Christ, a love that ceaselessly 
 
Palliser, Margaret Ann. 1992. Christ, Our Mother of Mercy: Divine Mercy and Compassion in the 
Theology of the Shewings of Julian of Norwich. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter., 96. 
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works to restore humankind to perfect union with God’.321 Here, the sense-perceptual failure of 
persons is narrated as an expansive event which implicates both created and divine.322 For the 
created order to falter or lose sight of its Maker requires a divine response of Love, and greater 
love had no other person than the love which Christ bore on the Cross.323  
The Cross not only expresses a vision of the restoration of the sense-perceptual self, it also 
sees such restoration as the incorporation of the self into Christ’s being. This union expressed 
through the Cross as the restoration of the senses, Brant Pelphrey terms an ontology of oneing. 
According to Pelphrey, an ontology of oneing is the only means by which the self can truly be 
restored through the Cross. By first assuming the nature of the flesh and then restoring it, the Cross 
restores the loss of condition ascribed to the Fall. With the incarnation prior to the Cross follows 
the logic that Christ’s assumption of the materiality of existence initiates the bringing to perfection 
of persons through the Cross.324 The interplay, it may be argued, emphasises the centrality of the 
Passion of Christ in bringing the sense-perceptual self in alignment with its telos – union with God 
and the sense-perceptual living-out thereof.325 An ontology of oneing finds its expression in the 
Cross, for the Cross is the moment where the Second Person of the Trinity establishes the eternal 
union of persons with God through Christ. Julian writes concerning the union she is to have with 
Christ in the following way: 
 
321 Hide, Kerrie. ‘The Parable of the Lord and the Servant: A Soteriology for Our Times’. Pacifica 
10, no. 1 (February 1997): 53–69., 56.  
322 As Stacy Obenhaus shows in ‘The Doctrine of Creation in Julian of Norwich’s Showings’, if 
God is Love, and the coming into being of the created order, is an act of love, then the created 
order continues to be ‘the object of God’s continuing attention’. See Obenhaus, Stacy R. 2005. 
‘The Doctrine of Creation in Julian of Norwich’s Showings’. The Downside Review 123 (433): 
235–51., 236.  
323 John 15:13 
324 The movement from Cross, to incarnation, to creation, echoes the soteriology present to 
Athanasius of Alexandria’s theological anthropology. 
325 Pelphrey places Julian’s ontology of oneing in direct opposition to what he believes to be the 
Protestant narrative of at-one-ment. Whereas the latter describes an attitude on behalf of both God 
and humanity which justifies a rhetoric of condemnation and necessitated death by way of the 
Cross, the former speaks of an orthodox inclined reading of participation in God’s being by way 
of the Second Person. Pelphrey, Brant. 2012. Lo, How I Love Thee! Edited by Julia Bolton 
Holloway. Spring Deer Studio., 52. 
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And furthermore he will we wit, that this dear worthy soul was previously knot to him in 
the making: Which knot is so subtle and so mighty, that it is oned into God. In which oning 
it is made endlesly holy.326  
The logic of oneing in the Revelations of Divine Love describes Christ as the primordial source of 
Julian’s embodied existence. According to Julian’s medieval understanding of the soul and the 
sensory, the substantial union of the soul is knit into the being of the Maker and the fabric of the 
Trinity.327 It is a soul whose higher being is eternally part of the Trinity and whose sensory being 
perpetually undergoes perfection the face of Christ’s crucified countenance. It is, the soul of 
humanity subsumed in the Second Person’s being. Christ not only carries humanity but forms it 
and gives to the self his very own substance. Julian’s register of union constructs the sense-
perceptual self as an integrated being whose existence is continuously informed by Christ’s 
inspiration thereof. Julian’s writings thus advance a body-centred reading of the Cross expressed 
in terms of her longing to be made one with Christ.  
When sin is understood to be the sense-perceptual failure to recognise God’s presence in 
the created order, the Cross re-articulates this presence through the registers of paradox and the 
grotesque. The prominence of the Cross to the senses means that Christ’s life clothes the embodied 
self with a new reading of the flesh; one which reads the Cross not for the prevalence of suffering, 
but for God’s compassion with self-fragmentation. Insofar as persons have their being in Christ, 
the Cross reconciles the senses to its fount.328 The restorative model of the Cross focuses less on a 
proposed ontological disjuncture between human and divine, and more on the potential of persons 
to know God in the bodily terms of their existence. The Cross establishes relation between self and 
divine and affirms a participatory existence in the already and every day. The Love expressed by 
the Passion thus orientates human longing and desire to its fount,329 the Trinity.  
 
326 Julian of Norwich. ‘Revelations of Divine Love’. In The Early Modern Englishwoman: A 
Facsimile Library of Essential Works, edited by Betty S. Travitsky and Anne L. Prescott, Vol. 3. 
Printed Writings, 1500-1640: Part 4 1. Aldeshot: Ashgate, 2007. 
327 Julian of Norwich. 1978. A Book of Showings to the Anchoress Julian of Norwich. Edited by 
Edmund College and James Walsh. Vol. 1 & 2. Belgium: Universal Press., 560.  
328 For while the soul enjoys a pre-existence in God since the moment of creation, the sensory 
dimension of the embodied self is only united with God at the incarnation and Christ’s eventual 
passion. See Obenhaus, ‘The Doctrine of Creation’, 241.  
329 On the notion of longing and desire, I have an appreciation for Sarah Coakley’s ruminations on 
the Cross and how it evokes the transformation of desire. Describing the excess which I have 
argued is present in the grotesqueness of the Cross writes, the ‘act of ecstasis is itself an essentially 
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The Cross as Trinitarian speech 
An ontology of oneing establishes the Cross as the moment where Christ’s embrace restores the 
sense-perceptual self. Christ’s assumption of the flesh and Christ’s bearing of the created order as 
the Second Person of the Trinity restores the sense-perceptual self. At various moments in 
Revelations of Divine Love, Christ speaks in Trinitarian terms. Chapter 59 of the Long Text reads: 
 ‘It is I’, that is to say: ‘It is I: the power and the goodness of fatherhood. It is I: the wisdom 
and the kindness of motherhood. It is I: the light- and the grace which is all blessed love. 
It is I: the Trinity. It is I: the unity I am the supreme goodness of all manner of things. It is 
I who makes you to love. It is I who makes you to long. It is I: the endless fulfilment of all 
true desires’.330  
The ‘I’ which Christ refers to is a singular and yet collective communicative event. Christ’s ‘I’ is 
the ‘I’ of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, Trinity in unity. Each of Christ’s utterances expresses a 
different state of relation. When Christ speaks to Julian, Christ’s speech is the speech of the Trinity, 
and when Christ appears to Julian, He appears as the Trinity. Both the Cross and Christ’s speech 
enacts the activity of the Trinity in the created order.  
The ‘It is I’ speech of Christ ushers forth in a manner reminiscent of God’s speech in the 
burning bush in Exodus 3:1-17, and Christ’s ‘I am’ saying in John 14. Whether Julian makes this 
connection in her own understanding of Christ words, she does not say. It is important to remember 
though that this encounter establishes the fundamental truth that God subtends all. In Exodus as in 
John, these sayings stand out for their characterisation of God as the One who founds all that is, 
and the One in whom and by whom all that is continues to have its being. In the same Chapter 59 
of the Long Text, Christ’s speech continues: 
And he showed all this most blessedly with this meaning, - ‘See, I am God. See I am in 
everything. See, I do everything. See, I never lift my hands form my works, nor ever shall, 
without end. See, I guide everything to the end to which I ordained it from without 
 
divine act available only in the mystical body: in it I participate in the eternal exchange of love 
between Father and Son [and Holy Spirit] which breaks every hold on my resentment and 
bitterness’. See Coakley, Sarah. The Cross and The Transformation of Desire: Meditations for 
Holy Week on the Drama of Love and Betrayal. 128. Cambridge: Grove Books Limited, 2014., 19.  
330 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 128.  
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beginning by the same power, wisdom, and love with which I made it. How should 
anything be amiss?331 
Christ’s Triadic language points to God’s continued activity within the created order. Just like 
Christ’s speech, God’s activity is rendered according to the Trinity’s activity in the created order. 
The various states of relation expressed in Christ’s utterances, translates to the manifold ways in 
which God’s presence is immanent to the created order as power, wisdom and love. Christ’s 
Triadic language thus founds Julian’s visions and places the Cross central to God’s encompassing 
vision for the created order.  
The encompassing vision of the Trinity, Revelations of Divine Love reminds us, is always 
situated in the Cross. The Cross anchors all speech and all visions in the materiality of Christ’s 
existence. The Cross gives a corporeal grammar to the creative activity of the Trinity within the 
realm of the sense-perceptual. Chapter 24 reads:  
And with this our good Lord said most blessedly, ‘Look how I loved you’, as if he had 
said, ‘My darling, look and see your Lord, your God, who is your maker and your endless 
joy. My darling, look and see your own brother, your sovereign. My child, look and see 
your Lord God, your creator and your endless joy. See what delight and bliss I have in your 
salvation, and for my love rejoice with me now.’332 
The same Word who brought creation into being is Christ on the Cross. As a sense-perceptual self, 
Christ articulates the meaning of the Cross as God’s immeasurable act of love. When Christ invites 
Julian to perceive his countenance on the Cross, she understands love to be its purpose. Christ 
speaks to Julian as the Second Person of the Trinity but does so by using three different states of 
relation – as Lord, God, and Brother.  
Christ’s speech becomes an event characterised by Julian’s perception of the Father, who 
creates and sustains all that is, of the Son who re-narrates the materiality of our existence, and of 
the Spirit who perfects persons through grace.333 Christ’s utterance of love followed by the 
identification of ‘Lord, God and Brother’ symbolically reiterates the Trinitarian speech in terms 
that resonate with Julian’s embodied and theological imagination. Julian recalls: ‘[a]nd as long as 
 
331 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 56.  
332 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 72.  
333 Pelphrey, Brant. 1982. Love Was His Meaning: The Theology and Mysticism of Julian of 
Norwich. Austria: Institut Für Anglistik und Amerikanistik Universität Salzburg., 131.  
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we are in this life…our Lord God touches us tenderly and blessedly calls us, saying in our soul, 
‘Let me be your whole love, previous child. Attend to me…’334 That Christ meets Julian in her 
own embodied terms, suggests that the God who founds all that is, is the fount of her desire.  
Julian echoes the characteristically Augustinian register when she writes, ‘[f]or until I am 
of one substance with him I can never have complete rest nor true happiness; that is to say, until I 
am so joined to him that there is no created thing between my God and me.’335 Julian’s restlessness 
speaks of the desire of the sense-perceptual self to be in union with her Maker and to rest in Christ. 
This rest comes when the grammar of the Cross becomes the grammar of the senses. It is for this 
reason that Julian can truly find rest in Christ whom she names in corporeal terms as Maker, Carer 
and Lover. She finds rest because the corporeal grammar of the Cross transforms and perfects her 
senses. The perfection of the senses comes as a disruption, however, because the God whom she 
meets is beyond comprehension.  
When wishing to understand Christ’s words, Julian recalls, ‘[t]he number of words 
transcended my wits and all my understanding, and all my power, for they are the most exalted, as 
it seems to me, for I cannot tell what they comprehend’.336 Christ’s very own words alters the 
corporeal grammar of the sense-perceptual self. Christ’s ‘I’ also becomes the ‘I’ of Julian. Julian 
meets Christ both in the face of the Cross and as the One who bears the created order. The resulting 
encounter between self and divine, interrupts the order of things.  
Christ’s ‘It is I’ sayings causes a loss of the sense-perceptual self in the single yet 
Trinitarian ‘I’ of Christ. The incomprehensibility of Christ’s iterations so confounds the senses 
that it abandons itself. It is, however, not a total loss of the self because, in the face of the Second 
Person, the self rediscovers itself in the face of the Cross. The Cross clothes the imagination in an 
aesthetic which holds the grammar of the self in union with the Cross’s grammar. The consequent 
re-discovery assigns an entirely different status to the self, a glorified status which finds its ultimate 
expression in union with the Second Person. With the loss of self in the face of Christ and the 
simultaneous revealing of a glorified self comes a paradoxical exchange. It is an exchange that 
denotes both loss and gain: the loss of self, relating to the blindness of the sensory being to behold 
God, and the gaining of self, of the glorified existence which life in Christ establishes. The 
 
334 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 56.  
335 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 45.  
336 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 74. 
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exchange between loss and gain evokes an initial internal transformation and a gradual and final 
eternal transfiguration of the self. In the face of Christ, persons truly come to know themselves as 
they exist in Christ which is the perfecting of the senses.  
Julian’s revelations communicate a theology which at its heart, seeks to appropriate both 
the truth that God loves and cares for her, and the bearing that such truth has on her embodied 
existence. The Cross framed and continues to frame the human condition – not as sinners, but as 
persons whose senses yearn to be made one with the fount of their desire. Found paradoxically in 
the face of suffering and loss, the Cross communicates to Julian that God intends the embodied 
self to become part of God’s very own being through Christ’s death and resurrection. The Cross 
overcomes the fracture between human and divine not through violence but through love, in order 
that the senses may once again truly see the love which defines and orders their being.  
Since the purpose of the Cross is the restoration of the senses, its union with Christ 
establishes a new grammar which orders the senses. This grammar is the grammar of the Trinity, 
and of a person’s union with Christ. Such ‘oneing’ has the senses reoriented to Christ in Christ’s 
assumption, healing, and perfection of the sense-perceptual self. The initially abstract and 
incomprehensible ‘It is I’ of Christ, becomes the new corporeal grammar by which Julian is to 
understand the meaning of the Cross. This is because, the Revelations of Divine Love shows, the 
Cross is a Trinitarian act. The Cross is part of God’s encompassing vision for the created order, 
one which has the sense attuned to its fount. In Julian’s naming of Christ in various ways, she 
gives a unique and embodied grammar to the Second Person of the Trinity. We may call this 
grammar, in its deployment of a sense-perceptual register for Julian’s encounter with God, an 
embodied mode of articulating theology.  
 
An Embodied Articulation of the Cross  
The clearest articulation of Christ’s embodied response to Julian is the grammar of the Cross. 
Christ’s Trinitarian speech addresses Julian in intimate terms. With each utterance, Julian 
understands a different state of relation to be expressed. The image of mothering is one prominent 
to Julian’s understanding.337 In a rather long excerpt, which is worth quoting in full, the logic of 
Christ’s assumption becomes the logic of Christ as mother. Chapter 58 reads: 
 
337 It is traditionally considered that Julian’s usage of the Motherhood of Christ is focused in 
Chapters 59-63. An intensification of Christ as mother usage occurs in Chapters 52, 54, 58-60, 63
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Just as God – the blessed Trinity who is everlasting being – is eternal from without 
beginning, so it was his eternal purpose to create mankind, whose fair nature was first 
assigned to his own son, the Second Person of the Trinity. And when he so wished, by full 
agreement of the whole Trinity, he created us all at once; and in creating us he joined and 
united us to himself, a union through which we are kept as pure and noble as we were 
created…And so in our making, God almighty is our loving father by nature; and God all 
wisdom is our loving mother by nature, together with the love and goodness of the Holy 
Spirit, which is all one God, one Lord.338 
Julian uses a feminine register of perception for Christ who is her Maker and the One who sustains 
her being. The use of mothering metaphors to describe the nature of Christ’s relationship to Julian 
is a characteristically visceral register by which to name God. This register provides Julian with 
an embodied framework by which to understand the salutary existence that Christ establishes in 
persons. The self, created through the Word and held in being by the incarnation, is an entirely 
sensory being. Julian recalls, ‘I saw that the same beloved Second Person who is our mother in our 
substantial being has become our mother in our sensory being; for we are twofold by God’s 
making, that is to say, in substance and sensor being’.339 Christ’s incarnation thus grounds the 
sensory being, or sense-perceptual self, in the Second Person of the Trinity.  
The appropriation of mothering language when reading the Cross in Revelations of Divine 
Love suggests two things: Julian may have had a female audience to whom she attended, and she 
radically reconceived Christ’s address in light of the medieval passion tradition.340 The 
significance of the dual awareness lies in the reworking of the Cross in terms of the schemata of 
life. By embracing language that liberates rather than constrains, Julian’s feminising speech 
created a semantics of belonging which was conceptually closer to the experience of those who 
 
4. It is noteworthy that the intensification takes place post-chapter fifty-one as the parable warrants 
a parallel reading of Christ and humanity. 
338 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 126. 
339 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 127.  
340 ‘For in reading Julian one becomes aware that late-medieval Passion devotion ran a serious 
danger of becoming a dead-end, with too narrow a penitential focus. It aimed exclusively at 
generating emotion, by fair means or foul, in order to stimulate repentance and confession. Only 
Julian of all these Middle English writers succeeds in breaking out of this restrictive mind-set.’ 
See Barrat, ‘Stabant Matres Dolorosae’., 70. 
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identified as mothers and, once upon a time, as children. The strategy is akin to the psychological 
dimensions of Julian’s approach which Glasscoe highlights.  
The success of the maternal language lies in its establishment of an entirely different 
aesthetic of the Cross; one where Julian’s being is woven into the ‘fabric’ of Christ’s being.341 
That Julian conceives the substance of the embodied self as so entirely wound up in Christ’s being, 
speaks to another image which finds its unique expression in Julian’s reading of the Cross. The 
imagery finds particular meaning in Chapter 24 when Julian writes: 
Then with a glad expression our Lord looked into his side and gazed, rejoicing; and with 
his dear gaze he led his creature’s understanding through the same wound into his side 
within. And then he revealed a beautiful and delightful place, large enough for all mankind 
that will be saved to rest there in peace and in love.342  
During Julian’s time of writing, the wound of Christ was a prominent devotional theme.343 It served 
as an illustration of Christ’s compassion for humanity on the Cross. It also, and this is key, served 
as the new dwelling place for the sense-perceptual self. Christ’s wound was thus blessed, Julian 
perceives, because it was ‘open and rejoice[d] to heal’ persons.344  
Unlike the characteristic depictions of Christ’s wound as that which gapes at a worshipper, 
Julian paradoxically understands bliss, delight, and joy to be implied by Christ’s wound. The 
wound which marks the punctuation of Christ’s death through the piercing of his side with a spear. 
The water and blood which flows from Christ’s side evokes the register of the sacramental, since 
Christ’s wound becomes the birthplace of the Church. Here, imagery of birth is prevalent when 
Christ’s wound has blood and water spilling from it. The blood and water point not only to that 
 
341 When examining the potentialities of Julian’s feminizing speech, Denise Baker discovers in 
Julian a theology of the asexual soul: Julian modifies the ontology and anthropology implied by 
this Augustinian commonplace into an original theory of an androgynous God who creates the soul 
in an asexual image. Humans, both male and female, can know themselves by knowing God 
because, as children of God the Father and Jesus the Mother, and siblings of Christ, all individuals, 
regardless of their sex, have the potential for participating in the divine nature’. See Baker, Denise 
Nowakowski. Julian of Norwich’s Showings: From Vision to Book. New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1994., 113.  
342 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 71-2.  
343 ‘The side-wound was conventionally understood as offering a refuge for the sinner and, as a 
token of Christ’s love, the wound is a pervasive devotional theme’. Julian of Norwich, Revelations 
of Divine Love., 188-9.  
344 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 133. 
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which is now regarded as being symbolic for baptism and Eucharist, it also speaks of the divine 
transmittance of love and life that takes place because of the intimate connection between the 
Second Person’s incarnation and the sensory being of humanity. Pictured as the connection 
between a foetus and its mother, Christ is the lifeline upon which humanity draws its ontological 
status. Stated in modern parlance, the undistinguishable shared life between mother and child – 
their shared DNA – depicts the new status that humanity has in Christ.  
According to Julian, the wound of Christ is a ‘delectable place’ in the sense that it is the 
place where God’s comprehensive plan for the self is expressed in corporeal and feminine terms.345 
Julian’s ‘sweet beholding’ and her interaction with Christ on the plain of the delectable and joyous 
constructs a corporeal grammar which constantly overturns the order of Christ’s suffering.346 
Julian masterfully re-narrates the Cross so that it is an expression of God’s divine hospitality.347 
The vision of Christ’s incarnation founds persons in Christ prior to creation, and one that continues 
to have persons founded in Christ. The nature of Christ’s relationship to persons is, according to 
Julian, one reminiscent of mothering. Throughout Julian’s shewings, the metaphors of birthing, 
feeding, nurturing, and sustaining are employed in relation to Christ. For, writes Julian, ‘our 
Saviour is our true mother, in whom we are endlessly born, and out of whom we shall never come 
to birth…’348 Conceptualised as a moment of transformation, Christ goes beyond surrogacy to the 
place where his mothering evokes an actual transfiguration in the embodied self. The 
transfiguration expresses itself in the new ways in which the senses engages with the grammar of 
the Cross. In Julian’s visions, her feminine register of perception illustrates a sense-perceptual 
faith rooted in the embodied now.  
 
A new Theological Aesthetic 
 
345 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 133.   
346 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 133. 
347 Remarking on the prominence of the sacred heart tradition amongst female anchorites in the 
1300’s, Kristen McQuinn suggests that the interplay between the wound and heart of Christ are 
integral to a feminized rendering of God’s interaction with humanity. This is so because images 
of ‘blood, penetration and enclosure’ resonates closely with their own anatomical realities; the 
‘inclusion of such feminized images allows the female recluse…to relate to the Wounded Side by 
recalling her own feminine experience through the emphasis on the humanity of Christ and his 
Passion’ See McQuinn, ‘“Crepe into That Blessed Syde”: Enclosure Imagery in Aelred of 
Rievaulx’s de Institutione Inclusarum’., 95-6.  
348 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 126. 
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Julian’s feminine speech renders a unique aesthetic borne from her perception of Christ in terms 
that are resonant with her own embodied existence. Significantly, Julian’s visions come to her both 
in visceral and spiritual terms. Christ’s Trinitarian speech and the various stages of his bleeding, 
Julian interprets at the hand of her own embodied circumstance.  
In a reading of the Cross a new aesthetic arises when the sense-perceptual self attunes its 
senses to the restorative vision which the Cross expresses. If sin describes perceptual failure, the 
failure of the senses to perceive God’s revelatory presence in the life of Christ, then realising one’s 
true existence in Christ and having this new existence inform one’s engagements, characterises 
perceptual faith. Here, Julian is a primary example of perceptual faith in that her reading of the 
Cross focuses on the restoration which the Cross brings. She gives shape to this restorative vision 
by naming Christ’s Trinitarian relation as Mother, Brother, and Maker.349 Julian thus provides her 
own embodied circumstance as the grammar for her vision of Christ.  
Coming to terms with the unique aesthetic Julian advances is one which, like Julian’s 
progression in understanding, requires the love and grace of God. In Julian’s writings, the Cross 
of Christ serves as a visual aid whereby the sensory being sees itself in relation to the divine. The 
eventual apprehending of God amidst perceptual failures is the work of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit 
makes the Trinity known to the senses and so lays the foundation for the gradual transformation 
and eventual perfection of perception. This trusting orientation toward God culminates when God 
is seen not as a dis-embodied and abstract entity, but as a very embodied Saviour who stands in 
close relation to persons and the created order. As the senses gradually become cruciform, it takes 
up a perspective of the self within the life of the Trinity.  
Julian’s perceptual faith expresses the transformational logic of the Cross from the outset. 
The three wounds of contrition, compassion, and a purposeful longing which she invokes suggests 
the desire to perceive Christ in bodily terms. For Julian to have meditated upon her revelations 
over the course of twenty years shows a keen desire to have her whole being, her imagination, her 
reason, and her corporeality, attuned to God. In the eventual transformation that takes place when 
perceptual faith comes to its fullest, the embodied self transcends its own perceptual failures and 
enacts what it was made for, participation in the abounding Love of the Trinity.  
 
349 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 56.  
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The central tenet arising from Revelations of Divine Love as it pertains to perceptual faith, 
is that once the Cross orders the senses, the senses come to their fullest. The logic pertains to the 
senses as much as it does to the enactment of the meaning of the Cross. Chapter 87 provides a 
helpful account when Julian articulates a threefold working of the virtues which she perceives from 
the Cross. Julian writes, ‘the first is charity uncreated; the second is charity created; the third is 
charity given’ and ‘[c]harity uncreated is God; charity created is our soul in God; charity given is 
virtue’.350 In this example of charity, Julian expresses God’s being in terms that the self can 
perceive and enact. A participative logic arises where the practicing of those virtues known to 
describe God’s being, transforms the senses and by transforming the senses, gives to the self a new 
manner of existing in the world. What establishes the transformation of the embodied self, is the 
fact that the practiced virtues are a way of returning God’s loving embrace. When virtues are 
enacted and thereby display the senses’ orientation to God, the sense-perceptual self embodies and 
performs the new existence it has in Christ. 
To illustrate the logic of perceptual faith at play, one might imagine oneself taking a step 
back as though Julian’s first-hand experience is observable from a distance. Once the reader takes 
a step back and becomes the first-person narrator, a distinctive perspective of Julian may be 
observed. The reader witnesses how Julian’s exchange systematically evokes a change in her 
countenance. Imagined while being bedridden, Julian’s face, when meeting her maker, gradually 
transitions from weariness to delight; from existential anxiety to love, light, and life. Expressed in 
terms of the thematic of transfiguration, Julian’s countenance becomes the countenance of Christ 
when she inclines her senses to the transformative image of Christ.  
The reader next imagines Julian staring into the wound of Christ. What she discovers, is 
her very self enfolded in Christ where humanity is seated. When Julian stares into the wound of 
Christ, she discovers her soul. Stated in unambiguous terms, Julian equates the revelation of 
Christ’s ‘interior’ as the revelation of her very own soul: 
And thus I saw full surely that it is redyer to us and more esy to come to [th]e knowying of 
god then to know oure owne soule. For oure soule is so depe growndyd in god and / so 
 
350 Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love., 163.  
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endlessly tresoryd that we may nott come to the knowyng ther of tylle we haue furst 
knowing of god, which is the maker to whome it is onyd.351 
The knowledge Julian gains of herself through Christ makes explicit the meaning of the Cross. 
Divine caritas permeates Christ’s wound and subsumes the sensory so that it transfigures into the 
likeness of Christ. In this respect, the Cross acts as an earthly beatific vision. The cross emulates 
the Trinity and captures the sensory being thereby foreshadowing heavenly beatification. For 
Julian, transfiguration does not take place in the face of the penitential and violent but rather in the 
face of God’s eternal embrace expressed through love. As a salve to embodied existence, the 
varying countenances Julian perceives of Christ’s suffering, speaks of the gradual transformation 
of the self in the journey to beatification. She understands each occasion of the Cross as speaking 
to the embodied self and of Trinitarian intention. 
Julian’s unconventional way of registering Christ’s speech illustrates the fecund 
possibilities that arise when sense-perceptual self perceives God in its own terms. As has been 
explored in the Trinitarian iterations of Christ, Julian’s perception is grounded in the Word who is 
both human and divine, and who’s belonging to the Trinity brings the sense-perceptual self in 
union with God. Julian’s articulation of the Cross in terms of Christ’s wound opens a new 
grammar, where the wound of Christ becomes the very occasion by which humanity speaks of its 
participation in God’s being.352  
Julian’s Cruciform and Self-Involving Speech 
Julian’s visions provide an entirely new reading of the Cross. Sparked by the unique circumstance 
in which she writes, the Cross functions as a new aesthetic with which Julian may read her 
embodiment in relation to the divine. Julian’s visions start with the Cross as the absolute 
 
351 I have chosen to quote Julian’s theological reflection upon Christ’s wound in its Old English 
style because it depicts the centrality of the thematic of oneing in Julian’s thinking. Julian of 
Norwich. A Book of Showings., 571.  
352 In her reading of Revelations of Divine Love, Frances Beer argues that Julian may been aware 
of two theological trajectories propounded by the early church fathers Of whom, notably, ‘the idea 
that the divine nature included a feminine aspect, and with the use of the maternal metaphor to 
express the relation between the feminine aspect of the godhead and the soul.’… ‘the idea that the 
divine nature included a feminine aspect, and with the use of the maternal metaphor to express the 
relation between the feminine aspect of the godhead and the soul.’ Julian’s integration of such 
doctrines with her own bodyliness shows, in the second instance, a sensitivity to the multi-textured 
nature of embodied existence and the need of every individual to conceptualise their own existence 
in terms of God’s being. See Beer, Women and Mystical Experience., 151-3. 
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expression of God’s Love. From the Cross a vision ensues which promotes the restoration of the 
sense-perceptual self. Such restoration is held in the Word who is Julian’s mother since creation; 
Christ incarnate who is her mother in fleshly nature, and the mother of her new existence. At every 
stage of Julian’s reading of the Cross, the schemata of her life constantly informs the imagery, 
symbolism, and metaphor Julian uses to understand the meaning of the Cross.  
The exchange between self and Christ is mutually transforming. In the first instance, when 
Julian has her visions, she is reminded of the Christ who meets her in her own flesh. The visceral 
nature of her visions, the clarity with which Christ’s Trinitarian speech is uttered in filial imagery, 
and the visual depiction of Christ as Servant, as Maker, and as Lover, all point to the fact that the 
Word who meets Julian meets her in her own bodily terms. Just as Christ meets her in her own 
terms, Julian likewise registers her existence in terms which can only be founded in Christ’s 
divinity and humanity. Her reading of the Cross is suggestive of a soteriology premised on an 
ontology of oneing. This restorative model finds expression in the union between Julian and Christ 
as symbolic of God’s comprehensive vision for the created order.  
The register of desire is integral to the corporeal grammar of the Cross which arises from 
a reading of Revelations of Divine Love. Desire is the foundation of Julian’s aesthetic. The three 
wounds which she receives arise from her desire to know Christ in her own bodily terms. Christ 
responds in her visions through his loving embrace embodied on the Cross. Julian’s desire is met 
in the Cross, where grotesque and paradoxical disrupts the order of things. Just as the corporeal 
grammar of the Cross meets Julian in terms of her own embodied circumstance, the aesthetics of 
the Cross addresses each sense-perceptual self uniquely.  
Julian’s reading of the Cross serves as an example of how the reader can meet Christ in 
terms that are resonant with their own embodied context. Her account is fruitful, and this is key, 
because Julian’s visions illustrates how the self may engage with the Cross sense-perceptually. 
This does not mean that her grammar of suffering is the focal point, rather, it is a directive for the 
transformation which is to occur when persons interpret the meaning of the Cross. The value of 
Revelations of Divine Love lies not in its direct application but in its visual depiction of the internal 
transformation which occurs when the self meets Christ on the Cross. Julian embodies this 
transfiguration in the ways that her writings provide a logic of the Cross which re-interprets the 
self and restores the senses to the point where they are at one with God. 
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The logic of perception in Julian’s writings, I have formulated as sense-perceptual failure 
and faith. Whereas perceptual failure describes the inability of the senses to see itself truly in the 
divine, perceptual faith describes the attuning of the senses to the divine. The Word and the Spirit 
are the means through whom failure moves to faith. When the sense-perceptual self finds itself 
grounded in the Cross, it undergoes a transformation best described as the gradual growing toward 
God. With each incremental growing-toward God, a new articulation of self and divine finds 
expression. One sees this transfiguration especially in Julian’s feminine speech and embodied 
imagery for Christ’s presence to her. The liberty Julian has to understand the Cross in her uniquely 
feminine register of perception is one illustrative of an embodied manner of doing theology.  
Julian evidences an embodied theology when she translates Christ’s expressions into her 
own words. Her writings establish a script by which persons meet the divine and by which the 
Word speaks a language closest to her register of perception. The logic of Christ’s speech as that 
which is clothed in the sense-perceptual self’s words, is seen in Augustine’s writings too. The 
difference between the two is that Augustine does not assign to Christ the words that He speaks 
whereas Julian does. Julian understands Christ’s meaning and translates it in words that are closest 
to her theological imagination.  
The visceral imagery of the Cross Julian renders fits into her schemata of life. One example 
is the metaphor of Christ as mother. To be a mother is a register which may have been closest to 
Julian’s own embodied existence. By constructing a register of perception conceptually closest to 
such experience, Julian renders new ways of articulating Christ’s relationship to her. While Julian 
asked for her wounds as a manner of experiencing Christ’s embodied reality in her bodily terms, 
her desire is suggestive of one who wishes to understand what Christ must have been going 
through. This is the psychological dimension of Julian’s writings, as Glasscoe has suggested. 
Julian’s desire to know is thus a knowledge that seeks to inhabit, to reiterate, and live Christ’s 
experience.  
The above dimensions of Julian’s reading of the Cross, falls within the category of the 
performative. Performative speech is a manner of understanding the Cross laden with the aesthetic. 
On the one hand, it is the articulation of the restoration which the Cross establishes and on the 
other hand, it is the creative imagining of the embodied implications of such restoration. 
Performativity describes the moment when the senses actualise the oneing which is the result of 
the Cross. Destined for union with Christ in the Trinity, the Cross reminds persons of their true 
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home and telos. Unlike soteriologies which emphasises the ontological chasm between God and 
humanity, Julian’s soteriology has the Cross as a countenance of redemption which compels 
transformation and transfiguration. The Cross compels the movement toward God as that which is 
closest to the true condition of humanity in Christ. The countenance of Christ on the Cross 
bespeaks the glorified state of humanity. Once the sensory being comes to know itself in terms of 
the Cross, it learns to enact what it was made for, union with Christ.  
The Cross in Revelations of Divine Love, by articulating the various states of relation 
between persons and God, enacts a transformative corporeal grammar. In the union of human and 
divine, a graced exchange takes place where persons are restored and transformed in Christ and by 
the Spirit. With Julian’s gazing on the Cross, the very corporeal way in which Christ meets her is 
suggestive of the corporeal terms in which she finds salvation. Her perception is one which moves 
from desolation, reorientation, and liberation in Christ. To all those who are to engage with the 
Cross, a similar logic pertains.  
The soteriology of the Revelations of Divine Love expresses restored relations in the 
already embodied and material realm of existence. Living the corporeal grammar of salvation 
means living exactly as an embodied person whose orientation to the self, other and divine, is 
grounded in the Word who gives to the flesh a sacramental existence. The senses, in their 
performative posture, body forth the liberation which the Cross brings. The freedom which the 
Cross utters, is the freedom to praise, worship and desire God through the very embodied modes 
of existing in the world. Having the body express the unity which exists between persons and God, 
is a matter of the Word and the Spirit’s active communion with persons. With the simultaneity of 
self and God, the body becomes dialogically open, constantly gesturing, and signing to its origin.  
 
  
 128 
Chapter 6 
Dante and Performative Words 
 
The relationship that the Cross bears to Julian’s embodied theology, is the relationship between 
form and content as the relationship between the body of the Saviour and the liberation of persons 
in corporeal terms. The Revelations of Divine Love expresses, or performs, this very theological 
truth in the way that its text uses both evocative imagery and emotive language to convey the 
liberation of self in the face of the divine. Present to the Revelations of Divine Love is the literary 
and performative enactment of the corporeal grammar which the Cross depicts in its viscerally 
laden expressions. As we transition from a discussion of Julian’s somatic piety and the ways that 
her writings perform the incarnational presence of the Word, we move to a discussion of the ways 
in which a text, through its genre and gestural potentiality, gives form to the truths that it conveys.  
The relationship between form and content, especially as it relates to theological writing, 
is poignantly performed in the writings of the medieval poet, Dante Alighieri. Contemporary 
scholarship recovers Dante and especially The Divine Comedy (Comedy) for its theological 
qualities.353 His Comedy is a landscape of bodies, all slowly and gradually moving toward that 
which moves their being, namely God. Recent critical work by Dante scholars shows, that while 
 
353 Montemaggi, Vittorio. 2016. Reading Dante’s Commedia as Theology: Divinity Realized in 
Human Encounter. Oxford: Oxford University Press., Treherne, Matthew. 2010. ‘Liturgical 
Personhood: Creation, Penitence, and Praise in the Commedia’. In Dante’s Commedia: Theology 
as Poetry, edited by Vittorio Montemaggi and Matthew Treherne, 131–60. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press., Montemaggi, Vittorio, and Matthew Treherne. 2010. 
‘Introduction: Dante, Petry, Theology’. In Dante’s Commedia: Theology as Poetry, edited by 
Vittorio Montemaggi and Matthew Treherne, 1–13. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press., 
Turner, Denys. 2010. ‘How to Do Things with Words: Poetry as Sacrament in Dante’s Commedia’. 
In Dante’s Commedia: Theology as Poetry, edited by Vittorio Montemaggi, 286–307. Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press., Davies, Oliver. 2010. ‘Dante’s Commedia and the Body 
of Christ’. In Dante’s Commedia: Theology as Poetry, edited by Vittorio Montemaggi and 
Matthew Treherne, 161–79. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press., Hawkins, Peter S. 
2010. ‘All Smiles: Poetry and Theology in Dante’s Commedia’. In Dante’s Commedia. Theology 
as Poetry, edited by Vittorio Montemaggi and Matthew Treherne, 36–59. University of Notre 
Dame: Notre Dame Press., Took, John. 2006. ‘Dante’s Incarnationalism: An Essay in Theological 
Wisdom’. Italian Studies 61 (1): 1–17., Nayar, Sheila J. 2014. Dante’s Sacred Poem: Flesh and 
the Centrality of the Eucharist to the Divine Comedy. London: Bloomsbury Academic., Took, 
John. 2004. ‘Towards a Life of Dante: Ontological Anxiety and the Salvific Function of the Word’. 
Italian Studies LIX (1): 1–16., Montemaggi, Vittorio. 2016. Reading Dante’s Commedia as 
Theology: Divinity Realized in Human Encounter. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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his great poem is technically not theology, it is theological throughout. Significant for our purposes 
is the fact that the Comedy is all about bodies – the bodies of those Dante the pilgrim encounters, 
Dante the author (and by implication our own), and finally the body of Christ in Paradiso. His 
Commedia, no less than Julian’s Showings, is an essay in Christian anthropology. It is the 
performance of embodied theology where the body becomes the perceptual register for the 
presence of the divine. Although the Comedy is different in its character, genre, and form from 
Julian’s writings, its drive to bring the reader in to the dynamics of embodiment and salvation, is 
the same.  
Reading Dante’s Comedy means exploring the intimate relationship between the form and 
content of theological writing as it relates to the incarnation. Throughout Inferno, Purgatorio and 
Paradiso, one finds bodies in various orders of perception, from grotesque apprehensions, to 
reconciling figures, to beatific relations. The choice to read Dante thus lies therein that the Comedy 
has theological themes pertinent to its formulations while expressing those terms through the 
words, gestures, and movements of the bodies in the Comedy. When speaking of bodies in Dante’s 
Comedy, one bears in mind that it is a narration of the afterlife. The bodies of the Comedy are aerial 
bodies, spirited beings whose existence marks the same grammar of perception as material bodies 
in life.354 Aside from Dante the author, vis-à-vis Dante the pilgrim who finds himself in the 
Comedy, all the aerial bodies express themselves in an embodied manner.  
Dante wrote the Comedy in a complex socio-political context. Florence, the place of 
Dante’s philosophical, religious and political upbringing, is the very same place that brought him 
despair. In 1302 he was banished from Florence on charges of corruption. Even though Dante 
denied the allegations, he was forced into exile for the rest of his life and this shaped his Commedia. 
The imaginative landscapes which the three cantiche depict, perpetually draw on Dante’s own 
experiences of existential desolation, loss and homecoming.355 Inferno, for example, depicts in 
vulgar terms the lust for money and power enacted by the religious and political institutions of the 
day. Dante’s intention when writing the Commedia, however, is not to convey a set of empirically 
 
354 Webb, Heather. 2016. Dante’s Persons: An Ethics of the Transhuman. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press., 17.  
355 Took, John. 2004. ‘Towards a Life of Dante: Ontological Anxiety and the Salvific Function of 
the Word’. Italian Studies LIX (1): 1–16., pp. 6-8.  
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true facts. By poetic orientation and re-narration, Dante the author rather expresses what he 
observes as being the ‘la grandezza and la miseria of the human condition’.356  
The centrality of Dante the author’s experiences and its interwoven relationship with what 
pertains to theology has led certain scholars to investigate the ways in which God and Christ are 
foregrounded in the Comedy.357 More specifically, the question that concerns scholars is how such 
foregrounding is appropriated theologically. In Dante’s Commedia: Theology as Poetry, three 
interpretative possibilities arise when one reads the Comedy in relation to the Word of God.358 
Following Vittorio Montemaggi, the possibilities are: First, a liturgical rendering ‘whereby biblical 
passages and other religious texts are enacted and encountered through meaningful 
performance’.359 Second, an embodied rendering where themes that pertain to the incarnation, 
transfiguration and resurrection are parsed in terms of the lived experiences of persons. The final 
rendering lies in the ‘varied theological implications of the interpretive, ethical, and affective 
dynamic of the reader’s relationship to the poem’.360   
This Chapter falls within the existent theological framework outlined by Vittorio 
Montemaggi insofar as it attends to the ways in which the body in the Comedy narrates the 
relationship between self and o/Other. The second category with its Christological emphasis, 
pertains especially to this chapter as the Word of God incarnate becomes the proverbial landscape 
upon which the various states of relation in the Comedy may be understood. The Christological 
reading of the Comedy further investigates whether there is an implicit discourse on the body in 
 
356 Collins, James J. Dante: Layman, Prophet, Mystic. New York: Alba House, 1989., 4.  
357 A theological reading attends to the ways in which themes pertaining to the divine present 
themselves in the Comedy. Examples of scholars working at the said intersection are Robin 
Kirkpatrick with his translation of the Inferno, Purgatoria and Paradiso (2007), Vittorio 
Montemaggi’s Reading Dante’s Commedia as Theology: Divinity Realized in Human Encounter 
(2016) and Heather Webb’s Dante’s Persons: An Ethics of the Transhuman (2016). John Took’s 
series of contributions ‘Dante’s Incarnationalism: An Essay in Theological Wisdom’ (2006), 
‘Towards a Life of Dante: Ontological Anxiety and the Salvific Function of the Word’ (2004) and, 
‘Dante, Augustine and the Drama of Salvation’ (1993), furthermore, serves as catalyst for the 
embodied reading of the Comedy in this chapter. 
358 Montemaggi, Vittorio, and Matthew Treherne. 2010. ‘Introduction: Dante, Petry, Theology’. 
In Dante’s Commedia: Theology as Poetry, edited by Vittorio Montemaggi and Matthew 
Treherne, 1–13. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press., 3-4.  
359 Montemaggi and Treherne, ‘Introduction’., 3-4 
360 Montemaggi and Treherne, ‘Introduction’., 3-4. 
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Dante the pilgrim’s sojourning, and whether one might read the Comedy and find therein a pictorial 
poetics of Infernal, Purgatorial, and Paradisal relations.  
Regarding the life of Christ and the simultaneous affirmation of his humanity and divinity, 
his post-ascension body presents itself for engagement.  As Christ now exists in glory alongside 
God, his personhood epitomises the perfection of relations between self and God, as well as 
visually representing the future glory to which persons are called. It is Christ’s ascended body now 
seated in glory that strikes the scholar, Oliver Davies, as a motif within the Comedy.361 More than 
being a motif, Davies finds echoes of Paul’s Damascus road experience in the glorified Christ who 
is presented as a myriad of persons in the final cantos of Paradiso.362 Paul is significant to the 
Comedy because his experience simultaneously speaks of a Christ who is no longer physically 
present in the sense of Peter’s touching of Christ’s wounds, but whose presence to Paul is still 
embodied insofar as Christ’s divinity transformed Paul’s humanity.363  
The presence of the divine to the body in Paul’s theology, one also finds in the role that the 
smile, as gesture and expression of aerial bodies, play in the Comedy.364 The smile is a 
performative exchange where the invisible is captured in the embodied.365 The logic behind the 
smile is that it utters that which is ineffable through its embodied nature, visually enacting the 
poetics of the Comedy. The Comedy as poetry in its narratival style communicates its content 
through the symbolics present to its text. The words of the Comedy accordingly enact that of which 
it speaks.366  
 
361 Davies, Oliver. 2010. ‘Dante’s Commedia and the Body of Christ’. In Dante’s Commedia: 
Theology as Poetry, edited by Vittorio Montemaggi and Matthew Treherne, 161–79. Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press., 175-6. 
362 Davies, ‘Dante’s Commedia and the Body of Christ’., 175-6 
363 Davies, ‘Dante’s Commedia and the Body of Christ’., 175-6 
364 Turner, Denys. 2010. ‘How to Do Things with Words: Poetry as Sacrament in Dante’s 
Commedia’. In Dante’s Commedia: Theology as Poetry, edited by Vittorio Montemaggi, 286–
307. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press., 286 ff. 
365 Turner, ‘How to Do Things with Words’., 175-6. 
366 Denys Turner explains, ‘The language of the Commedia, precisely as poetic, creates and 
transforms the realities of interaction of which it speaks – it enacts that of which it speaks. And 
the character of the sign, which somehow makes to be that which it discloses, is, I argue, “quasi-
sacramental” - for, as Thomas Aquinas says, following a tradition through Hugh of St. Victor back 
to Augustine, it is in the nature of a sacrament that it “efficit quod figurat,” it “effects what it 
signifies”. Turner, ‘How to do things with Words’., 287.  
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The stylistic play between signified and effected speaks of the relationship which exists 
between the content and form of theological writing. When reading the Comedy, equal attention 
should be paid to that which is said and to how it is said.367 With the Comedy’s equally ordered 
stanzas, its repetitions of threes, its thirty-three cantos (with the exception of Inferno), its rhythmic 
notations and play on symbols, the Comedy beautifully illustrates what Dante the author seeks to 
convey in his poetry.368 Writing not as a Dante specialist, but as one who has come to depend on 
the translations of others, I find Robin Kirkpatrick’s translation of the Comedy valuable because it 
captures the relationship of content and form exceptionally well. Kirkpatrick’s translation 
communicates the expression of beauty present to the Commedia and captures the phenomenality 
of Dante the author’s text in a register which places equal emphasis on the sensorial, the gestural, 
and the embodied.  
 
Postures of the Comedy 
The words of the poet are reflexive, for without its characteristic intentionality, dialectical 
openness, and expressivity, it will fail to address its reader in the way it does. The movement 
between the words of the text and the thoughts of the reader, between things signed and things 
enacted, brings more voices into conversation. A reading of Denys Turner, Oliver Davies, and 
Vittorio Montemaggi in Dante’s Commedia: Theology as Poetry shows that the body is central to 
the Comedy.  
A case in point is that of Ugolino whose account in the Inferno can be read parallel with 
the Cross. Ugolino’s sons perform in word and deed the silence that followed the Cross. The reader 
finds her- or himself in the middle, participating in Ugolino’s account. When a gesture embodies 
the theological tenor of a text, it enacts what it signifies, rendering both speech and text 
performative and quasi-sacramental. With such performativity, readers partake of the truth 
concerning the Cross of which Dante the author speaks. In Ugolino’s instance, his sons’ silence 
and the absence of right relations materially foregrounds the Cross. Here, Ugolino represents not 
only human others, but also the divine other. Ugolino’s account expresses the role that bodies play 
in parsing the relative absence or presence of relations between self and other, and self and God. 
 
367 Montemaggi, Vittorio. Reading Dante’s Commedia as Theology: Divinity Realized in Human 
Encounter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016., 46.  
368 Montemaggi, Reading Dante’s Commedia as Theology., 46.  
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In the Comedy, the poet’s sojourning evokes three different narratival bodies. In Inferno, 
bodies visibly show the extent to which sins committed on earth were body or life negating. Sins 
committed against the flesh, for example, are actions which refuse the body as that which bears 
the likeness of God. This refusal of the body as the means by which to know the divine, is also the 
refusal of a God who is revealed in the body of Christ. If Infernal bodies showcase the dual refusal, 
bodies in Purgatorio depict a different state of relation, they gesture to the repairing of relations. 
Finally, there are those persons Dante the pilgrim meets in Paradiso whose bodies express beatific 
relations through their eyes, their smiles, and the light which shows forth from them.369 With the 
presences of so many persons and bodies, the Comedy’s collective address narrates the state of 
relations between text, reader, and author, through the physicality of embodied existence. 
To focus on the body and its physicality as potential communicative key, means taking into 
account those actions which also constitute embodied engagements.370 Because humans 
continuously stand in relation to another and can perceive such relationality through their bodies, 
speech is one posture of the body’s engagement with the world.371 Bodies as they present 
themselves are speech creating entities.372 If speech is a manner of a person’s standing in relation 
 
369 Matthew Treherne elaborates on this dialectic when he writes: ‘The smile of the universe can 
be related to this union with God in two ways. First, the smile is frequently associated in Paradiso 
with an outpouring of light. Aquinas speaks of “[q]uell’ altro fiammeggiare,” which “esce del riso 
/ di Grazïan” (Par. 10.103-4) [The next flame blazes out from Gratian’s smile]; the red light of the 
planet Mars is an “affocato riso” (14.86) [flares of a smile]; in Beatrice’s eyes “ardeva un riso” 
(15.34) [a smile was burning]. To smile, in Paradiso, is to reflect light. The smile of the universe 
is therefore a vision of the universe reflecting God’s light/glory back to him in that act of praise. 
This act of praise is also, however, presented as similar to God’s own act of smiling.’ Treherne, 
Matthew. 2010. ‘Liturgical Personhood: Creation, Penitence, and Praise in the Commedia’. In 
Dante’s Commedia: Theology as Poetry, edited by Vittorio Montemaggi and Matthew Treherne, 
131–60. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press., 156.  
370 Turner, ‘How to Do Things with Words’., 291.  
371 Here, I echo Vittorio Montemaggi when he says: ‘The significance of all this for our purposes 
lies in the fact that for Dante, to be human is not only to be an embodied being endowed with 
intellect and capable of loving, but also to be a linguistic being: humans are one because of the 
other...Words are both physical and rational signs, and in this they are emblematic of the ways in 
which, given their embodiedness, human beings communicate.’ See Montemaggi, Vittorio. 2005. 
‘“Nulla Vederee E Amor Mi Costrinse”: On Reading Dante’s “Commedia” as a Theological 
Poem’. Cambridge: Cambridge University., 68.  
372 ‘But if actions speak, then verbal utterances are actions too, and so “utter” as actions and just 
as words uttered. And these conjunctions of performative utterance and uttering performance allow 
for the analysis of complex interactions between them within speech-act themselves, insofar as we 
may distinguish within speech-acts between what is said in saying the words, and the meaning that 
 134 
to another, then as Oliver Davies shows, speech in the Commedia is both the communication and 
instantiation of the social contexts in which persons stand.373 In a reading of the Commedia where 
bodies visually depict sins committed on earth and the implicit acceptance or negation of the bodily 
order of engagement with the world, then speech is the ‘audible’ representation thereof. Speech, 
accordingly, points to that which is akin and different to itself. In the Comedy, speech enacts the 
state of relations between persons.374 It signs in a very material way to the relational register 
between Dante the pilgrim and the persons whom he encounters.  
In Inferno, canto 33, Dante the pilgrim encounters Ugolino and his four sons who by the 
decree of the archbishop of the time, were cast into the Hunger tower of Pisa where they were left 
to starve to death.375 Over time, Ugolino’s sons begin to cry out to him, but he falls silent, he gives 
no answer to his sons’ cries. The account is one of how sons cry out to their father, and how a 
father’s silence narrates their eventual demise. In an almost deafening way, Ugolino’s absence of 
speech materially enacts the breakdown of relations between father and sons.376 Silence here enacts 
that which is manifest but invisible (the absence of right relations) thus simultaneously effecting 
that to which it gestures.377 The logic of signing and effecting, does not pertain to speech alone, it 
also pertains to bodies from which speech ushers.378  
 
the action of saying them bears. This is just as true of gestures as it is of verbal speech.’  See 
Turner, ‘How to do things with Words’., 290-1.  
373 Davies, ‘Dante’s Commedia and the Body of Christ’., 165.  
374 Davies, ‘Dante’s Commedia and the Body of Christ’., 166-7.  
375 See Robin Kirkpatrick’s notes: Alighieri, Dante. 2007. Inferno. Edited and translated by Robin 
Kirkpatrick. London: Penguin Group., 442.  
376 ‘What the Inferno teaches us’ notes Davies, is that ‘the breakdown of language thus signals the 
collapse of community, leaving only isolated and fractured instances of individual subjectivity’. 
See Davies, ‘Dante’s Commedia and the Body of Christ., 167.  
377 Turner, ‘How to do things with Words’., 301.  
378 The dialectic of effecting that which is signified, does not pertain to speech or the absence of 
speech alone, it also pertains to the bodies from which speech ushers. Such is the case with 
something as simple as a smile. The smile, current research in Dante studies shows, plays a 
significant role in that it gestures to something other than itself. Davies explains, ’The flash of the 
eyes and the smile are bodily gesture, and thus also maintain the particularity of human identity at 
the very moment when the body attains its highest semiotic and distinctively nonverbal – which is 
to say, nondiscursive or ”angelic” - expression, itself signifying the light that fills the celestial 
cosmos and is ”l’amor che move il sle e l’altre stelle” (Par. 33.145) [the love which moves the sun 
and the other starts]’. See Davies, ‘Dante’s Commedia and the Body of Christ’., 172.  
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In parallel with this silence which signals the absence of relations, gestures have the 
potential of speaking of two realities simultaneously: of the state of relations between persons, and 
of the condition of possibility of such relations. The latter introduces a further theological 
dimension to a reading of the Commedia in terms of the body and its articulation in Inferno, 
Purgatorio and Paradiso.379 As bodily gestures are made to communicate the ineffable, one’s 
focus also turns to the condition of their possibility. Returning to the example of Ugolino whose 
sons cry out to him and he falls silent, Vittorio Montemaggi finds a Christological foregrounding 
in the account. The cry of the sons parallel Christ derelict on the Cross, and the final silence of the 
sons, echo the silence which follows the death of Christ. Here, the logic of effecting that which is 
signed, returns. 
Ugolino’s sons’ silence makes manifest the silence which was present to Christ on the 
Cross, and which now returns to us in the reading of the account. The intent of the theological 
reading of the Comedy, notes Montemaggi, is not to convey any accurate description, but rather: 
...one should speak about a text embodying an understanding of theology in which the aim 
is to invite others to realize that appreciation of truth rests on one’s ability to recognize that 
one’s understanding of truth is defined and constantly redefined by one’s readiness to 
respond in love to the will and needs of another. For, as have seen, from a Dantean 
perspective, human beings may partake in truth itself by shaping their words and deeds 
according to the dynamics of the Incarnation and Crucifixion of the Word.380 
The incarnation enacts the relation that is to be enjoyed between self and God in embodied terms. 
Christ’s assumption of the materiality of existence establishes the flesh as the means by which 
persons may truly come to know God.  
In view of a Christological foregrounding of the bodies in the Comedy, Christ’s body 
mitigates any abstraction of human in relation to the divine. The incarnation constantly holds the 
body’s speaking in Christ’s divine economy. As Denys Turner shows, ‘[t]he Word’s being made 
flesh must be the supreme case and archetype of the poetic act itself, of the utterance that 
 
379 ‘...the relationship between each person and the ground of her or his being might be defined not 
only in terms of a particular understanding of hylomorphism, but also by an understanding of how 
the embodied nature of human existence may be at one with the Trinitarian unfolding of divine 
being and with God’s own taking human form. Montemaggi, ‘Nulla Vedere’., 49-50.  
380 Montemaggi, ‘Nulla Vedere’., 87.  
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transforms, of the carnality that speaks God, “effecting what it signifies”’.381 Premised on the 
relation between self and incarnate Word, words in the Comedy can enact, gesture and perform 
past, present and future.  
Dante’s Comedy presents three different states of relation and three distinctive bodies, the 
Infernal, Purgatorial and Paradisal bodies. If heavenly bodies depict the perfection of relations 
between self, other and God, then the bodies of purgatory and hell denote the relative loss of 
relations amongst persons and the divine. This does not mean that the Word is absent to the bodies 
of Inferno, but that their bodies are incapable of perceiving the divine due to their sense-perceptual 
failures, and resulting failed relation between self, created other and divine. Bodies are corollaries 
of relation, the extent to which they are depicted as human or bestial, is the extent to which their 
actions on earth ravaged relations.  
 
Infernal Bodies, Disordered Love 
With the opening lines, ‘[a]t one point midway on our path in life, I came around and found myself 
now searching through a dark wood, the right way blurred and lost’ (Inferno, I. 1-3),382 Dante the 
author depicts Inferno as the epitome of existential anxiety. In a succession of grotesque 
encounters, Inferno visually illustrates how sins committed on earth ravaged relations, thus failing 
in the Dominical command to love God, self and neighbour. These persons failed, while alive, to 
act in accordance with the imperative to love. Inferno shows in various states how persons either 
accepted or rejected the fact that embodied existence in all its facets is ordered by love, whether it 
be the failure to love the self in the case of those who have taken their lives, the failure to adore 
God in the case of those who blasphemed the goodness of creation or those who failed to love their 
neighbours by rejecting them.   
Heather Webb suggests that the difference between the persons the Comedy depicts lies in 
the extent to which they can recognise that their personhood ‘cannot be taken away; it can only be 
renounced’.383 She accordingly reads persona in the Inferno as that which designates the 
irrevocable loss of something.384 In the realm of the discordant and grotesque, Dante the pilgrim 
 
381 Turner, ‘How to do things with Words’., 304. 
382 Kirkpatrick, Inferno., 2.  
383 Webb, Dante’s Persons., 10.  
384 Webb, Dante’s Persons., 3. 
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stands in stark contrast to the rest of the persons of Inferno; so Charon’s address of Dante shows 
when he calls, ‘[a]nd you there! You! Yes, you, the living soul! Get right away from this gang! 
These are dead’ (Inferno, III. 88-89).  
The logic of relationality finds expression in Inferno III. 103-105 when Dante the pilgrim 
describes those who are entering Hell as, ‘[t]hey raged, blaspheming God and their own kin, the 
human race, the place and time, the seed from which they’d sprung, the day that they’d been born’. 
Heather Webb suggests that the dead rage because they have made ‘the double error’ of ‘first 
identifying their persona solely with their bodies, and, second, believing that those bodies can be 
irrevocably lost’.385 One concludes that, despite all attempts at estrangement, resurrection is as a 
part of living as it is of dying. 
A correlation exists between the extent to which love ordered persons while alive, and the 
shape their bodies take in the afterlife. In Inferno, where bodies are disformed and grotesque, these 
persons illustrate the absence of right relations between persons, whether it be between self, other, 
and God. This depiction forms the spine of the Comedy. Illustratively, Dante the author depicts 
flesh as that which rots, bleeds, festers, peels and most importantly visibly expresses the inward 
loss and turmoil infernal bodies experience. The body, therefore, not only acts as the expression 
of desolation, it also acts as the medium through which Dante author and pilgrim narrates the loss 
of divinely ordered creation. 
One might recall the example of Ugolino who is first introduced to the reader in Canto 
XXXII where he raises his head from the skull which he gnaws on. In Canto XXXIII. 76-8, Dante 
the pilgrim recalls, ‘His words were done. Now, eyes askew, he grabbed once more that miserable 
skull – his teeth, like any dog’s teeth, strong against the bone’. Count Ugolino’s story is one of 
desolation and desperation. Ugolino recalls the moment when he realises his imminent death and 
the death of his sons:  
Listening, I heard the door below locked shut,  
Then nailed in place against that dreadful tower.  
I looked in their dear faces, spoke no word. 
I did not weep. Inward, I turned to stone.  
They wept. And then my boy Anselmo spoke: 
 
385 Webb, Dante’s Persons., 10.  
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‘What are you staring at? Father, what’s wrong?’386 
The transitions at play in Ugolino’s description are revealing. In the first instance, when Ugolino 
realises the fate of his sons, instead of turning words into consolations, he refuses speech. In the 
second instance, instead of inclining his heart to his sons who are dying, he hardens himself. 
Ugolino’s actions evoke a regression in his paternity and his humanity.  
Dante author casts Ugolino’s predicament in bestial terms when Ugolino says, ‘[o]ut of 
sheer grief, I gnawed on both my hands’ (Inferno, XXXIII. 58). His children, misinterpreting his 
gesture, presume that he is hungry and out of care and affection respond ‘[f]ather, for us the pain 
would be far less if you would chose to eat us. You, having dressed us in this wretched flesh, ought 
now to strip it off’ (Inferno, XXXIII. 61-3). In the verses that follow, Ugolino does not eat his 
children. Instead, he listens to their cries but refuses to respond to their existence. Ugolino’s 
response only comes on the 8th day when he, out of his own need, allows himself to ‘now blind, 
feel over them, calling on each, now all were dead’ (Inferno, XXXIII. 73-4).  
Eucharistic symbolism reverberates in Ugolino’s account when interpreted theologically. 
When Ugolino’s sons cry out to him, their cry echoes Christ’s cry of dereliction on the Cross 
(Inferno, XXXIII. 69). In contrast to Ugolino’s actions which effected estrangement, Christ’s death 
on the Cross brought restoration to self and other. Here Christ’s body is the Passover body which 
reconciles persons with God. Unlike Christ, Ugolino’s exchange with his sons is not reconciliatory. 
He commits a grotesque offense against his own body when he consumes his sons’ flesh. Ugolino 
eucharistically feeds on his sons, a gesture which mimics the Eucharistic but fails in that it is an 
illustration of disordered love. 
Ugolino’s account serves as an illustration of the centrality of the body to the expression 
of states of relation. The example of Ugolino visually depicts how the Comedy expresses a 
relational logic. Bodies never exist for themselves; they exist in order to show and express the love 
which orders their being. When persons misapprehend the command to love self, neighbour and 
God, their bodies in Inferno depict such disordering in grotesque ways. As such, bodies are the 
visual representation of the goodness of the created order, of which Inferno expresses the denial 
or refusal thereof. 
 
 
386 Alighieri, Inferno. XXXIII. 46-51. 
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Purgatorial Bodies, Incarnational Gestures  
Just as metamorphoses visually communicate the states of relations between persons in Inferno, 
Purgatorio has its own visual vocabulary. Bodies in Purgatorio, my reading suggests, make visible 
through gesture the state of relations between self and other. The theme of failed embraces is 
prominent in Purgatory, as persons first seek to embrace Dante the pilgrim but fail, and then 
acknowledge his presence in the face of their own material absences. This is because the bodies of 
Purgatory are aerial bodies and Dante the pilgrim’s is not. Whereas bodies in Inferno visually 
illustrate the refusal of the love which orders existence, bodies in Purgatorio illustrate the 
reparation of relations.  
As early as Canto II, the desire for restored relations between self and other is depicted. 
‘And one drew forward now’, Dante the pilgrim recalls, ‘to take me in his arms with such great 
warmth it moved me, so I did the same to him’ (Purgatorio, II. 76-8). But a failure ensues, ‘[a]h 
shadows, empty save in how they look! Three times I locked my hands behind his back. As many 
times I came back to my breast’ (Purgatorio, II. 79-81). Dante the pilgrim wishes to reciprocate 
Casello’s embrace but because the bodies in Purgatory are aerial, his arms return to him void. The 
failed embrace signals a key theme in Purgatory, persons will attempt to reconcile themselves to 
Dante the pilgrim, others and the divine. Here Dante the pilgrim’s body is the prototypical body. 
It gestures, perceives, signs and speaks, all with the purpose of incarnating a certain truth: that the 
journey to participation in the divine, requires the acknowledgement of God as Maker and the 
restoration of the Imago Dei through an embodied response to God and others. 
The primary means by which the restoration of relations will be illustrated is through the 
performance of gestures. Virgil, at the sight of the angel who comes to inaugurates those arriving 
at the shore of purgatory, for example, instructs Dante the pilgrim, ‘[f]old your hands in prayer’ 
(Purgatorio, II. 29). ‘Then, over them, he [the angel] made the holy Cross, at which they flung 
themselves upon the shore’ (Purgatorio, II. 49-50). Dante the pilgrim and the angel both gesture 
in their respective ways, Dante places his hands in the iconic mode of prayer, while the angel 
makes the sign of the Cross over the purgatorial souls. This invocation of the Cross runs throughout 
Purgatory. Such is the case with Manfred (Purgatorio, III.) and Buonconte da Montefeltro 
(Purgatorio, V.) who, in their respective ways, either call upon Mary or invoke the Cross. In both 
instances, gesture becomes the mode of expressing the dynamic of salvation as the restoration of 
love between self and God. Even though the reconciliation which they seek will only be perfected 
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in Paradiso, where relations are eternally ordered according to the Love which moves every being, 
purgatorial bodies incarnate the truth of their existence while they await this transformation.  
Manfred invokes the Cross by way of his body387 in Purgatorio III. 110 when he perceives 
Christ’s wound, ‘‘[l]ook!’ he said, and pointed out to a wound high on his chest’’.388 He continues, 
‘‘I, broken in my person, had received two mortal wounds and, weeping, gave myself to Him who, 
freely, cares to pardon us...’’ (Purgatorio, III. 118-20). Echoing Jesus as he pointed out his wounds 
to doubting Thomas, Manfred invokes Dante the pilgrim’s gaze and beckons it toward his wound. 
The purpose is to show that Manfred, in his state of desolation, called to God and was heard. 
Recollecting the failed embrace between Casella and Dante in Purgatorio II. 79-81, Manfred’s 
imagery of God’s embrace presents a stark contrast: ‘[m]y sins and crimes were horrible to hear. 
God, though, unendingly is good. His arms enfold and grasp all those who turn to Him’ 
(Purgatorio, III. 121-3).  
The symbolism of the embrace between Casella and Dante the pilgrim lies in that Casella’s 
gesture signs to his desire to have his relations restored. This restoration echoes the restoration 
which Manfred and Buonconte experience when they invoke God’s love and mercy by recalling 
the Cross of Christ. God’s gesture is one of forgiveness and reconciliation visually performed 
through the register of an embrace. Here the reconciliation of relations between self and other is 
also the reconciliation between self and God depicted in embodied form. Casella’s embrace, in its 
hyper-personified form, makes a direct correlation between his body with its redemption-invoking 
gestures and God’s body through the incarnation. The body, with all its imperfections and 
impurities, is the very same body which the Maker invites into His company. Kirkpatrick affirms 
when he writes, ‘[h]ere, as throughout the Purgatorio…the presence of Dante in the other world is 
emblematic of the salvation that is offered to all human beings through the Resurrection’.389 
Manfred’s invocation of God’s embrace avails a corporeal speech which, by mimicking or 
performing imagery resonant with the life of Christ, expresses the restoration of relations.  
 
387 ‘Manfred (c. 1232-66) was not only the illegitimate son of the Emperor Frederick II (1194-
1250) – whom the thirteenth-century Church frequently referred to as the Anti-Christ – but was 
himself excommunicated on three separate occasions…’ writes Kirkpatrick. See Alighieri, Dante. 
2007. Purgatorio. Edited and translated by Robin Kirkpatrick. Penguin Classics. London: Penguin 
Group., 332. 
388 (Purgatorio, III. 109-12). 
389 Kirkpatrick, Purgatorio., 344. 
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Depicted as the moment when bodies respond to their Maker through gesture, Dante the 
pilgrim’s encounter with Manfred and Buonconte signals another truth of the purgatorial flesh: 
that the telos of humanity is to be in eternal communion with God. Two cantos later, this truth is 
rendered in Purgatorio V. 85-129 when Buonconte describes how fatally wounded he is and how 
he drags himself to a river to die. Moments before he dies, Buonconte utters Mary’s name 
(Purgatorio, V. 101) and so is prised from the depths of hell. Exasperated at how such a small 
gesture can invoke the grace of God, Satan demands, ‘You’d prise him from me for one little tear, 
and carry off his everlasting part?’ (Purgatorio, V. 106-7).  
Buonconte’s monologue concludes with a victorious gesture of life over death where his 
arms are crossed one over the other; making the sign of the Cross. The invocation of the Cross of 
Christ parallels with Manfred’s invocation of imagery of the resurrection body and serves to affirm 
that ‘[t]he body that suffers violence is also the body that is redeemed and resurrected by 
association with the resurrection of Christ after his suffering on the Cross’.390 Manfred and 
Buonconte illustrate an incarnational logic where gestures manifest the possibility of being 
reconciled to God by invoking the Cross. Sheila Nayar brings the point home when she writes:  
Dante presents us, in fact, with a veritable constellation of allusion that orbit around 
Christ’s dual nature on earth: as human and divine son (and Son), as flesh and Flesh; or, if 
we prefer, as two “ontological extremes represented by the Trinity and by the physical 
body”.391  
Manfred and Buonconte not only gesture to Christ’s work in bringing about a reconciliation 
between God and self, they also performatively re-enact the dynamics of salvation – the human 
responsiveness to the love of God and God’s eternal embrace. In their gesturality, Manfred and 
Buonconte’s bodies sign to Christ’s reconciliatory love and the transformation of the self.   
Manfred and Buonconte’s accounts represent different instances of personhood in the 
Comedy. In the first instance, writes Heather Webb, persona can be considered as being ‘the nexus 
of particularity that resides in the union of the body with the soul, or in the way in which the soul 
 
390 Kirkpatrick, Purgatorio., 343. 
391 Nayar, 2014. Dante’s Sacred Poem, pp. 100. Nayar’s quotation of Kirkpatrick may be found 
in: Kirkpatrick, Robin. ‘Canto III: The Sheepfold of the Excommunicates’. In Lectura Dante: 
Purgatorio, edited by Allen Mandelbaum, Anthony Oldcorn, and Charles Ross, 21–38. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008., 30.  
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animates the body’.392 In the second instance, Webb continues, persona can also serve to define 
the communion between the Trinity. In doing so, it acts as analogue for Christ who, in his dual 
nature, subsumes both humanity and the divine.393 The analogous reading of relationality brings 
to the fore a third dimension of Dante’s purgatorial flesh, the represented flesh.394 In this instance, 
Dante the pilgrim’s body offsets by way of poetic narration that which is as yet not revealed in the 
Inferno, and that which is awaited and consummated in Paradiso. What Dante the pilgrim 
embodies, is that salvation is not abstracted from sensory perceptions and gestures. To the contrary, 
salvation requires the perceptive body to respond to God’s eternal goodness.  
In canto XX the relation of human and divine finds expression in the words of Statius’ (c. 
45 – c. 96) when he describes the generation of a foetus in terms of God’s constituting presence in 
the life of a person. The reader inadvertently hears of Statius when a celestial earthquake interrupts 
Dante and Virgil’s conversation (Purgatorio XX. 127-141). Each earthquake is accompanied by 
the exclamation, ‘Gloria in excelsis Deo!’ (a cross-reference to the song of the angels at Jesus’ 
birth in Luke 8:20),395 which brings into relief Christ’s birth, the incarnation of the Son in whom 
and through whom persons will be transformed.396 Each earthquake signals the transition of a body 
from Purgatory to Paradiso, in this instance, it is Statius who transitions.  
Statius’ presence on the way with Dante the pilgrim is foregrounded by an existential thirst 
which Dante experiences. Like the Samaritan woman at the well (Purgatorio, XXI. 1-3), Dante 
likens his thirst to that which Christ quenched in the woman. In answer to Dante’s thirst, Statius 
appears in a quasi-messianic way, as Christ did to the disciples, post-resurrection. What he 
continues to do, is to explicate the relationship between the heavens and purgatory. The heavens 
have the unmoved mover as its principle. Purgatory can only be moved by the consent of the 
heavens and, as will be learnt, the conjoining of the intellective will with God’s will. Eager to 
understand what causes the unchangeable purgatorial landscape to change, Virgil fittingly gestures 
that Statius should speak: 
In asking this, he [Virgil] pierced the needle’s eye 
of all I longed to know. And so my thirst,  
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through hope alone, became less keen in me. 
‘There’s nothing that this mountain’s holy law 
consents to,’ so the other now began,  
‘that’s lacking order or irregular. 
This place is free from every kind of change. 
Only what Heaven, of itself, receives 
Can act here as a cause, and nothing else. 
… 
Tremors strike here when any soul feels pure 
and rises, newly cleansed, to start its climb. 
And that cry follows as the soul ascends. 
The will alone gives proof of purity 
when, wholly free to change its sacred place, 
it aids and sweeps the soul up, willing well.397  
Statius’ response is twofold, that God is the one who destines each will to return to Godself and 
that each will must acknowledge within themselves the desire to ascent to God. The conjoining of 
these establishes beatification.  
Before Dante and Statius enter Paradiso, they, together with Virgil, encounter Dante’s 
friend, Forese Donati who suffers from emaciation.398 The question which next concerns Dante 
the pilgrim, is why purgatorial flesh can experience emaciation. He asks in Canto XXV. 20-1, 
‘[w]here there’s no need for nourishment…how can it be that people get so thin?’399 The question 
is put so simply and yet, Statius’ resulting monologue delves into the deep mysteries of generation, 
creation and the inspiration of the intellective will. In Canto XXV, Statius makes an extensive 
 
397 Purgatorio, XXI. 37-45, 58-63. Kirkpatrick, Purgatorio., 197-9.  
398 Statius continues to play a prominent role in Purgatorio XXI-XXV. In Canto XXI, Statius 
shows how the desire to know and belong is left unsatisfied when in purgatorial flesh. In Canto 
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XXIII, Statius and Virgil accompany Dante as he meets his friend Forese Donati and in Canto 
XXIV, Statius gives answer to Dante’s inquiring after the possibility of emaciation in a purgatorial 
flesh. In Canto XV, Statius continues with a full-fledged theological rendering of the formation of 
the human foetus finally depicting him as the theologian on the way.  
399 Kirkpatrick, Purgatorio, 229.  
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argument on the origin of the human foetus. With this monologue, he provides a theological 
account for the origin of humanity by drawing on God’s creation.  
The development of the human foetus, Status explains in three phases: generation 
(Purgatorio, XXV. 37-60), the creation of the intellective soul (Purgatorio, XXV. 61-76), and 
finally how the soul animates the body and the body, in turn, personifies the soul (Purgatorio, 
XXV. 79-108).400 Behind all three phases, but most prominently the first and the second, is the 
uniquely human feature of being constituted both by the workings of nature through biological 
generation, and the workings of the Maker in the impartation of the intellective soul.401 In 
Purgatorio XXV Statius thus discusses two bodies, one body which is given to humanity at birth 
but which exists because of God who breaths His Spirit into every creature, and one that after death 
no longer exists corporeally but whose aerial body permits it to experience sense-perceptions.402 
Heather Webb similarly understands that ‘[t]he aerial body is a constitutive mechanism for our 
continued human personhood after death, just as the embryonic body and infused soul are 
constitutive of our humanity at birth’.403 The twofold generation of persons is suggestive because 
it places persons central to the created and divine.404 
It is instructive that Dante the author describes bodies with their smells and profanities as 
the register by which persons grow toward God. The inclusion is significant for the place that 
Dante the author gives to the body and its ascent. The perfection of the Imago Dei does not translate 
to the loss of the body but rather its absolute affirmation. The body with its gestures and signs are 
transformed through love. This transformation performs in bodily terms how purgatorial bodies 
are transforming bodies, ever growing toward the Love that orders their being. Purgatorial bodies 
thus register through their sense-perceptions the various ways in which a person is assimilated to 
God. 
 
Paradisal Flesh: Beatific Relations 
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Bodies in the Comedy are aerial bodies, a literary and theological fiction which, is ‘a constitutive 
mechanism for our continued human personhood after death’.405 Dante the author’s construction 
of the aerial body enables a person ‘to receive sensation and express their feelings’ and can respond 
‘to the longings and other passions affecting the soul’.406 While the bodies in the cantiche await 
their resurrection in Christ, each cantica depicts these bodies in different states of being. In Inferno, 
bodies are distorted in their depictions, illustrating the refusal and rejection of the Love which 
orders their being. In Purgatorio, bodies gesture and sign to a future reconciliation between self 
and other and, in Paradiso, Love will finally perfect communion by transforming persons into 
responsive and participatory selves. The possibility of all three cantiche to describe a singular type 
of body is premised on the fact that these fictive aerial bodies enable ‘gestural, postural and 
affective relation’.407  
In Paradiso, Dante the pilgrim meets a myriad of heavenly beings. The poet’s body and 
the aerial bodies are not mutually exclusive, to the contrary, each serve to juxtapose the other and 
thereby produce various modes of being in communion: 
Now, Dante is able to contemplate the saints, who for him are not conventionally pious 
figments of the religious imagination, but nameable individuals whose presence in history, 
as now in the Empyrean, is itself sacramental in bearing the weight and light of divine 
reality. Like Beatrice, the saints are mirrors of God’s creative energy.408  
Those individuals who exist eternally because of God’s sustaining Love, depict the splendour of 
God in the Empyrean.  
In Paradiso XXX. 103-29, when Dante the pilgrim enters the Empyrean, he sees the saints 
who have gone before him displayed: ‘[a]bove that light, and standing round, I saw a thousand 
tiers or more as mirrorings of those of ours who’ve now returned up there’ (Paradiso, III. 112-4). 
Dante the author captures the imagery when he writes, ‘[i]nto the gold of that now-always rose, 
which grows from arc to arc, dilates and breathes the scent of praise to always-springtime Sun’ 
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(Paradiso, III. 124-6). Depicted in the imagery of a rose which bends and sways to the rays of the 
sunshine, are the individuals who, petal for petal, make up the rose. With this imagery, Dante the 
author affirms that, in Paradiso, individuality is never lost and, each individual’s presence exists 
within the collective whole.  
The intent as Heather Webb suggests is never to ‘transcend humanity’ but to ‘anticipate 
the final mystery in which God displays to the poet, at the climax of the poem, his own human 
face’.409 Heather Webb similarly continues by describing aerial bodies in Paradiso as having: 
…the possibility of fully integrating the human person into an ethically grounded 
copresence with other individuals in a network of relations based on mutual recognition 
and interpersonal attention that transcends the boundary that separates the living from the 
dead. 410 
The community that Dante the author envisions in the final cantos of Paradiso is a community 
whose existence incarnates love as the logic of communion. Foreseen in Paradiso’s rendering of 
existence is what a ‘plenitude of persona might look like’.411   
One might wonder what the Paradisal flesh looks like. Unlike Inferno and Purgatorio, 
Dante the pilgrim’s body is no longer the proto-typical body because Paradiso communicates 
perfected relationality. Over the cantiche, Dante the pilgrim’s body evokes a variety of responses. 
His body juxtaposes the love which has gone awry in Inferno. In Purgatorio, Dante’s presence 
evokes the desire of aerial bodies to reconcile with self, other and divine. Paradiso, finally, casts 
Dante the pilgrim’s body as not existing for the sake of itself, but for the sake of the revelation of 
God’s glory in a community of worshipers. Despite the glory displayed by the bodies that are in 
perfect relation with another, Dante perceives it as a whole. He recalls, ‘[m]y eyes, despite such 
breadth and altitude, were not confused or blurred but took all in – the kind and sum of this light-
heartedness’ (Paradiso, XXX. 118-20).  
One cannot describe the Paradisal flesh by extracting it from a given canto; one needs a 
synthesis of ideas based on Dante the author’s highly abstract and confessional descriptions of 
existence. One strategy is to focus on various thematic stages in Dante the pilgrim’s ascent.412 By 
 
409 Alighieri, Paradiso., xxi.  
410 Webb, Dante’s Persons., 26.  
411 Webb, Dante’s Persons., 31.   
412 Robin Kirkpatrick suggests four major phases in Paradiso. I follow Kirkpatrick’s identification 
of cantos, 1-9, 10 to the middle of 22, the end of 22 to the middle of 27 and, the end of 27-33 but 
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looking at the degrees to which bodies are perceptible, the reader may ascertain Dante the pilgrim’s 
own transfiguration as he draws closer to the Empyrean. For example, Paradiso I-IX, depicts 
Dante’s interaction with individuals whose personhood is still recognisable from the resemblance 
of their bodily features.  
As Dante the pilgrim moves on to Paradiso Cantos X-XXII, he reaches a second stage 
where persons appear in their original state. Here Adam and Eve come to the fore, Solomon 
engages in proto-resurrection dialectics, and the four cardinal virtues are discussed. In Canto XIV, 
Dante the author will expound on the idea of eternal bodies when he places in the mouth of 
Solomon, a task of describing resurrected bodies. During this second phase, semblances of 
humanity are gradually transfigured into geometric figures413 who all, in their respective way, 
refract aspects of Christ’ existence. The subtle but gradual changes suggest Dante the pilgrim’s 
own transformation which ‘implies not the transcendence of humanity but its transference from 
one dimension to another’.414  
A third distinguishable stage lies between cantos XXIII and XXIX where bodies exist in 
their resurrected state. As Dante journeys closer to the Empyrean, he meets aerial bodies who 
depict the heavenly realms. In all these Cantos, Dante the pilgrim’s own being is transformed in a 
manner that does not negate his bodily existence. This stage shows what it means to be truly human 
as a redeemed body. It is a highly confessional phase as the apostles Peter, James, and John 
examine Dante the pilgrim in the three theological virtues. Along with the apostles, there is an 
increasing invocation of Mary and references to creation as the en-flowering of humanity. The 
final stage, Cantos XXX-XXXIII, acts as the culmination of Dante the author’s progressive 
delineation of humanity in their perfected state. When Dante the pilgrim sees the heavenly hosts, 
a sacramental and quasi-liturgical performance takes place. The ‘individual creature’ is seen to 
 
diverge slightly on the last two phases. A reading of Paradisal Flesh requires the navigation of a 
related but different thematic landscape and therefore cannot be replicated exactly. Kirkpatrick’s 
outline may be found in Kirkpatrick, Paradiso., xxiii.  
413 ‘The souls who appeared in the lower spheres of Paradise still possessed the delicate outline of 
human faces. Now the figures that Dante meets display themselves as lights, fires, and 
thunderbolts, all intensely active, all forming patterns – constantly varied from sequence to 
sequence – of circles, rectangles, illuminated words and rising spirals. Thematically, Dante’s 
concern is with the various forms of moral energy that come to fruition in Paradise.’ Kirkpatrick, 
Paradiso., 367.  
414 Kirkpatrick, Paradiso., 333.  
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reside ‘not in the minds of other human beings alone but ultimately and most truly in the mind of 
the creator’.415  
In Canto XXXIII Dante sees the glory of God when he sees the body of Christ incarnate in 
the church. Kirkpatrick continues: 
In Dante’s Paradiso, we do not transcend humanity, but anticipate the final mystery in 
which God displays to the poet, at the climax of the poem, his own human face. Human 
reason cannot conceive how the divine may be at one with the human. It is, however, the 
redeeming implications of this mystery that Dante, as a love poet, has set himself to explore 
the final part of the Commedia.416  
The above four stages describe the multi-faceted nature of the Paradisal flesh. It progresses from 
a redeemed flesh, continues to a transfiguring flesh, becomes a confessional flesh and then finally, 
a perfected and participatory flesh. The Paradisal flesh undergoes continuous change, its change 
is progressive and aligned with the increased ability to see truth as the incarnate Word, Jesus Christ. 
Existing in the truth who is Christ, humanity comprises creative generation and divine inspiration.  
The distinguishing factor for proto-resurrected bodies is its re-constructed nature. Evidence 
hereof can be seen in the change Dante the pilgrim undergoes in Cantos XXIII-XXVI in his 
explication of faith.417 The Paradisal flesh changes and is re-created at the hand of the confession 
of faith. In their use of the words God speaks to reveal himself to creation (Logos), the Paradisal 
flesh undergoes an essential transformation and its ‘semblance’ is transfigured. The language for 
flesh that Dante the author employs in Paradiso lays claim to a new-found, divinely actualised, 
existence. This flesh is not a corruptible and broken flesh but a perfected flesh, one which, in its 
participation in divine reality, is animated by God’s abounding love.  
 
Co-bodies: Virgil and Beatrice 
Virgil and Beatrice illustrate the centrality of the body as a thematic in the Comedy. Their 
presences in the Paradiso mark the embodiment of Love which orders being. Together, they fulfil 
the roles of sage and scribe, not only by the words they speak but also by the signs and gestures 
 
415 Kirkpatrick, Paradiso., 463.  
416 Kirkpatrick, Paradiso., xxi.  
417 ‘Here, as the focus of attention falls upon Dante as character, the poet also reconstructs his 
identity around the central truths of his Christian faith – in a way that is comparable to the 
reconstruction of his Florentine ancestry in Paradiso 15-17.’ See Kirkpatrick, Paradiso., 24.  
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they make. Beatrice herself exists as an exemplar of perfect love 418 and her smile performs such 
perfected love and, in doing so, she acts as segue into the will’s attuning of itself to God.419 In the 
co-edited book by Montemaggi and Treherne, Dante’s Commedia: Theology as Poetry (2010), 
Peter Hawkins takes a similar line of argument:420 
Every smile given, received, or exchanged signifies that someone was there to notice – 
Dante the character in the poem, who first saw for himself and then told us about his vision. 
But every smile also asserts the imaginative activity of Dante the poet, draws attention to 
his sustained act of invention, his bringing into this drama of salvation an expression that 
over the course of the poem he made into his hallmark.421 
The significance of Beatrice lies in the truth that she embodies. Beatrice is the example of how we 
can truly be who we are, to the glory of God. Her existence analogously illustrates the human 
responsiveness to the divine in its splendour. When Dante the pilgrim gazes at her, she diverts his 
gaze by directing it to God’s glory. Here Dante’s gazing at Beatrice is an extension of his response 
to God just as his gazing was a response to the white rose. Beatrice’s beauty symbolises the 
transformation persons in Paradiso undergo when they are brought into eternal communion with 
God. Such communion transforms the body so that it too reflects God’s love and perfect 
relationality. Beauty thus evidences God’s transformation of the self in a manner that is visibly 
reflected in the body.  
In the Paradiso beauty acts as a transcendental because it discloses to the human 
imagination the transformation of the self in the face of the divine. Warren Ginsberg in his book, 
Dante’s Aesthetics of Being (1999), notes a similar logic. He writes, ‘Dante makes the very 
relationship that affiliates the activities of the sensible and intellectual souls an analogue of 
Beatrice, who is both a living woman and the essence of beatitude’ and continues, to suggest how 
Beatrice in her fullest sense is ‘a being whose effects only the full articulation of the rational soul 
can adequately describe, yet whose essence transcends the capacity even of the intellect to 
 
418 Soskice, Janet Martin. 2018. ‘Dante and the Path of the Pilgrim’. 2018.  
419 Montemaggi, ‘Nulla Vederee E Amor Mi Constrinse’., 91. 
420 Hawkins, Peter S. ‘All Smiles: Poetry and Theology in Dante’s Commedia’. In Dante’s 
Commedia. Theology as Poetry, edited by Vittorio Montemaggi and Matthew Treherne, 36–59. 
University of Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 2010., 53.  
421 Hawkins, Peter S. ‘All Smiles: Poetry and Theology in Dante’s Commedia’. In Dante’s 
Commedia. Theology as Poetry, edited by Vittorio Montemaggi and Matthew Treherne, 36–59. 
University of Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 2010., 53.  
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comprehend’.422 Based on the role Beatrice plays in the Comedy, beauty is to the senses as 
revelation is to words, both incarnate the divine. Equally so, Virgil’s strategic gestures incline 
Dante the pilgrim’s spiritual eye to the truth that lay before him, and signs to the reader when 
significant moments in the text arise.  
Dante the pilgrim, Beatrice, and Virgil are central figures to the Comedy because it is with 
them that Dante the pilgrim embarks (with the reader) on his existential wayfaring. It is also with 
their guidance that Dante the pilgrim engages ‘horizontally’ and ‘vertically’ with the figures who 
he meets along the twisting roads to Paradiso. It is in Dante the pilgrim’s journey to the Empyrean 
that the incarnation of right relations, as I have suggested thus far, is finally revealed. This is not a 
question of the presence or absence of materiality but of the alignment of self with God’s eternal 
love. This alignment happens systematically. Accompanied by the pardoning of sins, each person 
comes closer to seeing God’s eternal love and, in return, responds in adoration. Depicted in the 
final scenes of the Empyrean is a Dante who, with each glimpse of God’s astounding light, desires 
to peer even deeper into the mystery of God’s being. What Dante the pilgrim sees when his eyes 
have become accustomed to the light, is the face of Christ, the light of truth so clearly embellished 
with that which draws God’s affection, humanity.  
It is significant that Dante the pilgrim’s wayfaring concludes with a glimpse of the divine 
in human likeness.423 It confirms a theological reading of the body as a sacramental entity. Dante 
the author’s use of the human image as a way of relating to God echoes the corporeal grammar 
that pervades the Comedy. The grammar upholds Dante the pilgrim’s embodied journey and also 
the continuing embodied journey the reader takes as they imaginatively engage with his ascent. 
That Dante author and pilgrim sees persons in the reflection of God’s splendour, suggests that 
images are modes by which we come to know and worship God. The implication of such a 
rendering is that the human image is sacramental in its constant gesturing to its Maker. The fact 
 
422 Ginsberg, Dante’s Aesthetics of Being., 9.  
423 It furthermore, says something about Dante’s Christian confidence. Kirkpatrick writes, ‘The 
vision he finally receives is a vision of the face of God. This vision defeats understanding of any 
systematic or general kind precisely because it is a particularity, a singularity, a face which may 
be loved but cannot be described. There is no attempt here to project some human conception of 
the divine on to God’s unknowable reality. There is, however, the confidence, born of Christian 
belief, that God, incarnate in Christ, indeed has a human face. This is the ultimate truth and the 
ultimate mystery’. Kirkpatrick, Paradiso., xl.  
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that God who is without form reveals Godself as bearing a human face indicates the worth and 
dignity of the created order.  
 
 
Dante’s Incarnationalism 
Dante the pilgrim’s flesh maps an incarnational logic, whether it is the distorted flesh of Inferno, 
the gestural bodies of Purgatorio or the beatific relations of Paradiso. ‘At every point’, writes 
John Took, ‘the divine, for Dante, is immanent in the human, at work deep within it, reconciling 
it to itself, and bringing it to its final perfection’.424 The truth underlying this claim is founded on 
the logic of the Word made flesh. The Word who brought the revelation of the true essence of 
humanity to creation, who continues to order and sustain creation and who perpetually reveals 
divine relationality to persons. The Word made flesh in the Comedy, is also the Word who is 
revealed in Dante the author and pilgrim’s words. Dante the author’s words, Dante the pilgrim’s 
gestures and body incarnates the Love which orders persons.   
The Comedy expresses the truth of the incarnation in three ways, in reconciliation, 
participation and literary performance. In reconciliation, the relationship between self, other and 
divine is restored. Took suggests:  
It is, in other words, a discourse at every point taking seriously the indwelling of the 
Godhead (‘And the word became flesh and dwelt among us [...] full of grace and truth’) 
whereby the essential enters into the existential as the leading parameter of human 
experience of human conditions of time and space, whereby the supra-natural is seen to be 
at work within the recesses of the natural, and whereby grace is understood to abound in 
the totality of man’s engagement with the world.425 
Expressed in this passage is the affirmation that Christ’s presence restores humanity to its proper 
moral and ontological sufficiency.426 Love orders this new existence and reconciles persons so that 
their perfected relationality participates in God’s being. A medieval corporeal ontology founds the 
constitution of the self on the metaphysical Word who is Christ incarnate. Montemaggi affirms,427 
 
424 Took, John. ‘Dante’s Incarnationalism: An Essay in Theological Wisdom’. Italian Studies 61, 
no. 1 (2006): 1–17. 
425 Took, ‘Dante’s Incarnationalism’., 17. 
426 Took, ‘Dante’s Incarnationalism’., 17.  
427 Montemaggi, ‘Nulla Vederee E Amor Mi Costrinse’., 50. 
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‘they are supreme expression of the ontological unity between truth/divine-being/God and the 
material unfolding of creation’.428  
Dante the author poetically excavates the truth of the incarnation through his own words. 
Words perform, through a constellation of relations, the truth of the incarnation to every reader 
who decides to be a co-traveller of Dante the pilgrim and author. Dante the author’s words are 
formative because they draws the reader in, asking them to take part in the truth which he speaks. 
According to Heather Webb, Dante tasks the reader to understand his words as being descriptive 
and formative – avenues by which each person can engage with the personae of the Comedy. 
Words, according to Webb, ‘are not descriptive of the objective; they are the very enactment of 
relation and person-building’.429 The Comedy requires every persona, whether character or reader, 
to take for themselves the restoration of love which transfiguration suggests.430   
To read the Comedy is to enter Dante the author’s world and to take part by way of the 
imagination and the embodied self. In doing so, the reader becomes a co-traveller and so 
assimilates that which happens to Dante the pilgrim. Kirkpatrick reads a similar logic in Dante as 
we have seen in Webb when he writes: 
To read a poem by Dante is, in a real sense, to enter into responsible and responsive 
connection with another ‘person’, body as well as mind. For bodily form occupies a central 
position in Dante’s philosophical thinking; and words, in belonging as much to the 
sensuous as to the conceptual sphere, offer an exact analogy to those psychosomatic 
interrelations of body and rational spirit that constitutes human identity.431  
Dante the pilgrim’s body encapsulates a constellation of bodies that are most appropriately 
captured in the words he uses to describe his ascent. In this sense, the interweaving of the sacred 
and the profane in the Comedy is deeply performative when it renders the author and audience 
responsible for the finding of meaning. The gestures, signs, and symbols in Dante the author’s text 
draw the reader in, while the readers also, in their own bodily responsiveness, experience the 
Comedy as truly participatory.  
 
428 Montemaggi, ‘Nulla Vederee E Amor Mi Costrinse’., 50.  
429 Webb, Dante’s Persons., 29.  
430 For, as Webb argues, ‘it is in the work of creating and tending such communities of the living 
and the dead that we transhumanize and personalize our biological identities’. Webb, Dante’s 
Persons., 30. 
431 Kirkpatrick, Inferno., lxxxv.    
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A similar revelatory logic presents itself in the progressive unveiling of God’s being in the 
final cantos of the Paradiso. Here, Dante the pilgrim’s eyes, with their gradual adjustment to God’s 
light of glory, increasingly see the body of Christ incarnate. Mary, the mother from whose womb 
Christ took flesh, ‘is the face to which the unknowable God is known to have turned both Creator 
and as human child’ and ‘she is the fixed point of reference both for God and for humanity’.432 
Her image speaks of the reality that God is most clearly expressed in the embodied existence of 
those who faithfully serve him. The emphasis on the embodiment and personal encounters that 
pervade the Comedy, I have interpreted as indicating an ontology that places bodies and persons 
central in the relationship between God and persons.  
Tentatively described as a corporeal ontology, Marianne Shapiro suggests that ‘Dante 
argues neither for an idealism that denies matter an independent reality nor for a technical dialectic 
of matter and form’.433 Instead, ‘he persuades via the truth of experience and feeling in the account 
of a vision’.434 Dante the author’s poetic narration is suggestive of those processes that an 
individual undergoes when making sense of their reality and, as such, illustrates the body’s relation 
to a particular milieu and the interpretation thereof through a given frame of reference. Throughout 
the Comedy, the body and its degrees of visibility are modes of expressing the states of relation 
between persons. In Paradiso, beatific bodies know God actually. In Purgatorio, incarnational 
bodies yearn for relation and thereby increasingly embody divine intention. Finally, in the Inferno, 
there are those who refused the Love which orders their being, grotesquely depicted in their 
deformity.  
 
Self-Performative Words  
The incarnational logic in the Comedy finds expression in the corporeal ontology that words 
perform. Dante the author uses poetic expression as a means of incarnating the Word. By 
interweaving a simultaneity and duality of presences into his Inferno, Purgatorio and Paradiso, 
Dante the author creates a reverberating landscape where bodies become central to the articulation 
of divine reality.  
 
432 Kirkpatrick, Paradiso., 474.  
433 Shapiro, Marianne. Dante and the Knot of Body and Soul. London: MacMillian Press, 1998., 
xi.  
434 Shapiro, Dante and the Knot of Body and Soul., xi.  
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The Inferno, Purgatorio and Paradiso map in poetic fashion the journey from existential 
alienation, desolation and anxiety to existential homecoming.435 In this journey, Dante the 
pilgrim’s body is constantly receptive to the bodies of other persons whether it be the distorted 
persons of Inferno who, sometimes reptile-looking and sometimes inanimate-looking, embody 
what the loss of self looks like, the self-possessing persons of the Purgatory who, by way of their 
recognition of corporeality express the centrality of the body to relationality, and to the beatific 
bodies of Paradiso who, in their desire to behold the divine, reflect divine intention.  
In the depiction of the varying sets of relation, of self to other and divine, the Comedy 
simultaneously holds together the socio-political landscape and the religious imagination from 
which Dante the author conceives the Comedy. The Commedia parallels sacred literature insofar 
as it captures Dante the author and pilgrim’s own embodied existence in a register that lays claim 
to realities that surpass past and future. The landscape Dante the author has created, tasks the reader 
with the choice of either accepting or rejecting the landscape, spiritual or otherwise. The Comedy, 
by its nature, is spiritually inductive and requires that the reader attend to the body. By attending 
to the body, we attune ourselves to God and thereby also to the heart of the Dominical command, 
love of neighbour, self and God.  
The body expresses one dimension by which Dante the author maps his existence in 
relation to God, others and the text. In virtue of the Christological foregrounding in the Comedy, 
bodies give shape to words as they pertain to the divine. Uttering these words in the Comedy occurs 
at the hand of other bodies, and since bodies mark personhood, words are uttered as the expression 
of the ordering of relations to self, other and divine. The right ordering of relations, Paradiso 
shows, is the embodiment of the Love that Dante the pilgrim perceives in the final cantos of the 
Comedy. The grammar of love implicit to the Comedy performs the incarnation insofar as the 
incarnation is the perfection of the Love that orders persons.  
The power of Dante the author’s text is that he uses words to gesture to the Word, and to 
direct the reader to the body. In doing so, he constantly draws into conversation the dialectics of 
the incarnation and the very embodied, albeit shadowed, existence of persons in the Commedia. 
Dante the author insists on conceptualising Dante the pilgrim’s existence at the hand of the 
 
435 John Took’s article, ‘Towards a life of Dante: Ontological anxiety and the salvific function of 
the Word’, Italian Studies, 2004, LIX.1., 1-16 has been particularly helpful for understanding the 
Comedy as a commentary on life’s existential quandaries.   
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heavenly realms and the saints who reside there. In Canto XXXII the reader may be dismayed at 
the painstaking precision with which Dante the author formulates the heavenly realms. It is as 
though, for Dante the author, meeting the divine is meeting all those whose existence has been 
sustained by God’s eternal love. It is not that the saints are gods, but that they participate in God’s 
eternal glory by being united in Christ. Having Canto XXXIII conclude with a prayer to Mary and 
the glory of God, leaves the reader with one remaining image, the exchange between human and 
divine. Such exchange requires no negation, but absolute affirmation and perfection.  
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Chapter 7 
Synthesising the Body in Theology: 
Drawing Conclusions 
 
This thesis is written in response to a persistent concern amongst Christian writers, many of them 
but not all feminists, that the body is somehow lost or diminished in Christian theology. This comes 
in view of Descartes’ philosophy with its prioritisation of mind over body and the legacy it created. 
When reading Christian thought through this Cartesian lens, theology seemingly harbours its own 
hierarchisation of that which is spiritual and heavenly over that which is material and earthly. If 
this is the case, the fear of the loss of the body in Christian theology is not without basis. This 
thesis suggests, however, that such dualisms are symptomatic of a latent Cartesianism, and that 
they do not do justice to the complex and intertwined depiction of personhood that one finds in 
Scripture and the early church writings this thesis engages. We thus respond to this diminished 
understanding of the body in Christian theology by engaging the resources that we have in 
historical theology coupled with insights from modern philosophy. We do so in order to construct 
a Christian ontology of the flesh that challenges a dualistic understanding of personhood.  
Any adequate response to a diminished reading of the body within Christian theology 
should locate the body and its sense-perceptual engagements with the world in relation to the 
doctrine of creation (creation ex nihilo), and the definitive affirmation of this revelation in the 
embodiment of God in the Son (incarnation). The relationship between revelation and the Word, 
the seventeenth century theologian and philosopher Nicholas Malebranche expounded in the wake 
of Cartesianism. Malebranche’s metaphysics of the Word and divine intelligibility thesis has 
captured the imagination of secular philosophers. His sensuous theology, Judith Butler shows, 
formed part of Merleau-Ponty’s early lectures on the nature of perception. Following Butler’s 
account of Malebranche in Merleau-Ponty’s lectures, Malebranche’s sensuous theology lends to 
an articulation of the flesh as that which is open and responsive to the world.436 Such openness 
 
436 The latent influence of sensuous theologies of the Malebranchean sort, Judith Butler shows, 
aids Merleau-Ponty’s formulation of the flesh. Butler, Judith. 2005. ‘Merleau-Ponty and the Touch 
of Malebranche’. In The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, edited by Taylor Carmen and 
Mark Hansen, 181–205. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., Butler, Judith. 2015. Senses of 
the Subject. New York: Fordham University Press. 
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provides new insights into the recovery of the body in theology because the Christian flesh stands 
open not only to the created order, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, but also to its Creator.  
Merleau-Ponty formulates the relationship of creature to Creator in a non-religious register 
as the relationship of the visible to the invisible. In ‘Merleau-Ponty and the Touch of 
Malebranche’, Butler uses the example of love to illustrate how the invisible can permeate the 
visible in a manner that is manifest in an embodied way.437 Butler’s example is a natural starting 
point for the Christian theologian as well because it illustrates how love can be both an abstract 
term and an embodied reality.  
Love is a register of perception where the invisible is made visible to the senses by calling 
to mind that which the senses can perceive. The subjective self who engages with the world by 
way of their senses (the sense-perceptual self) perceives love and so, by way of such sense-
perceptual engagement concretises that which is initially abstract or invisible. Here, the sense-
perceptual self continuously re-articulates love through their unique particularity. Butler thus cites 
love as an example because it describes the continuum of existence in which a sense-perceptual 
self exists both as sentient and sensible. The movement from abstraction to concretisation, a 
Christian ontology of the flesh will suggest, is incarnational. Christian theology adds a further 
dimension to Butler’s example by implicating God in the sense-perceptual self’s making visible 
the invisible.438 Love is, for Christian belief, the expression of the God who is Love, and whose 
Love orders existence – it is thus intimately tied to both the created order, and the transcendent.  
Merleau-Ponty, of course and as we have already seen, was wary of the notion 
transcendent, seeing it as denoting an ontological chasm impossible to traverse. But as our chapters 
two to four suggest, any conceptualisation of transcendence as distance instead of difference is 
problematic for Christian theology, too. Sigurdson’s proposal that transcendence be read as 
difference instead of distance makes an important shift in the question of the relationship between 
 
437 Butler, Judith. 2005. ‘Merleau-Ponty and the Touch of Malebranche’. In The Cambridge 
Companion to Merleau-Ponty, edited by Taylor Carmen and Mark Hansen, 181–205. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press., 198.  
438 I find Harrison’s work instructive here because it shows how Augustine’s words become 
incarnational when they are ordered to God. When Augustine’s speaks his words, he does so while 
invoking the divine. This invocation, a pneumatological reading of perception shows, has divine 
agency present to the incarnational logic. Harrison, Carol. 2018. ‘Confused Voices: Sound and 
Sense in the Late (Wild) Augustine’. Pusey House, Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1–20. 
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the sense-perceptual self and the transcendent.439 This shift changes the nature of the concern from 
a God who is inaccessible to the sense-perceptual self to a God who is accessible in terms that yet 
need to be explored.  
Increasingly during the seventeenth century,440 the relationship between the transcendental 
and its invisible nature led to the prioritisation of that faculty that could apprehend the invisible in 
abstract terms: that is, the mind. In Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and ontology, and consonant 
with modern biology, one finds the solitary hegemony of the mind to be a myth. It is, therefore, 
impossible for the senses to exist unaffected by the world in which it functions.441 Since perception 
is, as Merleau-Ponty has shown, an entirely embodied activity, it concerns the same created flesh 
from which the self originates.442 This flesh, I have argued, is as much part of the Christian story 
of creation as it is of the incarnation. Both doctrines affirm the intertwining of the flesh of persons 
with the flesh of creation, and of God’s sustained presence in it as Creator.  
The intertwining of the flesh of persons with the flesh of the created order suggests not 
only that God is present to the flesh of persons as Creator, but that senses can perceive such a 
presence. This reversibility of perception thesis suggests that the senses are key not only in 
registering the divine presence in the created order but also in establishing an embodied grammar 
whereby God is revealed, once more, in terms that are as embodied and visual as the incarnate 
Christ. The question that concerns a Christian ontology of the flesh is not so much the loss of the 
body, but the loss of a grammar by which to articulate the body’s perception of the divine in the 
flesh of creation. When one has constructed a grammar for such perception, and this is key, one is 
retrieving the body for theology.  
 
439 Sigurdson, Ola. 2016. Heavenly Bodies. Incarnation, the Gaze, and Embodiment in Christian 
Theology. Michigan: Eerdmans., 271.  
440 ‘Epistemology’. 2020. In Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology. 
441 Chapter one deals extensively with this dynamic. See especially Bryan Bannon’s reading of 
Merleau-Ponty’s flesh. Bannon, Bryan. 2011. ‘Flesh and Nature: Understanding Merleau-Ponty’s 
Relational Ontology’. Research in Phenomenology, no. 41: 327–57., 330. 
442 Merleau-Ponty’s own concern of the loss of the body post-Descartes finds expression in his 
phenomenology of perception and ontology of the flesh that refuses any disassociation or  
disaffiliation of the senses with the immanent created order. See Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1968. 
The Visible and the Invisible. Edited by Claude Lefort. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press., pp. 42-43, 188-9. As well as, Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2002. 
Phenomenology of Perception: An Introduction. London: Routledge., pp. 406-10. 
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It is a truism that all knowledge of God depends on the body since our entire existence is 
as bodies, yet the body is often strangely occluded in the texts of theology. Knowing God means 
perceiving God, and thereby employing the faculties of the senses to apprehend the divine, sense-
perception becomes prerequisite to the expression of divine presence in material terms. One 
cannot, therefore, retrieve the body in theology without also resourcing language that pertains to 
God. Resourcing the body means recovering an embodied grammar for perceiving the divine. 
Experience and reason, a theological grammar of perception shows, have little to do with the 
dualistic structuring of knowledge acquisition. Rather, experience and reason exist within the same 
category of embodied knowing circumscribed as perception. At the centre of this singular 
perceptual continuum is the relationship between sentient and sensible, as the relationship between 
the sense-perceptual and the world in which God continuously reveals Godself as Creator.443 The 
critique that a Christian flesh is a dualistic flesh here becomes symptomatic of the attempt at a one-
sided retrieval of the body.  
Articulating the relationship between creature and Creator and the sense-perceptual register 
thereof, one may best explain as the body’s making visible of the invisible through gesture. 
Medieval writers, especially, employed a somatic register and thus gesture to express their piety. 
It is the case for Julian of Norwich as it was for Dante Alighieri. Key theological moments find 
signification in the way that Julian is lying on her bed nearing what seems to be her death and the 
way that Christ presents himself to her on the Cross, and in the way that the crossing of arms of a 
dying soldier in the Comedy serves as an invocation of the divine. Two moments that show how 
texts embody the gestures of bodied beings.  
In the writings of Julian and Dante, love is the leitmotif that shapes their perception which, 
in turn, finds translation in terms of their unique bodily circumstance. Julian and Dante provide in 
their texts an embodied grammar by which they (and their readers) may perceive God in bodily 
terms.444 For Julian, this culminates as the Love that is the meaning of the Cross. Christ reveals 
 
443 Here, a constant flux and movement exists between self and other so that one’s embodied 
circumstance can never be the embodied circumstance of another. The distinction is significant 
because, and this is key, affect and perception provides new ways of articulating the presence of 
the divine in unique corporeal grammars.   
444 The particularity of existence associated with the self as embodied being enriches a reading of 
the flesh in Christian theology, for the flesh not only exists as the expressive means of registering 
divine presence, it also provides the grammar for such perception. Presented as embodied 
theologies, both writers employ the materiality of existence as the register for their perception. 
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this love to her through a succession of visions. For Dante, specific persons embody love through 
their gestures and appearance. Both Julian and Dante’s registers of perception employ the 
materiality of existence as a manner of clothing the invisible, and both registers of perception 
inevitably also transform the meaning and scope of that which is perceived.  
Throughout Revelations of Divine Love, Julian’s particularity as a female religious woman 
frames Christ’s revelation to her. She ‘clothes’ Christ’s words to her in a grammar that is 
conceptually closest to her own existence, and thereby renders the Word in her own bodily 
terms.445 The Comedy, in turn, illustrates the potentiality of the flesh in expressing divine presence. 
Each stage of the Comedy expresses in bodily terms the relative presence or absence of the love 
that orders the being of persons. Whereas bodies in Inferno express the absence of right relations, 
Purgatory hints at the reconciliation between self and divine when bodies gesture. Paradiso, 
finally, illustrates the perfection of the senses when self and divine are made one. One may, of 
course, object by saying that Dante’s bodies are not in fact bodies but aerial constructions of former 
bodies. This would be the case but does not seem to inhibit Dante’s very visual depiction of the 
state of persons in Inferno, Purgatorio and Paradiso. Likewise, the Comedy is a literary 
masterpiece borne from a sense-perceptual self who, through various states of perception, clothes 
the invisible in embodied and arguably religious grammar. That the aspect of the religious is so 
present to the Comedy bears interesting implications for a logic of theological perception in the 
realm of the secular.446  
Love finds particular expression in the Comedy in the quasi-sacramental gestures of 
Manfred (Purgatorio, III) and Buonconte da Montefeltro (Purgatorio, V).447 Both persons invoke 
the Cross when they either point to Christ’s wound or form their arms in the shape of the Cross.448 
 
445 Julian’s embodied theology is suggestive because her flesh never becomes an obstacle to her 
perception of the divine, it is instead the corporeal grammar by which Christ is uniquely made 
known to her. 
446 The relationship between the sacred and the secular cannot be explored within this dissertation 
but hints toward interesting avenues for future study. See Bosch, Robson Rozelle. 2018. ‘Carcass 
and Cross: Discovering the Sacred in the Secular’. Theology 121 (4): 252–60. 
447 See Chapter six, pp. 11-16.  
448 In the visual nature of Julian’s visions and of Dante’s depiction of Buonconte and Manfred’s 
invocation of the Cross suggests that the Cross provides the corporeal grammar by which the new 
life which Christ establishes finds expression in the bodies of persons, and that persons may take 
part in that reality by creatively establishing their own embodied language by which to speak of 
this new life. The restoration which the Cross brings is both for a body which finds its truest 
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In the Christological foregrounding of Manfred and Buonconte, Dante’s Comedy maps the ways 
in which Christ’s flesh presents a corporeal and theological grammar by which the self can express 
their existence in relation to the divine. In the Comedy, love is the divine attribute that is embodied 
as an expression of its relative absence or presence in the lives of persons. Persons in Inferno, for 
example, have their bodies depicted in grotesque ways. Their bodies make visible the extent to 
which their lives were not marked by the love that orders their being. Bodies in Purgatorio, in 
their gestural postures of reconciliation and the invocation of the divine, illustrate the desire to 
have love order their being. Those in Paradiso, finally, visually portray (through the light that 
surrounds them, and the glory of God in which they are held) the perfect union of the self with the 
love that orders their being.  
Dante the pilgrim’s perception is central to the narration of the bodies in the Comedy since 
his body brings theirs into relief. It is Dante the pilgrim’s body then that brings the truth that the 
Comedy speaks to fruition. His own perception undergoes a change throughout his sojourning, 
suggesting not only the transformations of the persons whom Dante the pilgrim meets, but also his 
own transformation, and of his own growing understanding of the Love that orders his being. In 
Paradiso, when Dante the pilgrim sees God, his vision is transfigured and he truly sees what he 
describes in the final cantos as a beatific vision. This final vision is of the community of saints, all 
perfectly ordered to their fount, God. Dante’s transfiguration performs the perfection of his senses 
when they are ordered to God’s revelation.  
The final cantos of Paradiso visually depict the relationship between perceptual failure and 
faith as Dante the pilgrim’s sight undergoes a gradual transformation. His text enacts the new 
potentiality of a theological grammar of perception. Dante the pilgrim performs, in this instance, 
by way of visual illustration and poetic speech the movement from estrangement, to restoration 
and beatification. Significantly, Dante the author does so by bringing other persons into Dante the 
prilgrim’s perceptual continuum. Here, persons such as Beatrice and Virgil uniquely express the 
truth that the Comedy speaks. Dante the pilgrim’s embodied responsiveness illustrates how the 
 
meaning in Christ by invoking the grammar of the Cross through its words, gestures and deeds, 
and for perceiving the self in relation to the Cross as one whose humanity is the goal and purpose 
of the Cross. Both aspects describe what it means to perceive rightly, to see oneself fully as one 
relates to the God who meets one as Trinity on the Cross. This God meets persons in their own 
terms, and as their very own.  
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senses are all narrated according to a theological grammar. The senses yearn, they seek, and they 
find by either misapprehending, or apprehending the divine.  
Dante the pilgrim’s speech, in its visual depiction of the self in relation to other and of the 
transformation of the self in relation to that other, is performative. It performs the Love that orders 
being, but also as in the case of Julian of Norwich, the Love which is the meaning of the Cross. A 
new perceptual potentiality arises in this instance insofar as the senses relate to the world in a 
manner which presupposes their new existence. Here reason and experience together inform Dante 
the pilgrim’s perception. Through his perception, the truth that pertains to the right ordering of 
relations and the effect of Love on persons, is made explicit.  
Dante and Julian’s registers of divine presence reminds one of the sensuous theology found 
in Malebranche’s reading of Descartes and Augustine alongside another. Although their 
theological agendas and the context in which such agendas arose differed greatly, the presence of 
a Pauline thematic in the theorising of a sensuous theology is noteworthy.  The value of laying 
claim to the senses, as Merleau-Ponty’s own writings suggests, lies in the emphasis of the body as 
open and responsive to the world in which it exists. When the world is shot through with divine 
presence, the senses become central to the perception of such presence. Here, the sense-perceptual 
self is the material condition by which the presence of God is registered.449 
 
Concerning Anthropocentrism: Perception and Participation   
One persistent concern also rightly shared by those who fear the ‘loss of the body’ in Christian 
theology, is an anthropocentrism which makes the Cross and salvation solely the province of 
human beings and says nothing to the rest of the created order. However, a Christian ontology of 
the flesh must, of its natural emphasis, speak of the materiality of persons as well as their place 
and embrace of the rest of the created order. What this embrace might look like, chapters two to 
four discussed by showing the interconnection of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo and the 
 
449 This is not to suggest that physical and spiritual senses are at odds with another. Rather, they 
exist as distinctive modes of a singular responsive attitude to the divine. The senses perceive God 
in the materiality of existence and have the Word and Spirit translate such perception in terms of 
God’s desire to commune with persons. The physical senses thus perceive God in the materiality 
of existence and the spiritual senses translate such perception in terms of the Christian narrative. 
The physical and spiritual senses together provide a grammar for the perception of the divine. See 
Gavrilyuk, Paul L., and Sarah Coakley, eds. 2012. The Spiritual Senses: Perceiving God in 
Western Christianity. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press. 
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incarnation, and how the Cross advances a vision of creation where the created order may truly 
flourish. These three dimensions found a theology of the body in that the doctrine of creation ex 
nihilo expresses God’s creative presence in the realm of the material, and the place that the created 
order has in gesturing to this presence. A theology of the Cross, in turn, shows how Christ’s 
assumption of the materiality of existence heals and restores all that is in God’s encompassing 
vision for the created order.  
The intertwining of the body and the created order, means that the recovery of the body is 
a ‘setting right’: of the relationship between the body and the created order, and thereby a re-
affirmation of the place that the body has within the world. Recovering the body for theology does 
not, then, mean that such recovery is done at the expense of the created order, or that persons enjoy 
precedence over the created order. Instead, the recovery of the body is also the recovery of the 
created order. Chapter three and four suggests that the writings of the early church fathers confirm 
such a thesis in their simultaneous emphasis on the human and the created order in a reading of 
the doctrine of creation.  
In their conviction that the created order evidences God’s Trinitarian activity in the realm 
of the material and the embodied, the writings of Athanasius and Augustine place the doctrine of 
creation at the heart of the created order’s ‘visible making’ of the divine. This theological assertion 
suggests that the created order cannot exist without God’s bringing of it into being and that God, 
as its Creator, is constantly present to the created order, holding and sustaining it within the life of 
the Trinity. That the created order exists, and that persons can perceive such an existence, gestures 
to the God who is indiscriminately present to all. One may object, however, that humans are 
singled out for their existence as the imago Dei. This may be true, but only insofar as the sense-
perceptual self can perceive God’s presence subjectively and so respond in kind by attuning the 
senses to the divine. Apart from the subjective response of the sense-perceptual self, persons 
embody the collective signing forth of God’s creative presence.  
The materiality with which the subjective self perceives the divine, is the same materiality 
that constitutes the created order. This materiality of existence that marks humanity and the created 
order, makes them indistinguishable from one another. Merleau-Ponty uses the concept of 
intertwining to describe the relationship of self and thing of nature. He does so by using the term 
flesh and by describing it as an element. An element denotes that fundamental part of existence 
that is present to all as the basic constituting factor for existence. When Merleau-Ponty thus speaks 
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of flesh as an element, he recognises the ontological continuum of existence which runs through 
all.450 There is no ontological distinction in Merleau-Ponty’s theorising between the things of 
nature and the flesh of the self.451 This is important since it relativises the hierarchisation that can 
occur when humans and created order are considered ontologically.     
The ontological continuity between persons and the created order, as we have just affirmed, 
makes headway because it places the sense-perceptual self and the created order within the same 
perceptual continuum. The mutually inhering relationship of the self and the created order, one 
may also refer to as dependence. The sense-perceptual self depends on the created order for its 
perception of the divine, because the materiality of the created order is the flesh by which we come 
to perceive God who is Creator of all and Christ on the Cross. This is important because it reminds 
us that, while the Cross concerns salvation, it also concerns the vision of how creation can come 
to its fullest. When we thus perceive the created order, and exist in it as sense-perceptual selves, 
the created order has its own story to tell, one that has its own soteriological unfolding.  
Creation and the Cross are thus two distinctive yet Trinitarian instances in the life of the 
created order.452 The very existence of the created order is thus a sign of the communion that is to 
be enjoyed in the life of the Trinity. Insofar as gesture is the making visible of the invisible through 
an existent grammar of perception available to the senses, the created order too participates in 
God’s revelation in time. While the doctrine of creation concerns the created order, and the Cross 
humanity, both attest to the God who chooses the materiality of existence as the means by which 
creatures are to know their Creator.453 Both creation ex nihilo and the Cross make God known in 
 
450 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1968. The Visible and the Invisible. Edited by Claude Lefort. 
Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Evanston: Northwestern University Press., 139. 
451 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible., 139. 
452 I draw this conclusion from Chapters two through to five where Augustine’s Confessions, 
Athanasius’ On the Incarnation, and Julian of Norwich’s Revelations of Divine Love, feature 
centrally. 
453 Soskice addresses the relationship of creature to Creator when she writes, ‘Creation is not 
something that happened to the universe long ago. It is not the distant accomplishment of a distant 
God. Creation ex nihilo underscores the belief that God imparts the being of all created things, 
visible and invisible. The world is graced in its createdness which is happening all the time. In 
Christian understanding it is the Word through whom all things are made who redeems and renews 
all things – hinds and stags drinking from the waters of life – the new creation that embraces in its 
tendrils the nesting birds, the sheep and the shepherd, he sober bishop at his writings.’ See Soskice, 
Janet Martin. 2013. ‘Creation and the Glory of Creatures’. Edited by Janet Martin Soskice. 
Creation ‘Ex Nihilo’ and Modern Theology, Modern Theology, 29 (2): 172–85., 185.  
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a manner that suggests God’s continued presence to the world, and both depict God’s presence in 
the world to as one of restoration and communion.454  
A reading of the created order from the doctrine of creation and the Cross suggests that the 
Trinity founds and sustains the materiality of existence. God’s presence to the created order is not 
removed or distant but intimately present and manifest through the Word and the Spirit. The 
relationship between Creator and creature is, therefore, such that the senses can perceive God’s 
divine activity in the life of the created order. As a reading of Merleau-Ponty in the wake of 
Descartes suggests, one must differentiate between the object of one’s perception and the ground 
of such perception. One must take care, especially, when the object of one’s perception is the 
divine. One may, for example, speak of God’s immanence in a manner that loses any sense of 
ontological difference (pantheism). Here, all distinction is lost when the perception of divine 
presence is registered as the unmediated perception of God. Another reading may interpret the 
perception of the divine as effecting a change in God’s revelation and therefore, a change in the 
nature of God’s presence to the created order (panentheism).  
A theological grammar of perception diverges from pantheism and panentheism in two 
notable ways: First, while God is transcendent to the world, God is always immanent to it through 
God’s Spirit, the Third person of the Trinity who was sent by God in Christ’s name.455 Through 
the Spirit, God is immanent to the world in a manner where one’s perception of the divine is 
mediated by the Spirit. The perception of God in the created order becomes the perception of God’s 
agency in the world. Second, God is immanent to the created order but in such a way that God 
remains unaffected by perception. The sense-perceptual self cannot effect a change in the life of 
the Trinity by way of its perception and embodied expression of the divine. Instead, the senses 
employ the corporeal grammar of the person of Christ as a means of interpreting the relationship 
of self to divine. Both qualifications are significant because perception is a participatory activity 
founded in the Trinity.  
The whole created order takes part in God’s revelation albeit in varied but similar ways. 
This is due to the relationship between creature and Creator, and God’s sustained activity in the 
world. One may speak of this as a general ‘making known’ of the divine. With this general 
 
454 When persons lose sight of their relationship to the created order and of God’s presence to the 
earth’s existence, Romans suggests, they order their senses to the creature and not the Creator.  
455 John 14:26 
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rendering, there is no intentionality of which to speak. When speaking of a theological grammar 
of perception, however, one begins to speak of intentionality and the ways in which the self 
understands their perceptions to relate to the divine. Here, creation and incarnation tell, in their 
own way, the logic of love that reveals itself daily. What one notices with the introduction of the 
subjective ‘inclining of the senses’ to the revelation of the divine in the everyday, is the centrality 
of the body in perceiving the heat of the sun, the aromas of blooming flowers, and the sound of 
the wind, and understanding this as being part of God’s speaking as Creator in and through the 
created order.  
What it is that God speaks as Creator through creation becomes the grammar of perception. 
Love, this chapter has suggested thus far, is one such register of perception by which the God who 
creates in love, through love, and by love (in the words of Julian of Norwich) is the telos of 
perception. This love finds expression, particularly, in the life, death, and resurrection of Christ. 
Receiving Christ in the context of His temptation in the desert, His baptism, His crucifixion, and 
His transformation are all instances of the narration of God’s Trinitarian activity. Christ’s 
incarnation provides a new embodied grammar of the Trinity, while visually enacting the healing, 
transformation, and perfection that persons are to undergo in Him.456 It is at this point that we 
begin to speak of the incarnation as the re-creation of the sense-perceptual self.  
When Christ is the object of perception, an eternal transformation occurs in the sense-
perceptual self. The transformation that the senses undergo translates in chapter four’s reading of 
Athanasius’ writings as creation ex Verbi. The sense-perceptual self receives a new status in Christ 
whereby her or his own perception becomes Christo-form through the ministry of the Spirit. As 
we have suggested throughout this dissertation, the Spirit is central in the Worded existence that 
persons assume because the Spirit holds the flesh of persons and the flesh of Christ in the economy 
of God. Existing in Christ by the Spirit thus means that the senses are continuously renewed 
according to the Word and the Spirit who informs their engagements with the world.  
A reverse-expressive relationship arises between the flesh of persons and the flesh of Christ 
in that the Word informs perception and embodied perception gives shape to the invisible Word. 
 
456 Christ exemplifies what it means to exist as the image and likeness of God, for Christ not only 
bears the divine image, he also bears the perfection of the image of God in persons. See Baddeley, 
Mark. 2015. ‘An Exploration of Athanasius’ Strategies for Reading Genesis 1-3’. Phronema 30 
(1): 115–36., 131.  
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When Christ informs perception, His life, death and resurrection provides a new vision of the 
created order. Perceiving the world according to the vision that God has for the created order in 
Christ, means taking part in a reality that is at once greater than oneself and entirely grounded in 
the embodied and material.  
A substantial part of articulating the body’s place in theology is understanding the role that 
perception has in inaugurating persons aesthetically into the life of the Trinity. Here, Christ 
becomes the participative norm who orders the senses to the divine in order that they may perceive 
God’s encompassing vision for the created order. Since one exists as perceiving beings, having 
one’s senses ordered to the Word transforms one’s own existence. Perceiving Christ through one’s 
own particularity means appropriating this transformation in terms that resonates with one’s own 
existence. Paul puts this succinctly when he describes in 2 Corinthians 3:18 how a person, when 
beholding the divine image, is continuously transformed into the image of the divine.  
While the idea of becoming what one beholds has today been loosed from its original 
theological moorings, the logic Paul advances is deeply resonant with a reversibility of perception 
thesis. In the reversibility of perception thesis that Merleau-Ponty advances, persons are always 
affected by the world in which they exist and cannot bracket their existence. This inability of the 
self to bracket their existence when perceiving another, and the inevitability of the shaping of the 
senses through perception, together constitute a grammar of perception where the object of 
perception shapes the self and vice versa.  
To become what one beholds in a phenomenology of perception and ontology of the flesh 
is to participate, by way of perception, in the world. A correlation exists between perception and 
participation so that becoming what one beholds presupposes an intimate relationship between the 
sentient and sensible. In Romans, the participatory logic of perception expresses itself in Paul’s 
exhortation to perceive rightly the One who is in and over all (Ephesians 4:6). Notably, the same 
person who has been made the figurehead for a negated Christian flesh is the figurehead for the 
resourcement of a theological grammar of perception.  
Chapter two’s reading of Paul’s theology of the Cross begins with the story of Israel and 
the law. A reading of the New Testament scholar, Tom Wright has shown that the Law of Moses 
was the concretisation of God’s presence in the life of Israel and required both affection and 
obedience. As the history of Israel shows, the senses cannot always attune themselves fully to the 
object of their desire and affection. It was the case then, as it is the case now. In Romans, the Cross 
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mediates this sense-perceptual failure by providing a new manner of ordering the senses to the 
divine. In Romans, Christ was the final articulation of God’s covenant with Israel, and embodies 
the new relationship between God, self, and Israel. Christ is the new order of perception because 
He orders the senses rightly through the Cross.  
The incarnation of the Son is the enfleshment of the new participative norm by which each 
sense-perceptual self may truly come to know the God who brings all that is into being. Christ not 
only evokes a personal address but supplies the image by which the senses may perceive God’s 
eternal embrace. Christ provides the new grammar of perception because He is co-Creator, whose 
flesh not only attests to the materiality of existence but also to the God who brings all that is into 
being. This metaphysical reading of the Word made flesh (expressed in Chapter three) is the new 
measure of perception in the person of Christ.  
Beholding the person of Christ establishes a new participative norm by which the senses 
are not only attuned to Christ but transformed by the Spirit. A reading of the book of Romans 
makes headway in its language of Spirit and Messiah, law, and grace, and of the covenantal 
relationship between God and Israel. These supposed binary markers in Paul, so Susan Eastman, 
Grant Macaskill, and Tom Wright argue, function centrally in Paul’s theology of the Cross. The 
Cross brings the flesh of persons and the flesh of Christ together in a complementary rather than a 
competitive way. Reading the flesh in Paul is not a case of choosing Christ’s flesh over that of the 
self, but of its intertwining in the cosmology of the Cross.  
The term ‘cosmology’ is instructive for its narration of the relationship between the self 
and the created order and the life, death, and resurrection of Christ.457 First, the self exists as one 
whose senses are continuously shaped and informed by the created order and its cosmic ordering. 
Here, the sense-perceptual self exist as one who is open to the positive and negative influencers 
that form part of existence.458 Navigating these influencers is precarious in a reading of Paul 
because so many have interpreted him as saying that the flesh is life negating and the spirit is life 
affirming. The correlation then often leads to the equation of the flesh as death and the spirit as 
 
457 I follow Susan Eastman’s evaluation of the term Eastman, Susan G. 2017. Paul and the Person: 
Reframing Paul’s Anthropology. Michigan: Eerdmans., 49-51. 
458 Wright’s intricate discussion of the Law of Moses, sin, and the new law that Christ embodies 
delineates the relationship between life affirming and life negating influencers. See Wright, Tom. 
2017. The Day the Revolution Began: Rethinking the Meaning of Jesus’ Crucifixion. London: 
SPCK., 276-94. 
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life. Second, the Cross has its own cosmology through the life, death, and resurrection of Christ. 
In Christ’s salvific economy, life describes the new existence that persons enjoy as embodied 
beings in Christ, and death describes the laying to rest of that which makes the senses blind to 
God’s revelatory presence in the created order. Life and death describe two modes of existence 
that are always simultaneously present to each sense-perceptual self. Choosing the life which 
Christ inaugurates, as Wright suggests, is existing as one who is cruciform or Christ-like. Choosing 
death means choosing to live a life that does not conform to the Cross.  
Contrary to the dualism of flesh and spirit as the dualism between death and life which 
strips the self of agency, the Cross advances the agency of the sense-perceptual self insofar as the 
senses either take part in the cosmology of the Cross or not. It is not then that Paul advances a 
logic of life and death or spirit and matter but of Messiah and Spirit where the embodied self 
constantly lives within the cosmology of the Cross.459 Paul’s theology of the Cross is characteristic 
for its encompassing and restorative vision for the created order through the Second Person of the 
Trinity. In Romans, the Cross is the culmination of God’s covenantal relationship with Israel. 
Christ embodies the old and the new as he takes upon himself the trespasses associated with the 
inability of the senses to attune to God fully.460 Christ’s hypostatic union establishes a new order 
of perception by which persons, through grace, may adore Christ and thereby the Trinity. This new 
law in Christ is life and light because the Cross reverses a failed logic of perception. Here, Christ’s 
incarnation safeguards against the misapprehension of the divine insofar as Christ founds a 
person’s new manner of relating to God.  
Grace orders the senses through the reconciliation Christ establishes on the Cross by 
sanctifying and justifying the sense-perceptual self and thereby restoring the senses to their original 
state.461 First, the Cross heals the senses by restoring them to the fullness of their being. Here the 
 
459 Wright, The Day the Revolution Began., 276-94. 
460 Wright, The Day the Revolution Began., 276-94. 
461 Serene Jones makes the case for a reading of the Cross that starts with God’s affirming grace, 
and then moves to the reconciliation of self with God. Traditionally theologies of the Cross have 
the order reversed. I prefer Jones’ ordering as it supports the restorative reading of the Cross 
Chapter five advances. See Jones, Serene. 2000. Feminist Theory and Christian Theology: 
Cartographies of Grace. Minneapolis: Fortress., Bosch, Robson Rozelle. 2014. ‘“Flourishing? A 
Feminist Theological Perspective”’. Journal of Gender and Religion in Africa 20 (2): 133–50., 
Bosch, Robson Rozelle. 2013. ‘Graced, Happy or Virtuous: Three Female Theological Voices on 
God and Human Flourishing’. Stellenbosch. 
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imago Dei translates as the union of self and divine so that perception becomes an extension of the 
perfection of right relations between self and God.462 Second, the senses are ordered anew, or 
reconciled, to their fount who is the object of their perception. In these two instances, Christ is the 
participative norm through whom the senses perceive their telos, the Trinity.  
The Trinity has a structural place in Julian of Norwich’s Revelations of Divine Love where 
she makes grace central in her restorative reading of the Cross. Grace is the evidence of God’s 
renewal and restoration of the senses because it awakens the senses to the same Love which orders 
their being and which is the meaning of the Cross. The vision of the Cross as the restoration of the 
senses, and of the union in the Second Person of the Trinity, can only take place when one reads 
the Cross as a Trinitarian act.463 Julian of Norwich’s writings not only capture this logic in an 
embodied manner, she also registers Christ’s address in Trinitarian language. Each address of 
Christ, Julian identifies as different states of relation between herself and the persons of the Trinity. 
Christ’s Trinitarian address is, therefore, also a relational address. He is her Lover, Carer, and 
Maker,464 who meets her as God who is Trinity in unity. Significantly, these are all names that are 
closest to Julian’s embodied existence, suggesting the intimate relationship between the senses and 
the divine.  
Reading the Cross as a moment of restoration and oneing bears significant implications for 
the place of perception in a Christian ontology of the flesh. By starting with the Cross as a vision 
of Love expressed in Trinitarian address, the senses participate in a narrative which seeks the 
perfection of the senses. Needing to perceive rightly means seeing truly the God who meets persons 
in the materiality of their existence as the fulfilment and perfection of their existence. Julian’s 
writings exemplify the homecoming that the senses experience when ordered by the Cross. 
Perceiving herself in light of the Cross, Julian’s expression of the Trinity in terms resonant with 
her own existence suggests an understanding of the self where the body and its senses are sufficient 
in capturing her filiation to the divine.465  
 
462 Bouter, Peter, F. 2001. Athanasius van Alexandrië en zijn uitleg van de Psalmen. Zoetermeer: 
Uitgeverij Boekencentrum., 88. 
463 Wright, The Day the Revolution Began., 293.  
464 Julian of Norwich. 2015. Julian of Norwich: Revelations of Divine Love. Translated by Barry 
Windeatt. Oxford World Classics. Oxford: Oxford University Press., 56.  
465 See Soskice, Janet. 2007. The Kindness of God: Metaphor, Gender and Religious Language. 
Oxford: OUP. 
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Julian’s visions of Christ on the Cross develop a soteriology of the sense insofar as 
perceptual failure marks the failure of the self to see its true existence in Christ. In contrast to 
sense-perceptual failure, sense-perceptual faith describes the senses as they are in Christ. The 
Cross, in Revelations of Divine Love, provides the grammar by which the senses may perpetually 
be oriented to the divine. Perceiving Christ is thus a salutary act. When Christ is the object of 
perception, the sense-perceptual self is incorporated into Christ’s economy and, is thereby 
transformed. By having one’s perception transformed, one’s manner of perceiving the world is 
rightly ordered to God. Existing in the world as one whose sense-perception is Christo-centric 
means not only seeing God’s encompassing vision for the whole of the created order, but also 
seeing the place that persons have in realising this vision within the created order. Here, Christ is 
the new perceptual norm in which persons participate.  
The failure to perceive Christ and God’s encompassing vision for the created order, 
Romans equates to idolatry. Traditionally associated with the adoration of images that are not God, 
the Cross shows the failure to perceive in terms of God’s vision for the created order also equates 
to idolatry. The language of idolatry one finds, intertwines with the language of affect and desire. 
The senses yearn to adore an image in a manner that it perceptually closest to their own embodied 
existence. The relationship between image and senses, one reads in the quintessentially 
Augustinian phrase, ‘because you made us for yourself and our hearts find no peace until they rest 
in you’.466 Augustine’s restlessness is characteristic for its bodily register. It is Augustine’s heart, 
the metaphoric seat of affect and desires, that yearns to become one with God. In order to 
appreciate this bodily grammar of union with the divine, one has to consider the relationship 
between the body and sin in Augustine’s writings which has led some scholars to conclude that he 
is less appreciative of the body than this dissertation has argued so far.  
Following Harrison’s analysis of affect in Augustine’s writings, one may argue that his 
focus lies not so much with the body, but with the ordering of the senses to the divine. Augustine’s 
anthropology does not cast as long a shadow upon a theology of the body when read from the 
perspective of a theological grammar of perception. When Augustine emphasises the brokenness 
of life because of sin, one may interpret it as perceptual failure, the inability of the senses to attune 
itself to the divine. The place of sin in Augustine’s writings, one should read in light of the 
 
466 Augustine. 1961. Confessions. Translated by R. S Coffin. London: Penguin Books., Book I., 
21.  
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redemptive story of the metaphysical Word. This Word is the God by whom creation comes into 
being, by whom the human predicament is absolved, and through whom believing persons now 
exist as the totus Christus.  
Augustine’s anthropology recognises God in the life of the believer with all its capacities 
and capabilities. It translates as a Trinitarian aesthetics where the truth communicated by the 
revelation of the Triune God is incarnated in the everydayness of existence. The Holy Spirit, whom 
Augustine’s writings present as the creative and sustaining God present both to Godself and to 
creation, communicates to persons within the realm of the visible and embodied. It is the Spirit 
who reveals Godself to the created order in terms resonant with their own existence. In the Spirit’s 
communication with the believing self, their own embodied situatedness becomes the framework 
by which divine speech is translated within a given context and time.  
In a similar way, Athanasius in On the Incarnation and Letters concerning the Holy Spirit 
expounds the relationship between self and God in terms of the Word and the Spirit. According to 
On the Incarnation, God creates ex nihilo according to God’s image. The doctrine of the imago 
Dei suggests that persons are not only created for communion with God, but that their very 
embodied manner of existence is the means by which they should come to know God.467 Knowing 
God means perceiving God, and thereby employing the faculties of the senses to apprehend God’s 
hand at work in the created order. Christ is the ultimate exemplar to whom persons are conformed. 
On the Incarnation makes special reference to the Egyptian Fayūm portraits as an example of the 
relationship between persons and the divine. The Word graces persons with existence in Him, and 
the Spirit continuously conforms the self to its Christo-centric existence.  
When expressing the telos of perception in the way that I have, one wants to relate these 
sense-perceptual processes to the Spirit. The Spirit is sometimes side lined in a reading of the 
Cross, and yet, the Spirit is central in actualising the senses according to its Christo-centric 
existence. Here, once more, the question is not of spirit verses matter, but Spirit and Messiah. What 
has thus been in the background until now, I would like to bring to the foreground. A theological 
grammar of perception rests on the Spirit who, after Christ’s death and resurrection, actualises the 
senses to their fount.  
 
467 Baddeley, ‘An Exploration of Athanasius’ Strategies for Reading Genesis 1-3’., 131. 
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The relationship between the flesh and the Spirit’s actualising of the senses rests on the 
equality that the Spirit has with the Father and the Son. Maintaining the equality of the persons of 
the Trinity is the only way one can speak of the Spirit’s relation to the senses. When one is speaking 
of the actualisation of the senses, one is speaking of the Spirit’s communication of divine truths to 
persons. The Spirit must be immanent to the life of the Trinity, Romans 8 suggests, otherwise the 
Spirit’s revelation and the utterance thereof by the sense would not have the same condition of 
possibility.  
Romans 8 brings the Spirit in relation to the flesh through the Cross. Two images crystallise 
in the Cross, the Spirit who holds Christ’s groans with that of humanity’s, and the Spirit’s 
revelation of such groaning to the Trinity.468 The same Spirit who held Christ’s humanity and 
divinity in the hypostatic union, is the Spirit who holds persons in Christ’s divine economy. The 
simultaneous affirmation of the Spirit as God who is present to Christ and to persons is significant 
for the communicative continuum which the Spirit establishes. Correspondingly, Julian’s 
Revelations of Divine Love describes the Spirit’s communicative act in terms of the love and 
goodness that holds all that is into being, and which describes the relations of the Trinity. The 
Spirit’s unity with the Trinity means not only that persons are incorporated into God’s economy 
in the Word and through the Spirit, but also that the Spirit makes the existence of persons present 
to the life of the Trinity.  
In Letters to Serapion concerning the Holy Spirit Athanasius shows that the Spirit’s 
immanence to persons occurs in unison with Pentecost (Acts 2:1-31), where Christ sends the Spirit 
in His stead. At Pentecost, persons responded to the Spirit’s presence in an embodied manner by 
spontaneously speaking in ways which made incarnate God’s presence to persons. The account of 
glossolalia is suggestive, in a reading of a theological grammar of perception, not necessarily 
because persons spoke in ways that were incomprehensible but that persons were compelled to 
 
468 Wright, The Day the Revolution Began., pp. 292-3.  
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make known (utter) the presence of the divine to their senses.469 The necessity to witness reveals 
the role that the Spirit has in invoking a response from the sense-perceptual self.470  
The Spirit evokes a response from the sense-perceptual self because the Spirit reveals 
God’s encompassing vision for the created order to persons, and what it means to exist as the 
imago Dei. The Spirit conforms the senses to the grammar of the incarnation and the Cross, and 
so transforms and enlivens the senses to God’s presence in the created order.471 One sees the 
responsiveness of the senses to the divine in Augustine’s Christological interpretation of Scripture. 
In Confessions book XIII, Augustine recalls the words of Christ, ‘[t]he things which you see by 
my Spirit, I see, just as I speak the words which you speak by my Spirit…’472 The modes by which 
the Spirit communicates divine truths to persons Carol Harrison captures in her analysis of vox and 
verbum in Augustine’s writings, two modes of speaking made in responsiveness to Christ’s 
presence. Both the incoherent and unutterable (vox) register of perception and the comprehensible 
and articulate (verbum) register of perception, manifest God’s presence to the senses. These modes 
of speaking suggest the Spirit’s actualisation of the senses.  
 
Articulating the Body in Theology 
This thesis has taken the challenges that surround the Christian flesh and has shown the body to 
be present to Christian theology but in ways that need fresh articulation. We can see this in 
considering some of the debates around of gender specific language for God. Mary Daly’s critique 
that if God is male, male is god473 expresses the concern that a dominant or one-sided depiction of 
 
469 Sarah Coakley includes the section, ‘The Charismatic Constituency: Embarrassment or Riches’, 
when writing on her investigation of glossolalia in modern Anglicanism. Her findings are 
suggestive for the interrelationship of affect, perception and the Trinity advanced in this Chapter. 
See Coakley, Sarah. 2013. God, Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay on the Trinity. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press., 152-189. 
470 This necessity to witness bears interesting conclusions when read in light of Harrison’s analysis 
of vox and verbum in Augustine’s Christological interpretation of Scripture.  
471 One finds vivid imagery depicting the role of the Spirit at the annunciation. Read analogically, 
the Spirit’s formation of the Christ child in Mary’s womb speaks to the Spirit’s actualisation of 
existence in the flesh. The Spirit enlivens Mary’s flesh by awakening in her God’s divine intention. 
In the presence of the divine, the flesh is perpetually transformed according to God’s will. It 
simultaneously announces this will by attesting to God’s presence in bodily form. 
472 Augustine, Confessions., xiii. 29. 341. 
473 Daly, Mary. 1985. Beyond God the Father: Towards a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation. 
Boston: Beacon Press., 19. 
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God’s revelation to the created order can be life negating.474 Since this dissertation emphasises 
perception and the ways in which it informs our knowing, a theological grammar of perception 
suggests that the masculine representation of God’s revelation is one register amongst many. 
It may be granted that a masculine register of perception has enjoyed prominence for 
centuries, but this need not lead to the elimination of embodied language. Instead, we may liken 
this one-sidedness to idolatry. In chapter two, idolatry was described as sense-perceptual failure; 
the attuning of the senses to that which is like the Creator but not God. Analogously, one may 
argue that when one image made in God’s likeness is presented as the only means by which the 
senses may come to know the divine, then that image is an idol. Attuning the senses to the image 
instead of the Maker is a misapprehension of God, and a misappropriation of the register of 
perception with which God reveals Godself to persons. But such misappropriation (and the 
concomitant sin of idolatry) can be levelled against any and all register of perception that seek to 
assert itself over and against other grammars of perception.  
A masculine register of perception, like other registers, shows how persons apprehend 
God’s revelation uniquely in their embodied circumstance according to the cosmos of relations in 
which they exist. The Comedy illustrates this dynamic in the way that his vision of the divine is a 
vision of the heavenly hosts who all, arranged in the form of a rose, are held in being by God who 
is Love. Dante the author’s register, similar to Julian’s register which speaks of God as Mother, 
Lover, and Brother, shows how God meets all equally and yet diversely.  
In the varied registers of perception, concern might arise as to whether a theological 
grammar of perception universalises God’s revelation, i.e. where there is no ‘normative’ 
description of God’s revelation. With Julian, as with others, it is the young Jewish Nazarene whose 
unique identity grounds all perception. Christ’s incarnation is the particular revelation of God to 
the created order through the flesh of creation. In Christ, all perception of God is grounded in the 
love that He articulates through the Spirit. Any weariness of the subjective as theological criteria 
for the perception of God need not deter us because Christ’s hypostatic union ontologically 
changes the nature of perception in him. Christ’s hypostatic union reconciles the ontological 
distinction between creature and Creator by assuming, healing, and restoring the flesh of persons. 
 
474 The sociologist, Brene Brown, does a lot of work on the role that shame has in discourses of 
exclusion. Shame here becomes the status associated with those who are not represented or visible.  
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The hallmark of Christ’s union with persons is the centrality that the flesh plays both in perceiving 
Christ and in translating such perception in embodied terms.  
The incarnation is the absolute affirmation that God meets us in the flesh of the person of 
Christ as the God who created ex nihilo. A theological grammar of perception indistinguishably 
holds creation ex nihilo and incarnation together because Christ meets persons as their Creator and 
Saviour.475 These doctrinal narratives express God’s eternal embrace communicated to and for the 
sense-perceptual self as the Imago Dei. Persons are central to the expression of God’s creative 
agency as the three persons of the Trinity because they exist as the Imago Dei. When God creates 
in God’s image, the three persons of the Trinity bring persons into unique relationship with them. 
Having said this, one should be weary, as Karen Kilby suggests, of instrumentalising the persons 
of the Trinity.476 Here Julian’s understanding of the Trinity is profoundly orthodox since her 
expression of the Trinity expresses itself in the identification of God’s relation to her as three 
diverse yet simultaneous expressions.477  
In view of Julian’s sayings, a theological grammar of perception understands the Triune 
God as affecting the self in differing ways. The Trinity meets the sense-perceptual self as Creator, 
Lover, and Sustainer in ways that are resonant with Julian’s corporeal grammar and yet distinct in 
articulation. God brings the flesh of persons (as the created order) into being through God’s divine 
agency. Being made in God’s image denotes, in this instance, the subjective expression of the 
sense-perceptual self in her or his ability to direct his or her agency toward God.478 God Incarnate 
is the One who, through the continuous activity of the Trinity in the person of Christ, is the 
embodiment of the perfection of the Imago Dei. Christ both embodies the vision of the orientation 
of the sense-perceptual self to the divine, and He provides the corporeal grammar by which the 
self can attune its senses to the divine. The person of the Trinity who conforms the senses to the 
 
475 The flesh of the created order cannot be removed or stripped in the perception of God because 
it is the very revelation of the God who is Creator and Saviour. 
476 Kilby, Karen. 2000. ‘Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the 
Trinity’. New Blackfriars 81 (956): 432–45., 439.  
477 Julian of Norwich. 1966. Divine Revelations. Translated by Clifton Wolters. Penguin Classics. 
London: Penguin Group., 128. 
478 Dominic Robinson expands on the Imago Dei and Irenaeus as it relates to a person’s turning to 
God. See Robinson, Dominic. 2015. ‘Ecclesial-Narratival Model of the Imago Dei’. In The 
Ashgate Research Companion to Theological Anthropology, edited by Joshua R. Farris and 
Charles Taliaferro, 207–16. London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group., 209.  
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divine, and who actualises the ontological union between Christ’s personhood and humanity (and 
thereby the flesh of persons with the flesh of Christ), is the Holy Spirit. The Spirit actualises the 
existence of the sense-perceptual self insofar as the Spirit constantly orientates the senses to their 
divine fount.  
The exchange of the Trinity with the sense-perceptual self structures the Imago Dei as a 
Trinitarian act. The sense-perceptual self here embodies God’s vision of creation and recreation. 
Not in any anthropocentric way, but in the way that all beings come to their fullest when they 
express God’s intention of communion and love. Existing as the Imago Dei thus means existing 
as God’s embodied articulation of the restoration of the flesh that is to come. This restoration finds 
articulation not as the recovery of that which is lost, but as the gradual transformation, perfection, 
and beatification of the self through the Love that orders all being. The Trinity hereby becomes 
the vision of the restoration of self and created order, and therefore also, of the vision of its 
recreation.479 
The question of the relationship between subjective perception and God, is a matter that 
concerns the form and content of perception. All perception proceeds from the standpoint of the 
God who meets persons first and foremost as ‘I am that I am’ in Julian of Norwich’s words.480 
This metaphysical register for the divine grounds all perception in the One who is prior to all, in 
all, and the condition of possibility of all. God who is Trinity in unity is the content of theological 
perception. When we perceive God’s creative activity in the created order, one perceives such 
creativity first and foremost metaphysically. All consequent embodied articulation of this presence 
unfolds according to the One God whose being goes unaffected by the grammar of perception with 
which the self registers such presence.  
A grammar of theological perception constantly holds together the metaphysical and visual 
through the ministry of the Spirit. God is the content of all theological perception and Christ 
incarnate is the form of such perception. The Third Person of the Trinity, the Spirit, mediates 
between the content and form of theological perception. Through the Spirit, the life of the Trinity 
is present to the senses both as the Triune God who transcends all embodied expression, and as the 
 
479 The theme of creation and recreation especially as it relates to the Cross is prominent in 
Wright’s The Day the Revolution Began.  
480 Julian of Norwich. 2015. Julian of Norwich: Revelations of Divine Love. Translated by Barry 
Windeatt. Oxford World Classics. Oxford: Oxford University Press., 128.  
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incarnate One whose presence is made visible through each person’s register of perception. The 
Spirit’s mediation of the form and content of a theological grammar of perception safeguards 
against the misappropriation of the divine in human image.  
While the Cross transforms the senses and so affirms the absolute centrality of the body 
within the soteriological unfolding of the created order, the Spirit graces the senses with the ability 
to register God’s personal address in their own corporeal grammar. Because God’s presence to 
persons and the reception thereof through the senses is immensely personal, each sense-perceptual 
self responds to God in their own corporeal terms as the purposeful desire to have God immanent 
to them. A theological grammar of perception desires to articulate God’s vision for the created 
order expressed in the Cross through the senses of the sense-perceptual self. It does so by weaving 
the grammar of perception together with the grammar of theology. This grammar, as we have been 
suggesting, is the grammar of creation and incarnation. God assumed the materiality of existence 
in order that the sense-perceptual self may know God, take part in God, and thereby receive Christ 
in their own terms.481  
Notably, the writers whose theologies found this thesis’ recovery of the body through the 
reconstruction of a theological grammar of perception, had themselves registered God’s revelation 
sense-perceptually. Paul’s Damascus road experience, Augustine’s experience of joy and delight, 
Julian’s visions of Christ, and Dante the author and pilgrim’s translation of divine truths in terms 
of the person of Beatrice, all stand as experiences that capture the appearance of the divine in the 
embodied circumstances of persons. Each account, in its experiential and subjective nature, has a 
sense-perceptual register of its own grounded in Trinitarian theology. These writers display how 
the words of their texts, their thoughts, and the recording of their deeds, translates as the close 
connection between Word, symbol, and performance.  
Although we have texts as the only source of reference, and as such have a necessarily 
textual basis, the writers whom we have been engaging in this dissertation all have a very bodily 
register of perception. Julian, for example, describes how she is about to collapse before she 
receives her visions, and how pain moves through her body. A manner of speaking that the reader 
 
481 Athanasius of Alexandria. n.d. ‘Dei Incarnatione: On the Incarnation’. In NPNF2-04. 
Athanasius: Select Works and Letters, edited by Philip Schaff. Vol. 4. Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, II. Michigan: Christian Classics Ethereal Library. 
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can associate with based on their own awareness of pain. Likewise, Dante poet employs love as 
the register of perception to express the truth that the Comedy speaks.  
Julian and Dante are distinguishable from Athanasius and Augustine for the somatic 
register they employ to convey their meaning. While the contexts of Julian and Dante differ from 
the bishops, one may be reminded that both Athanasius and Augustine are writing for the liturgical 
setting. A setting defined by the fact that abstraction finds concretisation through word, symbol, 
and performance. The relationship between word, symbol, and performance, we may be reminded, 
is the visual unfolding of the ways in which persons come to know the divine.  
Whether the early church fathers or the medieval writers, all knowing originates in bodily 
experience. No knowledge is innate to persons but instead mystic and bishop drew from their own 
context as a means of communicating divine truths. One sees this in the way that Athanasius, for 
example, draws on Egyptian material culture to convey the truth of the incarnation. All experience 
is, therefore, necessarily bodily experience, and so what a Christian ontology of the flesh opposes 
is not abstraction but the loss of the body and the body’s learning.  
One may think here of the ways in which the senses have a unique role in communicating 
the love that orders existence. The centrality of the bodily thus lies therein that these experiences 
orients the senses to their fount. We have described this orienting earlier as a homecoming of the 
senses. Dante the poet visually depicts beatification in the way that Dante the pilgrim’s sight 
undergoes a transformation between Inferno, Purgatorio and Paradiso. Characteristically Dantean 
is the fact that Dante the pilgrim’s vision undergoes a transformation with each encounter he has, 
whether it be the negated flesh of those in Inferno, the striving persons in Purgatorio, or his vision 
of the white rose, and finally of God as persons in perfect communion held in the Love that 
characterises God’s being. In the final cantos of Paradiso especially, Dante the pilgrim peers at 
the glory of God in a manner that suggests a drawing-in and a transformation of the self. The glory 
that Dante the pilgrim beholds is a glory that is active instead of passive. With each gaze, Dante 
the pilgrim not only sees, but also has his senses conformed, and thereby irrevocably changed by 
his sight of the divine. Here God’s glory is the grammar for the soteriological unfolding from 
perceptual failure, to the restoration of the senses, to perceptual faith and participation. Dante the 
pilgrim hereby bodily performs (makes visual through enactment and representation), the self who 
meets the telos of its perception.  
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The communion of persons in the final cantos of Paradiso visually performs the 
homecoming of the senses in vivid and bodily terms. This performative posture that Dante the 
pilgrim’s perception takes, enacts the shift that occurs within a theological grammar of perception. 
Vittorio Montemaggi names this dynamic in the Comedy Christological foregrounding. Here the 
soteriological unfolding of the sense-perceptual self occurs alongside the bodily representation of 
God’s revelation. In today’s terms, one might think of Handel’s Messiah and the ways in which it 
takes the message of Christ and translates it in audible terms. Music and the role that it has in 
making audible (visible) the invisible is but one example of what may be termed an incarnational 
performance.  
Incarnational performances are participative in nature. One may liken these performances 
in liturgical context to the sacraments and the way that sacraments instantiate God’s presence. 
Here the liturgical space is the symbolic representation of the body of Christ that is the church. 
And, just as the sense-perceptual self makes visible the invisible in liturgical context, persons take 
this sacramental showing forth in non-liturgical contexts too. Incarnational performances thus 
extend the liturgical space by instantiating God’s presence in the ordinary and non-religious. This 
extension is significant because echoes the communion for which persons are created in the 
Genesis account.  
 
Drawing Conclusion for a Christian Ontology of the Flesh 
There are several reasons to suggest that the body has been placed in the background in Christian 
theology. This thesis, by focussing on Scripture and its interpretation thereof by a select group of 
writers, suggests that the Christian tradition is unduly credited with body-negating sentiments. On 
the contrary, the doctrines of creation ex nihilo and incarnation are doctrines that pertain to the 
body (and bodies) as the expression of the relation between human and divine. By articulating the 
significance of these doctrines for the body and its sense-perceptual engagements, this thesis 
suggests that the body is and has always been unmistakably central to God’s vision for the 
communion of creature and Creator. The fact that the writers whom this thesis engages with all 
display intricately interwoven understandings of creation ex nihilo, the incarnation, and the Trinity, 
suggests that the body is not lost to their writings either.  
In both the Bible and its interpretation over the centuries of Christian thought, the body is 
central. The ‘how’ as to the ways in which the body is central to such writings becomes clear when 
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one reads the presence of the body in terms of the sense-perceptual registers that an author employs 
to convey the meaning of a text. By reading those theologians that employ the bodily registers for 
their understanding of the human-divine relationship, this thesis places itself within the context of 
an already existent body-employing community of writers. If there is a loss of which to speak in 
view of these authors, it is a loss that came after their writing, and in a manner that one might not 
anticipate. 
On reflection, one finds that what is lacking is not the bodily in the texts of the early church 
and medieval writers that we have been reading, but a grammar with which to articulate the body’s 
learning (sensing) of God’s revelation. We thus find in contemporary discourses the pernicious 
tendency to attribute a negative conception of the flesh to (amongst others) Paul and Augustine. 
There is an enormously underdeveloped field of inquiry when it comes articulating the perceptual 
registers that persons employ to communicate divine presence. This thesis tries to respond to this 
gap by constructing a framework with which to read the theological grammars of perception 
pertinent to the writings we have been engaging. Ways that, as chapter four suggests, can give new 
modes of speaking of God’s presence in time and space. By constructing a theological grammar 
of perception, this thesis also then tries to recover those writers for contemporary theologians, such 
as feminist theologians, who may have relegated them to the dust heap as body-negators.  
The choice to read Augustine and Paul who are both often credited with spiritualising the 
body, is to show that, even when read in relation to those themes that one traditionally associates 
with body-negating sentiments (sin, guilt, shame, etc.,) the body is absolutely central to their 
articulation of the relationship between human and divine. When one understands the body to be 
an entity that is first, constituted by the network of relations in which persons exists and second, 
by the fact that it always exists as a creature in relation to the Creator, the body cannot be dislocated 
from the self in a manner that would suggest its bracketing. We have suggested, therefore, that 
what concerns the recovery of the body is not the refusal of abstraction but the retrieval of a 
neglected manner of understanding the body’s presence to Scripture, doctrine, and the writings of 
certain thinkers. 
If there is a loss of the body of which to speak, it is the short-lived loss of a grammar for 
the body’s learning in the presence of the divine. Such a loss is one that defines Christian theology 
in response to Descartes’ philosophy. And yet, the body was recovered for Western philosophy by 
way of Merleau-Ponty’s reading of, amongst others, a certain strand of sensuous theology. By 
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enlisting Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, we find that what needs recovery is not the body but a 
grammar for the body’s learning. An unexpected but valuable outcome is the framework that 
Merleau-Ponty gives to a conception of the self in terms that, albeit different in register, accords 
with the cosmic relational matrix that Scripture describes.  
The similarities between Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the self and that which we find in 
a reading of Paul is particularly helpful in reframing the loss of the body as the neglect of a 
grammar of perception. Our reading, by reframing the language of the body’s reception of the 
divine through a myriad of sense-perceptual processes, thus moves beyond the task of recovery to 
that of reconstruction. We could have, of course, concluded with the recovery of the body in 
theology but that would not have been as satisfactory as further presenting new ways in which to 
formulate the body’s knowing. We continue then to indicate sense-perceptual failure as the cause 
behind the perceived loss of the body. The term ‘sense-perceptual failure’ here describes how 
persons fail to perceive the body’s presence to theology through a lack of vocabulary, and a 
misperception of the ways in which the body articulates itself in a text. Sense-perceptual failure, 
like the other terms this thesis constructs, gestures to a greater soteriological rendering of the self 
in relation to the divine.  
Insofar as the senses pertain to the reading of theological texts (exemplified in the ways 
that this study has tried to ‘find’ the body), the senses also play a significant part in physically 
enacting the state of relation between human and divine. By focussing on those registers of 
perception the writers employed, one finds a unique narration of the senses’ journey from failure, 
to faith, to homecoming. We mapped this movement in a unique and innovative way in terms of 
the body’s manners of speaking ‘God with us’. Here, the body’s showing forth of the revelation 
of God in the materiality of existence makes visible the invisible. One quickly finds, however, that 
describing this bodily ‘God with us’ gets inhibited by the anxiety surrounding the ontologically 
different in Western philosophy.  
Once we reintroduce the transcendent as a category of perception, we begin to uncover the 
significant contribution this study makes. A Christian ontology of the flesh seeks to articulate the 
ways in which the body can perceive the divine in a register that is consistent with the materiality 
of their existence. This materiality is founded in and through the God who is invisible and yet 
entirely immanent to persons. Learning to recognise the immanence of God through the corporeal 
grammar of the Son and the ministry of the Spirit, means that one is undergoing a sense-perceptual 
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transformation. This transformation of the senses characterises a uniquely somatic unfolding of 
the body that is founded in God’s vision for creation and recreation. A Christian ontology of the 
flesh maps this unfolding soteriologically as that moment when the sense-perceptual self has their 
senses ordered to the divine.  
When the senses are ordered to the divine, the life of the sense-perceptual self becomes 
interwoven with the narrative of God’s revelation to persons through creation, incarnation, and 
Cross. We call this the homecoming of the senses; that moment when the sense-perceptual self 
begins to understand their life in relation to God’s revelation in the created order as the expression 
of God’s desire to commune with persons. By being present to the created order, God’s revelation 
becomes a deeply participative reality which persons partake of daily. It is striking that the 
theologians we have been reading capture this participatory existence in the ways that their 
gestures, gazes, sounds, and writings visually enact their homecoming.  
In their making visible of the invisible, the writers who we have been reading perform what 
we may understand as the vision of God’s new creation. Homecoming here denotes two 
fundamental sense-perceptual processes, the orientation of the senses to their divine fount, and the 
senses’ perception of such divine presence in the materiality of existence. Grammars of oneing, of 
joy and of beatification all register the transformation of the self in the presence of the divine. This 
transformation one may also frame as an incarnational performance – that moment when a sense-
perceptual self understands the status that they have in Christ through the Spirit, and articulates 
this status in embodied terms.  
While we have framed incarnational performances in terms of the registers our select group 
of writers employ, we may also find such performances in the everyday. One grammar of 
perception that strikes me, is that of art. Art is a particularly effective mechanism of calling to 
mind the varied articulations of God’s revelation to the created order. These articulations are 
characteristic for the ways in which they foreground an aspect of God’s revelation to the created 
order. In past publications, I have tended to focus on the ways in which the Cross is a popular 
mode of expression especially because the Cross speaks to all equally.482  
 
482 One such grammar cruciform grammar of perception the feminist theologian Serene Jones 
employs. I explore this register in Robson, Rozelle. 2014. ‘“Flourishing? A Feminist Theological 
Perspective”’. Journal of Gender and Religion in Africa 20 (2): 133–50.  
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The Russian performance artist, Pyotr Pavlensky, incorporates a similar register in the 
dialectics of the Cross that are present to his commentary on those injustices he perceives.483 I find 
Pavlensky’s perceptual register of the Cross interesting in the way that he uses an explicitly 
religious register for his performance in a secular context.484 Whether Pavlenksy himself is 
religious or not, he does not say – the key to his performance is that he incorporates the theological 
as a means of describing what is askew in the world. Without him necessarily intending, Pavlensky 
foregrounds the Cross and the ways in which the Cross renders an alternative vision of love to that 
which is at the order of the day.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
    (Carcass by Pyotr Pavlensky, 2013.)485 
 
What Pavlensky does within the Russian landscape, the Ethiopian Orthodox artist Aïda 
Muluneh does within the African landscape. While Aïda Muluneh has been internationally 
acclaimed for her art, her art incorporates a grammar of perception that is particularly African in 
its coding. This is because in Africa, Muluneh describes, the making of art is an act of praise 
 
483 See Robson Bosch, Rozelle. 2018. ‘Carcass and Cross: Discovering the Sacred in the Secular’. 
Theology 121 (4): 252–60. 
484 Robson Bosch, ‘Carcass and Cross’., 3, 7.  
485 J. B. Platt, ‘The Body Politic’, The Calvert Journal, <https://www.calvertjournal.com/ 
opinion/show/3365/pyotr-pavlensky-protest-art-living-pain-sculpture> (accessed 12 August 
2016). Photograph by Maxim Zmeev. 
Photo of Carcass removed for copyright reasons. Copyright holder is 
Maxim Zmeev. 
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expressed in response to the divine.486 Based on my construction of a Christian ontology of the 
flesh, I interpret her responsiveness in making art as an act of love made to the God who creates 
all that is by His abounding love. The prominence of bodily subjects in Muluneh’s art is, 
furthermore, instructive for the ways that the body is always to the fore when the sense-perceptual 
self has their senses attuned to the divine.  
One particular series of photographs, her Series 99 (nine-nine), engages with the Comedy’s 
Inferno xx and reinterprets it within an African aesthetic framework. Here, once more, what Dante 
the author captures in word, symbol, and gesture, Muluneh performs through her depiction of the 
processors in Inferno xx.487 Her interpretation of the Comedy is an act of embodiment, and since 
the topic that concerns such embodiment is the love that grounds all existence, Muluneh’s Series 
99 shows how a theological grammar of perception is universal to all, but yet expressed in very 
particular registers defined by the cosmos of relations in which that particular artist exists.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      (Aïda Muluneh, Series 99/Part Two, 2013)488 
Pyotr Pavlensky shows how performances with a theological foregrounding can make 
visible the invisible in the realms of the religious and non-religious. Aïda Muluneh frames devotion 
as a posture of existence which expresses divine presence through the making of art. Both Pyotr 
 
486 Muluneh, Aïda. 2019. In Conversation with Aïda Muluneh on Series 99 and an Eastern 
Orthodox Aesthetic Interview by Rozelle Robson Bosch. Skype. 
487 Robson Bosch, Rozelle. 2019. ‘Bodies, Theology and Dante’s Divine Comedy: Engaging Dante 
and Aïda Muluneh’., Stellenbosch Theological Journal. Forthcoming. 
488 Muluneh, Aïda. 2013. ‘The 99 Series’. 2013. https://www.aidamuluneh.com/the-99-series-
1/?fbclid=IwAR2ugOS-mprG2JTGHALzN1vzxKa8qEEF9ni6cI8l8kGsKYc65O1Xy0FMxpc. 
Photo of Series 99/ Part Two removed 
for copyright reasons. Copyright 
holder is Aïda Muluneh. 
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and Muluneh participate in that which is invisible and yet manifestly immanent to their grammars 
of perception. These are two ways in which what we have expressed as a Christian ontology of the 
flesh finds expression in the life of persons. Art, through flesh, can expound Scripture. 
The artists that I have mentioned in this final reflection show how present the body is in 
the expression of self, other, and divine. The challenge that their art leaves with us is whether we 
are willing to re-engage the senses and to orient them to the divine. When we are willing to do so, 
we may once more receive God’s address in personal and embodied terms. Here we need not fear 
the absence or diminishment of the body as it is the very grammar by which God’s revelation is 
made incarnate. By inclining the senses to the divine, one might find God already and always 
tabernacling amongst us. 
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